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Widsom is the ability to see the long-run consequences of 
current actions, the willingness to sacrifice short-run gains 
for larger long-run benefits, and the ability to control what 
is controllable and not to fret over what is not. Therefore 
the essence of wisdom is concern with the future. It is not 
the type of concern with the future that the fortune teller 
has; he only tries to predict it. The wise man tries to 
control it. Planning is the design of a desired future and 
of effective ways of bringing it about. It is an instrument 
fhat is used by the wise, but not by the wise alone. When 
conducted by lesser men it often becomes an irrelevant ritual 
· that produces short-run peace of mind, but not the future that 
is longed for ... The need for corporate planning is so 
obvious and so great that it is hard for anyone to be against 
it. But it is even harder to make such planning useful. Plan-
ning is one of the most complex and difficult intellectual 
activities in which man can enage. Not to do it well is not a 
sin, but to settle for doing it less than well is (Russell L. 
Ackoff, 1970, p. 1). 
Thinking well is wise; planning well, wiser; doing well wisest 
and best of all (Persian Proverb). 
Nature and Objectives of the Study 
This study in the field of business policy/corporate strategy1 
examines the nature of relationships between the grand corporate 
strategies pursued by industrial firms and their top managers' per-
ceptions of relative importance (to effective strategy implementation) 
of different functional tasks. The study also examines the nature of 
influence of size, corporate diversity, industry type, production 
system, organizational structure and preceived environmental uncertainty, 
on the interrelationships between the grand corporate strategies pursued 
l 
and the relative importance of different functional tasks. 
The field of business policy/corporate strategy deals with the 
management of the total organization, and therefore, it constitutes the 
heartland of business practice and management process. Unfortunately, 
the study of corporate strategy--its formulation, implementation, and 
evaluation--by both the management educators and practitioners, is 
embryonic and does not match its crucial importance to the survival 
2 
and growth of contemporary business organizations. As a result, a 
predictive theory of business policy has not been developed and most of 
the research in this area has not been rigorous. This study attempts to 
provide new insights on the issues involving the effective implementation 
of grand corporate strategies in different types of industrial firms. 
This study focuses primarily on top managers' perceptions of the 
relative importance of key result areas in different organizational 
functions to effective implementation of different grand corporate 
strategies. It seeks to identify critical or strategically significant 
function(s) for effective implementation of each type of grand corporate 
strategy. Therefore, the scope of this study is specific and limited. 
It does not purport to investigate the entire gamut of problems involved 
in the field of corporate strategy, in that it concentrates only on the 
problems of corporate strategy-implementation. Although the study 
utilizes the functional tasks' influence-mix approach to corporate 
strategy, only the influence of organizational functions on corporate 
strategy implementation is examined; their influence on the formulation 
and evaluation of corporate strategy is not within the purview of this 
study. 
The field of business policy focuses on the total organization and 
deals with the problems and functions of the top management. It is 
therefore apparent that any business policy phenomenon may involve a 
3 
vast array of variables; most of these variables are difficult to isolate, 
define and measure. The lack of omniscient human rationality is con-
spicuous by its absence in the field of business policy. In fact, even 
in the specific narrow area of implementing the corporate strategy, as 
Steiner and Miner (1977, pp. 607 and 608) point out, 11 the scope of 
managerial activities associated with implementation is virtually co-
extensive with the entire process of management.'' In large corporations, 
according to Mintzberg (1977, p. 93), 11 research shows that most work 
processes of senior managers are unstructured and that they require a 
profound integration of various aspects of the organization and its 
environment. 11 Therefore, it is difficult to establish accurate cause-
and effect relationships in a business policy study. Besides, the 
independent and dependent variables are generally influenced by a number 
of mediating or intervening variables that cannot be ignored without 
making the study too simplistic or unrealistic, but care must be taken 
to ensure that the study does not become too unwieldy and therefore 
infeasible. This study, therefore, examines the influence of six key 
mediating variables - size, corporate diversity, industry, production 
system, organizational structure and perceived environmental uncertainty -
because of their potential conceptual importance to the key variables in 
this study. 
Finally, it must be noted that the study's findings are based on 
managerial perceptions and opinions rather than on observations of real 
world actions and results. 
The main objective of this study is to profile the relative 
strategic significance of seven different organizational functions to 
effective implementation of different grand corporate stt·ategies, as 
perceived by the senior executives of large American industrial corpor-
ations. This study therefore, utilizes the functional areas' strategic 
significance-mix approach to the study of some of the problems involved 
in the implementation of grand corporate strategy; it recognizes the 
fact that ·an astute and judicious determination of strategic key result 
4 
areas in different functional tasks during the corporate strategy-
formulation stage considerably facilitates the process of strategy-
implementation. In other words, the concept of "management by exception" 
isoperationalized and top management attention is focused more on key 
result areas in the functional task(s), identifi~d as critical or 
strategically significant to effective implementation of the grand 
corporate strategy pursued by the firm. 
The study seeks answers to the following questions: (i) Is it 
possible to identify the strategic mixes of organizational functions 
for effective implementation of different grand corporate strategies? 
(ii) Do the strategic mixes of organizational functions for a particu-
lar grand corporate strategy vary: (a) among companies of different 
size, (b) among companies having different degree of corporate 
diversity, (c) among industries, (d) among companies having different 
production systems, (e) among companies having different organizational 
structures, and (f) among companies with dissimilar managerial percep-
tions of environmental uncertainty? 
The answer to these two main research questions have been derived 
through a field study, involving survey-type instruments (mail question-
naires), of large U.S. industrial corporations listed in the 1978 
Fortune Directories of the 500 largest U.S. Industrial Corporations and 
the Second 500 Largest U.S. Industrial Corporations. In order to help 
focus the research, a conceptual framework in a summary form (presented 
in Figure 1) emphasizing eight key concepts underlying this study has 
been developed. 
Significance of the Study 
This research contributes significantly to the development of the 
substantive area of business policy and furthers the progress towards 
5 
a more predictive field of study. Since the functional tasks• strategic 
significance-mix approach to the study of effective implementation of 
different grand corporate strategies is rather new, this study is pri-
marily exploratory in nature. It builds upon the existing research and 
develops and empirically tests a coherent body of concepts. 
The contingency approach of this study strikes a middle ground 
between the traditional universalistic approach of prescriptive th~ories 
and the particularistic case-study approach devoid of any conceptual 
framework. It recognizes the fact that the concept of corporate strategy 
is dynamic and complex, and 11 ••• suggests that there are definable 
patterns of relationships for different types of organizations and that 
we can improve our understanding of how the relevant variables interact 11 
(Kast and Rosenzweig, 1973, p. ix). 
The increased use of an empirical approach to the study of business 
policy is all the more desirable since most management researchers have 
avoided this area. Although these problems are the most relevant to 
the business organizations throughout the world, the pertinent variables 
Grand Corporate Strategy 






Managerial Perceptions of 
Environmental Uncertainty 
Managerial perceptions of rela-
tive strategic significance of 
seven different organizational 
functions to effective implemen-
tation of grand corporate 
strategy pursued by the firm 
Figure l. The Study•s Conceptual Framework 
cannot always be rigorously measured and therefore the research in this 
area typically is methodo 1 ogi ca lly 1 ess e 1 egant than in other more 
developed fields. Halpin (1968, p. 308), therefore, wonders whether 
the social scientists have "the courage to study what is really worth 
studying.11 Mintzberg (1977) points out that 
Researchers in management policy cannot use the most popular 
methodologies of other fields of management as models in 
their work. Their research must be related to the real 
world it purports to describe and be less obsessed with 
rigor as an end in itself .... Only by remaining open to 
the rich complexity of reality can effective theory-
building be initiated in a new field (p. 94). 
As mentioned earlier, this study is exploratory in nature and is 
intended to reveal more fully the relationships between the variables 
involved. The exploratory type of study "seeks what is rather than 
predicts relations to be found; 11 such :a study has 
. three purposes: to discover significant variables in 
the field situation, to discover relations among variables 
and to lay the groundwork for later, more systematic and 
rigorous testing of hypotheses (Kerlinger, 1973, p. 406). 
Commenting on the usefulness of his research, Heau (1976) makes 
the following remarks which seem equally applicable to this study: 
Research in business, as in any other social science, is not 
an end in itself, and the value of research is measured by its 
usefulness. In so far as a theory should possess the follow-
ing attributes: explicability, generalisability, replicability 
and predictability, the present research is not a theory. Its 
aim is to provide an understanding, rather than to generate 
generalisations, allow replicative results or predict causality. 
Yet, Aristotle has remarked that an educated man demands no 
more than the exactitude that is allowed by the subject matter 
that is dealt with (Ch. I, p. 7). 
The study also provides contributions to the effective management 
practice. It does not attempt to indulge in simplistic and premature 
prescriptions, but it does give the practitioners new insights into 
corporate strategies. However, by profiling the relative strategic 
7 
significance of different functional tasks to effective implementation 
of different grand corporate strategies, based on a collective 
perception of practicing managers, it lays the foundation for a 
systematic evaluation of this concept for effective theory-building and 
better management practice. 
Outline of the Study 
This study is organized into seven chapters. This chapter 
described the nature and objectives of the study and also its signifi-
cance to theory and practice. 
8 
Chapter II provides a review of the pertinent literature, both 
theoretical and empirical, from business policy and organization theory, 
which provides a foundation for the conceptual framework developed in 
this study. 
Chapter III presents the definitions and operational measures of 
variables involved in the study. 
Chapter IV describes the conceptual framework, which the study is 
designed to investigate. The general relationships among the theoreti-
cal and empirical works supporting the study, and the research questions 
investigated by the study are posed and discussed. 
Chapter V describes the research methodology used in the study. 
Chapter VI provides the analyses of data collected for the study. 
Chapter VII provides a summary and discussion of the major find-
ings, discusses their implications for theory and management practice, 
and presents final conclusions. 
FOOTNOTES 
1Like most emerging fields of study, the field of policy/strategy 
has its own share of semantic problems and confusion. There are many 
different definitions of terms used by various distinguished scholars. 
There is a lack of consensus about the meaning of words like strategy 
and policy. These words have a long established meaning in common 
parlance and they seem to change meaning with new developments. lt 
is, however, important to distinguish between strategy and policy. 
According to Haner (1976): "A strategy is a multiple-step approach to 
achieve a specific objective. It is controlled by a plan, involves 
coordinated use of selected components and resources of the company, 
and covers the time frame necessary to accomplish the objective~' (p. 
259). "A policy is a statement verbal, written or implied, of those 
principles and rules that are set by managerial leadership as guide-
lines and constraints for organizational thought and action 11 (p. 53). 
As a distinct discipline, the field of business policy lacks a commonly 
and universally accepted name, although "strategic management" seems 
to be currently very popular. For instance, according to Glueck and 
Willis (1979, p. 95): "Strategic managrment and business policy is 
the portion of management theory concerned with top management deci-
sions affecting the future of the total enterprise. 11 It is interest-
ing to note that the Academy of Management's professional division 
in this field is still known as "Business Policy and Planning 
Division." In the business world, however, the terms "strategic 
planning" and "corporate planning" are more common [for an extended 
discussion of this subject see Steiner and Miner (1977, Part I)]. 
9 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Empirical research in corporate strategy is of a very recent 
·origin. As Hofer (1975, p. 790) points out: 11 Since the concept of 
strategy was not developed extensively in the business literature 
until the late 1950s, almost no empirical research related to it was 
done until the early 1960s. 11 During the last ten years or so, various 
research studies have been directed towards the theoretical develop-
ment of the concept of corporate strategy. 
This chapter broadly reviews important concepts in the field of 
business policy and organization theory which are directly relevant 
to the development of this study's conceptual framework discussed later 
in Chapter IV. Within this chapter, relevant parts of three major 
areas of literature are surveyed: corporate strategy, relative 
importance of different organizational functions, and contextual 
variables - environment, technology, size and structure. 
Corporate Strategy 
The word "strategy .. has been used in military sciences for 
centuries. As Steiner and Miner (1977, p. 19} point out: "Strategy 
derives from the Greek strategos which meant general. The wordstratEgy, 
10 
11 
therefore, literally meant •the art of general. • It refers to that 
which is of major concern to top managements of organizations ... 
Alfred Chandler (1962, p. 13), in his seminal work .. Strategy and 
Structure: Chapters in the History of American Industrial Enterprise, .. 
defines strategy as 11 the determination of the basic long-term goals and 
objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and 
the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals. 11 
Quinn (1962) defines a strategy 11 as a plan that determines how the 
organization can best achieve its desired ends in light of the opposing 
pressures exerted by competition and by its own limited resources .. 
(Gilmore and Brandenburg, 1962, p. 68). 
Glueck (1976, p. 3) defines strategy as 11 a unified, comprehensive, 
and integrated plan designed to assure that the basic objectives of the 
enterprise are achieved ... Strategy, therefore, refers to an organiza-
tion's master plan for achieving its mission, objectives, and goals. 
And, for those with an inclination for parsimony and brevity, 11 Strategy 
indicates how the organization plans to get where it wants to go 11 
(Thompson and Strickland, 1978, p. 12). Thus, it is clear that develop-
ing and sustaining an ongoing strategy is extremely vital to the long-
range viability of the organization because it determines the major 
directions the organization takes and the momentum with which it moves. 
Aguilar (1967) provides a more comprehensive definition of company 
strategy: 
Company strategy is an integrated and harmonious 
pattern of objectives which are of fundamental importance 
to the long-term survival and health of a company. As such, 
strategy defines the company•s basic image, purposes, fields 
of present and future activity, and expected future position 
in these fields. Strategy should be responsive to both the 
risks and opportunities confronting the company in its 
external environment and the strengths and weaknesses -
present and potential -within the firm itself (p. 4). 
Steiner (1969b) believes that: 
Developing a strategy is usually a very difficult and fateful 
task. It usually means questioning old methods, exploring 
unfamiliar environmental waters, facing up to an objective 
evaluation of strengths and weaknesses, forcing important 
changes on people in the firm and organizational arrange-
ments, and taking high risks with the firm's capital. This 
has to be done in a world of rapid change, and it has to be 
done continuously (pp. 238-239). 
Textbook wisdom suggests that, 
... ideally, every corporate body has a strategy that meets 
three cr-iteria: (1) It recognizes and understands how the 
forces of the past have affected the organization. (2) It is 
responsive to the current forces of change. (3) It is capable 
of implementing programs based on the first two cons i derat·ions 
(Vance, 1970, p. 6). 
As Tilles (1963, p. 112) notes, "while the notion of a strategy is 
extremely easy to grasp, working out an agreed-upon statement for a 
given company can be a fundamental contribution to the organization's 
future success. 11 
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The aforementioned definitions of corporate strategy highlight two 
important dimensions: scope and importance. A corporate strategy thus 
defined refers to a master strategy, a grand strategy or an overall 
strategy and encompasses "the entire pattern of company's basic mission, 
purposes, objectives, policies, and specific resource deploymerit 11 
(Steiner and Miner, 1977, p. 20). Paine and Naumes (1974) distinguish 
an overall or grand strategy from corporate strategies in the following 
manner: 
. an overall strategy (or corporate strategy) may be 
defined as a plan which encompasses not only the mission, 
policies, objectives and more specific goals of the 
organization, but also a plan of action for achieving 
these objectives and goals. Subsequent decisions are 
based on the plan. On the other hand corporate strategie~ 
may be described as a stream of significant decisions which 
emerge over a period of time into a pattern. In this case 
the decisions, made on an ad hoc basis while trying to 
adapt to various uncertainties, determine the strategy 
(emphases supplied) (p. 7). 
According to Newman (1967, p. 77), "a firm's success depends on 
its basic plan - its master strategy- for dealing with the elements 
of change, growth, and adaptation." Robe'(·t E. Wood while Chairman 
of the Board of Sears Roebuck & Company once commented: "Business is 
like war in one respect, if its grand strategy is correct, any number 
of tactical errors can be made and yet the enterprise proves success-
ful" (Chandler, 1962, p. 235). As military strategists know, in any 
war if the overall strategy is right and effective, the ultimate 
victory in a war can be achieved in spite of some setbacks in a few 
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battles. The final outcome of a war is determined not by a few abortive 
tactical maneuvers but by the effectiveness of the overall strategy. 
Similarly, a company can be financially successful if its grand corporate 
strategy is appropriate and efficacious even though it is inefficient 
in some areas or in the use of some of its resources. 
In the business policy literature, few attempts have been made to 
provide an exhaustive scheme of classification of grand corporate 
strategies. Glueck (1976, pp. 120-121) provides a four way classifica-
tion of grand strategies as outlined below: 
1. Stability (most frequently used) 
2. Growth 
3. Retrenchment (least frequently used) 
4. Co~bination (of two or more grand strategies, either 
simultaneously or sequentially). 
Of the grand corporate strategies listed above, growth and 
retrenchment strategies have been subject to further analysis and 
cl a_ssifi cation by many authors. Product-market strategies at the 
business and/or division levels have been analyzed in detail. 
Similarly, strategies in different functional areas have also been 
variously described and analyzed. The analysis of one type of grand 
corpor~te strategy- external acquisitive growth -will be discussed 
in this section, since it highlights the importance of different 
organizational functions in different types of external acquisitive 
growth strategies. 
Kitching (1967) in his study of corporate acquisitions, 
classified acquisitions into five different categories: 
Horizontal - Same industry as buying company, with approxi-
mately the same customers and suppliers. 
Vertical integration - Major supplier or customer of the 
buying company and in the same industry. 
Concentric marketing - Same customer types as buying company 
but different technology. 
Concentric technology - Same technology as buying company 
but different customer types. 
Conglomerate - Customers and technology different from those 
of buying company (p. 85). 
Howell (1970) believes that existing schemes of classifying 
14 
acquisitions (for example, Frc•s horizontal, vertical and conglomerate) 
often fail to recognize the intrinsic organizational implications of 
different types of acquisitions. He proposes the following classifi-
cation scheme generated by isolating acquisition candidates along 




Financial acquisition growth strategies are conglomeratic in 
nature with the primary focus on the financial implications of the 
acquisition. 
Marketing acquisition growth strategies are conglomeratic in 
nature with the primary focus on the marketing implications of the 
acquisition. 
Manufacturing acquisition gorwth strategies are concentric 
technology in nature with the primary focus on the technological 
implications of the acquisition. 
The firm's grand corporate strategy (both past and current) 
determines the nature of the firm's relevant environments and the 
resulting organizational states, it also suggests the range of 
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feasible options for the firm's organization and management. Table I 
summarizes the major differences Allen (1972, pp. 62-63) 11 found between 
the high performing conglomerates and vertically integrated companies 
with regard to environmental requirements, organizational choices, and 
resulting organizational states. 11 
Miles and Snow (1978, p. 29) have developed a typology of organiza-
tions: "Each of these types has its own strategy for responding to the 
environment, and each has a particular configuration of technology, 
structure, and process that is consistent with its strategy. 11 These 
are: 
1. Defenders - tend to follow 11 Stabil ity 11 strategy and are risk-
avert outside their narrow product-market domains. 
2. Prospectors - tend to pursue 11 growth 11 strategies and are 
perceived as risk-takers. 
3. Analyzers - tend to be more cautious, risk-neutral and 









SUMMARY OF MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HIGH PERFORMING CONGLOMERATES 
AND VERTICALLY INTEGRATED FIRMS 
Conglomerate Firms 
Greater environmental diversity 
Higher environmental uncertainty 
Less complex required interdependence 
Less intensive internal funding 
requirements 
More uncertain patterns of funds flow 
Higher degree of divisional self-
containment 
Smaller headquarters units focusing 
mainly on policy issues 
Less complex integrative devices 
Higher total differentiation 
Lower integrative effort 
Greater rapidity in responding to 
divisional requests 
Influence peaks at a lower (division 
general manager) level 
Performance evaluation systems with 
explicitly defined criteria, 
direct linkage between results and 
rewards and heavier emphasis on 
financial/end-result criteria 
Vertically Integrated Firms 
Lower environmental diversity 
Lower environmental uncertainty 
More complex required interdependence 
More intensive internal funding 
requirements 
More certain patterns of funds flow 
Lower degree of divisional self-
containment 
Larger headquarters units focusing on 
both policy and operating issues 
More complex integrative devices 
Lower total differentiation 
Higher integrative effort 
Less rapidity in responding to 
divisional requests 
Influence peaks at a higher (senior 
vice president) level 
Performance evaluation systems which 
are more informally administered, 
without direct linkage betweenresults 
and rewards, and balanced emphasis on 
financial/end-result and operating/ 
intermediate criteria 
Source: Allen, Stephen A. III. "Management Issues in Multidivisional Firms." Sloan t1anagement 
Review, Vol. 13 (Spring 1972), p. 63. 
·existing and new product-market domains and pursue growth strategies 
in concentrically related areas. 
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4. Reactors - do not pursue any of the above-mentioned strategies; 
lack any long-term strategy or an effective and consistent strategy-. 
structure relationship; are in a state of perpetual instability and 
are characterized by .. management by crisis. 11 
Relative Importance of Different 
Organizational Functions 
Various research studies have been conducted to determine the 
relative importance of different functional tasks in different types 
of organizations. 
In one of the earliest studies of this kind Stevenson (1968) 
considered the organizational attributes as corporate strengths and 
weaknesses, and grouped them under five functional categories; the 
factors considered important at top management levels (presidents and 
board chairmen) were organizational (42.4 percent), personnel (32.9 
percent) and financial (15.3 percent) (Glueck, 1976, p. 91). 
Aguilar (1967, p. 43) in his study of relative importance of 
different areas of external information found that market tidings 
(marketing management's sub-environment) accounted for 58 percent of 
all responses, based on the responses from managers 39 percent of 
whom were among the high echelons of management. 
Steiner (1969a) tried to develop a profile of strategic factors 
in business success--both for current performance and future importance. 
Glueck (1976, p. 265) concludes from Steiner's (l969a) study that 
11 the crucial aspects of the strategy that need to be evaluated are: 
(1) Management quality and development, (2) Environmental appraisal, 
especially market tidings, and (3) Financial return. 11 
Woodward (1965) studied the relationship between the type of 
production system (unit, mass and process) and three organizational 
functions (development, production and marketing). She concluded 
that firms having different production systems can be expected to 
have different 11 Critical functions. 11 Specifically, 11 there seemed to 
be one function that was central and critical in that it had the 
greatest effect on (organization's) success and survival 11 (p. 126). 
Figure 2 presents the manufacturing cycle and the critical function 
for each of the three types of production system. 
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Lawrence and Lorsch (l967b) found 11 that marketing had more influ-
ence than production in both container-manufacturing and food-processing 
firms, apparently because of its involvement in (uncertain) innovation 
and with customers 11 (Hickson et al., 1971, p. 219). 
Kitching (1967), investigated both the relative payoff values from 
synergy after acquisition and the ease with which synergy is released in 
each of the five business functions. The usual notions about potential 
for synergy indicate that business functions can be ranked in order of 
importance in the following manner: 
1. Production 




However, Kitching's research findings contradict the traditional 
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Note: The critical function is the one on which the cycle relies 
for success, these functions will be the most prestigious 
and those who perform them will have high influence in the 
firm. 
Source: Woodvmrd, Joan (1965), 11 lndustrial Organization: Theory and 
Practice, 11 Oxford University Press. Reproduced from P. T .. 
Terry ~~organizational Implications for Long Range Planning. 11 
Long Range Planning, Vol. 8 (February, 1975), p. 29. 
Figure 2. The Manufacturing Cycle and Technology 
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payoff in all types of mergers except one - horizontal mergers -where 
marketing had the highest payoff followed very closely by finance. 
Technology and production on the other hand produced the lowest 
relative payoff values from synergy after acquisition. Finance was 
also found to be the function in which it was easiest to release 
synergy in all types of mergers except one - concentric technology 
where synergy was achieved with the greatest ease in the area of 
technology. 
Kitching points out that his findings are subject to two major 
limitations. First, his sample dealt with companies acquired two to 
seven years ago, and it probably take~ longer to realize production 
synergy than any other type. This might partly account for the low 
relative payoff values in production. Second, 45% of his sample 
constituted conglomerates, where by definition, companies with 
dissimilar technological/production skills merge together. The char-
acteristic also partly explains the lower relative payoff values 
assigned to the production function by the corporate executives. 
However, the most important conclusion of this study is that effective 
management of the finance function is very crucial to the success of 
mergers. 
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Many authors have noted the increasing importance of the finance 
function. With the increasing trend toward multi-plant operations, the 
traditional argument of scale economies (resulting into lower costs and 
higher capital efficiency), does not seem valid even in the case of 
large,single and dominant business firms. And for large multi-industry 
and multi-national conglomerates the only synergistic benefit arises 
from a possible financial synergy. This outcome indicates a noticeable 
trend toward an increase in direct involvement of the chief financial 
officers in the strategic issues handled by top management. As Pohl 
(1973.) points out: 
These two factors - taking the lead in resolving 
important issues of general concern to the company and 
working more closely with the major executives throughout 
the company - should enhance the financial executive's 
stature in the organization. In the United States, in 
fact, the financial executive has already become a favored 
contender for the chief executive's chair. According to 
two recent surveys, chi .ef executive offi cel~s with fi nan-
cial background accounted for 24 percent of all CEO's in 
1971, an increase from 15 percent in 1967. Moreover, of 
all CEO's appointed in 1971, about 33 percent had finan-
cial backgrounds, exceeding all other backgrounds by a wide 
margin [Figure 3]. 
This trend, which does not seem to have reached its 
peak yet in the United States, is expected to gain momentum 
in Europe during the next few years as a result of the 
changing demands on the financial executive. It is a direct 
reflection of the important contribution the financial 
executive can and must make to his company in the years to 
come ( p. 22) . 
Fox (1973) (as quoted by Hofer, 1975, pp. 790-791) studied the 
influence of the product life cycle on business strategies and on the 
importance of the appropriate functional policies. He identified a 
specific functional focus for each of the five stages of the product 
life cycle. For instance, he determined that during the "decline" 
stage of the product life cycle, the functional focus of the business 
strategy should be on finance. Hofer (1977, p. 7) also identified the 
major functional concern for each of the seven distinct stages of 
product-market evaluation. 
-
Heau (1976) examined the relationship between strategy (defined 
in terms of product relatedness) and corporate structure. For this 
purpose the firms were grouped under four strategy categories: (1) 
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Source: Analysis of data published by Forbes (May 1972) 
on 724 largest U.S. corporations. The analysis 
was published in Management Practice (Summer 
1972). Reproduced from Poh 1, Herman H. 11 The 
Coming Era of the Financial Executive. 11 Business 
Horizons, Vol. 16 (June 1973), p. 22. 
Figure 3. Shifts on the Way to the Top 
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Diversifiers, and (4) Conglomerates. According to Heau, a comparison 
of the four categories of firms along their corporate organizational 
structure would show the tendencies depicted in Figure 4. Aside from 
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showing the characteristics of organizational structure and information 
flow for each category of firms, he also identified the corporate 
culture or the orientation of top management for each category. In 
terms of this study, the latter relationships could be restated as 
follows: 
Growth Strategy Critical Function 
l. Vertical integration Production 
2. Concentric technology Engineering and R&D 
diversification 
3. Concentric marketing Marketing 
diversification 
4. Conglomerate Finance 
diversification 
In a recent study of functional managements' influence on the over-
all corporate strategy, Godiwalla (1977) found that for firms having 
unit production system, marketing was the significantly strategic 
functional management. This outcome was also true for firms having 
mass manufacturing production system but for firms having process type 
of production, marketing was found to be the strategic functional 
management. For all the firms (of different sizes and production 
systems) taken together, marketing, finance and production were found 
to be the three most influential functions. 
Miles and Snow (1978, p. 196) in their study of .. interindustry 
compa·risons of strategy: electronics and food processing .. developed the 
concept of 11 Strategic function, .. it 11 refers to those functional 
areas within the organization considered by members of the dominant 
Vertically Technology Market 
Structure/Strategy Integrated Diversifiers Diversifiers Conglomerates 
Cor12orate structure 
1 ) functions existing at the top almost all R&D ~1arketing None 
(in addition to control, Engineering Purchasing 
finance, legal, personnel) 
2) size of the corporate staff very large quite 1 arge quite large very sma 11 
3) role of the Group Vice- small optional optional essential 
President (if any) 
Information flow 
4) dominant nature of informa- operational technology/ marketing/ financial tion flow between corporate 
and divisions biased biased 
5) amount of information very high high high low between corporate and 
divisions 
Cor12orate culture 
6) orientation of top industry technology marketing financial 
management (capacity) (market segmen- (product/ 
tation) market 
(market share) portfolio) 
Source: Heau, Dominique G. Long Range Planning in Divisionalized Firms: A Study of Cor12orate 
Divisional Relationshij2S. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard Business School, 
1976, Ch. IV, p. 9. 
Figure 4. Relationship Between Strategy (Defined in Terms of Product Relatedness) 
and Corporate Structure 
·coalition to be of strategic importance to successful competition in 
their industry." They found that the chief executives• perceptions of 
the top three strategic functions vital to their competitive success 
were different in the two industries. 
Rockart (1979) discusses a new approach - called the 11 critical 
success factor (CSF) method .. - to defining the managerial information 
needs, currently being actively researched and applied at the Center 
for Information Systems Research, Sloan School of t·1anagement, Mass-
achusetts Institute of Technology. According to Rockart (1979), 
for any business, critical success factors (CSFs) are 
The limited number of areas in which results, if they are 
satisfactory, will ensure successful competitive performance 
for the organization. They are the few key areas where 
'things must go right• for the business to flourish. If 
results in these areas are not adequate, the organization•s 
efforts for the period will be less than desired .... As a 
result the critical success factors are areas of activ.ity 
that should receive constant and careful attention from man- · 
agement. The current state of performance in each area should 
be continually measured, and that information should be made 
available (p. 85). 
Contextual Variables: Environment, 
Technology, Size and Structure 
This study also examines the nature of influence of size, 
corporate diversity, industry type, production system, organizational 
structure, and perceived environmental uncertainty, on the interrela-
tionships between the grand corporate strategies pursued and the 
relative importance of different functional tasks. Accordingly, 
pertinent literature relating to these contextual variables will be 
reviewed briefly in this section. 
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Environment and Strategic Planning 
Schendel and Hatten (1972) take a broader view of the emerging 
discipline of business policy, a view they call "Strategic Management. 11 
An important characteristic of Strategic Management is its prime 
concern with environmental change, its anticipation and adaption to 
it. According to Schendel and Hatten (1972 ): 
Strategic Management is the managerial process of deter-
mining and maintaining a viable relationship between the 
organization and its environment through the use of 
se1ected objectives, and efficient resource allocations 
to major programs and policies. Strategic management 
seeks a stable and viable match between the organization, 
its needs and resources, and the demands imposed by the 
environmental setting (p. 100). 
·Rawls, Rawls and Radosevich (1975) also contend that strategic 
management is mainly concerned with relationships between the firm and 
its environment. Strategic managers have roles and functions that are 
different from those of the operations managers. Rawls et al. reviewed 
the attributes of successful managers, and enterpreneurs and organiza-
tional innovators. They compiled a tentative list of attributes of 
successful strategic managers (see Table II). 
In one of the earliest studies of environmental influences 
relevant to organizational planning, Dill (1958) examined the influence 
of environmental constraints on the structure of organizations and the 
behavior of organizational participants. He studied the influence of 
the structure of the environment, the accessibility of information about 
the environment, and the managerial perceptions of the meaning of 
environmental information on managerial autonomy and concluded that 
11 behavior depends on the patterns of inputs from the environment to an 
organization and on the interpretation of these inputs as taken by 
TABLE II 




Self-reliant and independent 






Receptive to change 
High tolerance for ambiguity 
and frustration 
Charismatic leadership ability 
Organizing skills 
Creative and imaginative 
Risk-takers, (but not gamblers) 
Above-average intelligence 
Self-learners 
Broad experience base with frequent 
initial specialization 
High energy level 
Source: Rawls, J. R., D. J. Rawls and R. Radosevich. 
11 Identifying Strategic Managers. 11 Business Horizons, 
Vol. 18 (December 1975), p. 78. 
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members of the organization 11 (p. 409). 
Carter's (1971, p. 423) research suggests 11 that the goals of an 
organization can be closely related to the degree of uncertainty in its 
general environment and to the uncertainty in a particular project's 
forcasts. 11 He hypothesizes the relationship as follows: 11 The greater 
the uncertainty of outcome in the total environment of the organization, 
the greater the number of criteria, that is, goals, which will be sought 
to guide the strategic decisions. 11 
In an exploratory study of the impact of the business environment 
on the long-range planning process, Lindsay and Rue (1978) found, 
... that large business firms in a variety of industries 
are attempting to 'fit' their long-range planning processes 
to their perceived environmental conditions. That a number 
of the strategies used to achieve this 'fit' are in line 
with concepts developed by organization theorists (p. 119). 
Their study (p. 119) also focused on the specifics of the boundary-
spanning process of long-range planning and the findings suggest, 
11 that environmental turbulence and firm size are important 'contigent 
variables' to consider in the design of an effective and efficient long-
range planning process. 11 
Since grand corporate strategy or master strategy reflecting the 
grand design of an organization is formulated on the basis of organiza-
tion-environment interactions, it must be consistent with the prevailing 
and anticipated environmental conditions. As Richards (1978, p. 32) 
points out: 11 TO be viable over long periods, the master strategy 
must be viable in the light of the environmental conditions. 11 
Therefore, a change in the grand corporate strategy results mainly from 
actual or anticipated changes in the external environment (Hofer, 1973). 
In a research covering 358 companies, over a 45-year period, Glueck 
(1976) tried to determine the challenges the companies were facing; 
and found general environmental challenges to be the most important 
challenges, followed by market challenges. Glueck (1976, p. 48) 
offered the following proposition: "The major causes of growth, 
decline and other large-scale changes in firms are factors in the 
environment, not internal developments." Hofer and Schendel (1978) 
sum up the argument by stating that, 
... research by Hofer (1973) and Glueck (1976) indicates 
that almost all the strategic opportunities that a business 
will face stem from fundamental changes in the market and 
the industry in which it competes, its sources or conditions 
of supply, the action of its competitors, the broader 
environmental forces that have impact on these areas, or the 
ways that all of these factors interact with one another 
(p. 110). 
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Since a firm's external environment is one of the major determinants of 
its corporate strategy, the inclusion of environmental variables in any 
research dealing with corporate strategy cannot be too strongly 
emphasized. Taylor (1973b, p. 37) therefore argues that strategic 
decisions are "concerned with effecting major changes in the 'linkages• 
between the enterprise and its environment. 
Classification of Environemnts 
Duncan (1972) distinguished between an organization's internal and 
external environment and based on his research constructed a list of 
environmental components (Table III) particularly relevant to industrial 
organizations. He conceptualized four different types of environments 
as shown in Table IV: (a) Simple-Static (Cell 1); (b) Complex-
Static (Cell 2); (c) Simple-Dynamic (Cell 3); and (d) Complex-
Dynamic (Cell 4); he also hypothesized the degree of uncertainty 
that will be experienced by decision units in each of these 
TABLE III 
FACTORS AND COMPONENTS COMPRISING THE ORGANIZATION'S 
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT 
Internal Environment 
(1) Organizational personnel component 
(A) Educational and technological background and skills 
(B) Previous technological and managerial skill 
{C) Individual member's involvement and commitment to 
attaining system's goals 
(D) Interpersonal behavior styles 
(E) Availability of manpower for utilization within the system 
(2) Organizational functional and staff units component 
(A) Technological characteristics of organizational units 
(B) Interdependence of organizational units in carrying 
out their objectives 
(C) Intra-unit conflict among organizational functional 
and staff units 
(D) Inter-unit conflict among organizational functional 
and staff units 
(3) Organizational level component 
(A) Organizational objectives and goals 
(B) Integrative process intergrating individuals and groups 
into contributing maximally to attaining organizational 
goals 
(C) Nature of the organization's product service 
External Environment 
(4) Customer component 
(A) Distributors of product or service 
(B) Actual users of product or service 
(5) Suppliers component 
(A) ,New materials suppliers 
(B) Equipment suppliers 
(C) Product parts suppliers 
(D) Labor supply 
(6) Competitor component 
(A) Competitors for suppliers 
(B) Competitors for customers 
(7) Socio-political component 
(A) Government regulatory control over the industry 
(B) Public political attitude towards industry and its 
particular product 
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TABLE III (Continued) 
(C) Relationship with trade unions with jurisdiction 
in the organization 
(8) Technological component 
(A) Meeting new technological requirements of own industry 
and related industries in production of product or 
service 
(B) Improving and developing new products by implementing 
new technological advances in the industry 
Source: Duncan, Robert B. 11 Characteristics of Organizational 
Environments and Perceived Environmental Uncertainty. 11 





ENVIRONMENTAL STATE DIMENSIONS AND PREDICTED PERCEIVED UNCERTAINTY 
EXPERIENCED BY INDIVIDUALS IN DECISION UNITS 
Simple Complex 
Ce 11 1: Cell 2: 
low perceived uncertainty moderately low perceived uncertainty 
(1) Small number of factors and components 
in the environment 
(2) Factors and components are somewhat 
similar to one another 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
Large number of factors and components 
the environment 




(3) Factors and components remain basically (3) Factors and components remain basically 
the same and are not changing ~7 
Cell 3: •,/ 
moderately high perceived uncertainty c-
the same 
Ce 11 4: 
high perceived uncertainty 
(1) Small number of factors and components ( 1 ) Large number of factors and components in 
in the environment the environment 
(2) Factors and components are somewhat (2) Factors and components are not similar to 
similar to one another one another 
(3) Factors and components of the envir- (3) Factors and components of environment are 
onment are in continual process of in a continual process of change 
change 
Source: Duncan, Robert B. 11 Characteristics of Organizational Environments and Perceived Environmental 




four types of environments. 
Environmental constraints, contingencies, opportunities and 
problems affect the strategies, structure and size of the organizations. 
The character of the environment determines the degree of pressure for 
change, the immediacy for change, and uncertainties facing the organi-
zation. Relatively "placid" environments, because of their predict-
ability, permit varying organizational strategies. In contrast, 
"turbulent" environments are dynamic and are characterized by complex 
and rapidly changing conditions impinging on the organizations, which 
tend to increase uncertainty, reduce control and make prediction more 
difficult (Terreberry, 1968). 
Emery and Trist (1965) developed a typology of environments in 
which the environments were seen as being causal for the organizations 
within them, the four types of environments were: 
Type l - Placid, Randomized 
Type 2 - Placid, Clustered 
Type 3 - Disturbed Relative 
Type 4 - Turbulent Field 
Each type affects the size, structure and functioning of the 
organizations in different ways. For instance, the Type 4 environment 
is associated with greatly increased uncertainty owing to highly 
complex and rapidly changing nature of the environment. Organizations 
facing such environments tend to be more R & D conscious. Public 
relations function in such organizations also become increasingly 
important since organizations have to constantly struggle to seek and 
naintain social and economic legitimacy. 
Burns & Stalker (1961) classified organizations into two polar 
extremes: mechanistic and organi~. When the rate of technical and 
commercial change is high, organizations assume organic form, whereas 
the mechanistic organization is appropriate for stable conditions when 
the rate of technical and commercial change is low. 
Thompson (1967) classified the organization•s enviro~ment into 
four types: stable and homogenous, stable and heterogeneous, unstable 
and homogenous, and unstable and heterogeneous; and argued that 
heterogeneity and instability in the environment have significant 
implications for organizational structure. 
Organization - Environment Interaction 
34 
Hrebiniak (1978) very aptly sums up the gist of the main thesis of 
Lawrence and Lersch's (1967) classic study: 
Degree of differentiation depends on the uncertainty facing 
the organization; the greater the uncertainty, the greater 
the organizational differentiation necessary to cope with 
external demands; the greater the differentiation (including 
both task and attitudinal differences), the greater the 
integration needed to insure goal-directed behavior (pp. 349-350). 
Lorsch (1973) commenting further on the Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) 
study mentioned earlier states that 
... there must be a fit between internal organizational 
characteristics and external environmental requirements if 
the organization is to perform effectively in dealing with 
its environment. This fit between an organization and its 
environment, as we have examined it, has two related 
aspects. First, each functional unit (e.g. sales, production, 
and research) must have internal characteristics consistent 
with the demands of its particular sector of the total envir-
onment ... The second aspect of the organization-environment 
relationship which we have found to be important is that the 
total organization must achieve, in spite of the differentia-
tion among its units, the pattern of integration required by 
the total environment (p. 132). 
The latter aspect stresses the importance of general administration role 
and functions at the corporate level. 
I 
Hofer (1973) believes that 
In general, the leading authors ·in the field- Andrews, Ansoff, 
Cannon, Ewing, Guth, Katz, McNichols, Newman, and Tilles -
agree that strategic planning is concerned with the development 
of a viable match between the opportunities and risks present 
in the external environment and the organization's capabiltties 
and resources for exploiting these opportunities {p. 47). 
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Hofer (1973), for his preliminary research on patterns of strategic 
behavior, developed detailed systems for classifying strategic 
challenges and responses under different sets of categories (Table V). 
A closer examination of this table would reveal that most of the 
strategic challenges faced by organizations are in fact environmental 
challenges. He then developed a simple conceptual scheme for the 
strategic challenge-response process and hypothesized: 
(1) That alterations in a firm's strategy set (objectives, 
strategy, functional policies) result from either actual 
or forecast changes in its external environment and/or in 
its resources and capabilities ... ; (2) that different 
types of strategic challenges would elicit different strategic 
responses; and (3) that the type of strategic response adopted 
for a specific strategic challenge would, in general, signi-
ficantly influence the future success or failure of the firm 
(p. 47). 
The result of his preliminary study indicated 11 that different types of 
strategic challenges do indeed elicit different types of strategic 
responses" (p. 51). 
Since the strategy formulation process is considered to be a 
crucial part of organization-environment interaction, Anderson and 
Paine (1975) have developed a perceptually based strategy model (see 
Figure 5) to provide some insights on the environment/strategy 
formulation/internal properties interaction. The model is based on two 
perceptual variables: (1) environmental uncertainty, and (2) need for 
internal change. 
In order to enhance understanding, each perceptual variable 
has been reduced to two dimensions: perceptions of environ-
mental certainty and uncertainty, and low and high perceived 
TABLE V 
DETAILED SYSTEr~S FOR CLASSIFYING STRATEGIC CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 
Strategic Challenges 
!. Market ~lated Challenges 
-Major changes in market structure 
·Major changes in the product life cycle 
-Major changes in demographic structure 
-Major changes in the types of cu~tomers served 
-Major changes in the price elasticity of demand 
-Major increases in total demand (other than above) 
-Stagnation of or major decreases in total demand (other than above) 
H. Industry Related Challengeg 
-Major changee in the nature of product differentiation 
·Major changes in the economies of scale 
-Major crjllnges in the price/cost structure 
·Major changes in product or procees technology 
-Major changes in the distribution system 
-Major change in barriers to entry (other than above) 
Ill. Competitor Related Challenges 
-Entry of new competitors 
-Exit of old competitors 
-Major changes in the market share of existing competitors 
IV. Supplier Related Challenges 
·Major changes in the availability of raw materials 
-Major changes in the conditions of trade 
-Entry of new suppliers or exit of old suppliers 
V. ~source and Capability Related Challenges 
·Major excess of capital or cash flow 
-Major shortage of capital or inadequate cash flow 
-Major threat of outside takeover 
-Major excess of production facilities 
·Major ir.adequacy or sudden loss of production facilities 
-Major inadequacy or loss of top management 
VI. Broader Environmental Challenges 
-Major changes in economic conditions 
·Major changes in political/legal constraints 
-Major changes in social/cultural values 
Strategic Responses 
I. Changes in Objectives 
-Change growth objectives 
-Change profitability objectives 
·Change other objectives 
Il. Changes in Strategy 
·Major expansion in product/market scope 
.Increase penetration 
.New markets/existing products 
.New products/existing markets/existing needs 
.New products/existing markets/different needs 
.Forward integration 
.Backward integration 
.Concentric diversification: marketing 
.Concentric diversification: production 
.Conglomerate diversification 
·Major contraction of product/market scope 
.Major contraction of market coverage 
.Major contraction of product Iitle 
·Major expansion of gMgraphic scope 
·Major contraction of geographic scope 
-Major changes in distinctive competences 
.Major increase in marketing competence 
.Major improvement in distribution capability 
.Major increase in production competence 
.Major increase in R & D competence 
.Major increase in financial capability 
.Major increase in managerial competence 
II I. Change functions I policies 
IV. Liquidation 
-Liquidation of product line 
-Liquidation of division 
·Liquidation of corporation 
V. No Response 
Source: Hofer, Charles W. "Some Preliminary Research on Patterns of Strategic 











I. Fixed and well defined 
2. Optimization; maintenance; 
ellicicncv 
3. Process ·pl:1nning; maintain 
competence 
4. Closed/ >table/mechanistic 
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information 
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5. Adaptive planner; informa-
tion gathering 
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Varied and flexible 
Satisficing; survival; de-
velop effective problem 
solving 
Adaptive or contingency 
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merger; diversification 
Open/ adaptive/ organic 




4. Organization form 
5. Role performance of policy 
maker 
Anderson, Carl R. and Frank T. Paine. 11 Managerial 
Perceptions and Strategic Behavior. 11 Academy of 
Management Journal, Vol. 18 (1975), p. 817. 
Figure 5. The Perceptually Based Strategy Model 
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need for change. The resulting four quadrants present· 
different kinds of strategy formulation problems which 
require different strategies for effective solution. The 
model is intended as a framework for analysis of the 
strategy formulation process (p. 816). 
In a discussion of strategic moves in each of the four quadrants 
Anderson and Paine note that, 
While there is (depending on the stage of development, share 
of market, and forcasted market growth rate) an opportunity 
to exercise a great deal of discretion in each quadrant, 
each of the four quadrants seems to be associated with a set 
of possible strategic moves {or outputs) for the organiza-
tion or division, based on the appropriate perceptions (p. 819). 
Khandwalla (1976) views an organization's strategy as a response 
to its environment. His study of 79 firms generally confirmed that a 
comprehensive or Multifaceted strategy denotes a dynamic, complex, and 
uncertain environment. 
Segal (1974, p. 212) opines that "organizational response to its 
environment" is related to the organization's internal structure 
(interrelationship and overall management of units). It is also 
related to the organization's decision-making process (basis of 
decision and assessment), and its boundary-spanning strategy (basis 
of support and extent of decentralization). 
Salancik, Pfeffer and Kelly (1974) discussed the source of 
influence in organizational decision-making and argued that 
... influence derives from an individual's ability to reduce 
organizational uncertainty and that, when the nature of this 
uncertainty varies across organization decision contexts, the 
characteristics associated with this capability are also 
likely to vary ... influence determination works through a 
communication process which serves to define the source of 
uncertainty and to locate individuals capable of coping with 
the uncertainty {p. 55). 
Hickson et al. (1971) propose a strategic contingencies' theory of 
intraorganizational power which seems relevant to our concepts of 
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environmental uncertainty and relative importance of different organiza-
tional functions. Modern organizations have to cope with environmentally 
derived uncertainties in: (a) the sources and composition of inputs, 
(b) the processing of throughputs, and (c) the disposal of outputs; in 
order to ensure adequate task performance. Hickson et al. (1971, p. 
220) related coping with uncertainty by a subunit to its power and 
offered the following hypothesis: 11 The more a subunit copes with 
uncertainty, the greater its power within the organization ... However, 
in terms of this study, this hypothesis can be restated as follows: 
The more a functional unit copes with uncertainty, the greater is its 
strategic significance within the organization. Thus, the subunit that 
enjoys the greatest power in the organization is not necessarily the 
one facing the most uncertainty but the one that copes most effectively 
with the most uncertainty. The source of power, therefore, lies not 
in the high level of uncertainty per se, but in the subunit•s ability 
to cope effectively with high uncertainty. Such a subunit acts as a 
11 Shock absorber 11 for the whole organization in that it diminishes the 
impact of uncertainty on other subunits which tend to see themselves 
as more and more dependent on that subunit. Thus the perceived 
effectiveness of a subunit in coping with high level of uncertainty, 
and the increased number and degree of dependencies created by such 
coping behavior result in that subunit acquiring more and more power 
within the organization. 
Miles and Snow (1978) examined the relationship between 
the managerial perceptions of environmental uncertainty and the rela-
tive strategic importance of different organizational functions. 
The findings of this study suggest some support that when 
the organization faces high environmental uncertainty, it 
places greater emphasis on externally oriented functions such 
as market research and product development. Conversely, when 
an organization faces low uncertainty, internally oriented 
functions (such as production) assume strategic importance 
(p. 213). 
Hambrick and Snow (1977) believe that 
... in order to understand fully why a particular strategic 
alternative is chosen also requires knowledge of the environ-
mental and organizational context in which the decision is 
made ... Because of their importance, strategic decisions 
must be closely linked with each other to form a consistent 
pattern. This pattern is called strategy, an on-going stream 
of decisions aimed at effectively •matching• or aligning 
organizational resources with environmental opportunities and 
constraints (Thompson, 1967) (p. 109). 
Their contextual model of strategic decision making is shown in Figure 
6. Hambrick and Snow believe that the role of managerial perceptions 
of environmental and organizational variables in the strategic decision 
making process is extremely important; and that a useful conceptualiza-
tion of this role requires a sequential view of the perceptual process. 
In the first place, a manager•s field of vision cannot and does not 
encompass every aspect of the organization and its environment. Thus, 
a manager•s perceptions are primarily determined by (or limited to) 
those areas comprising his field of vision. Secondly, a manager does 
not exhaustively scan his own field of vision. Therefore, his percep-
tions are also limited to those areas (within his field of vision) 
selectively perceived by him. And finally, a manager•s age, his 
functional orientation, his position in the managerial echelon, and 
his value system collectively constitute a filter through which, the 
mass of information to be processed by him is interpreted. According 
to Hambrick and Snow (1977): 
This field of vision - selective perception - interpretation 
sequence for considering the conversion of information into 
a set of managerial perceptions that subsequently guides 
decision making appears to be useful in organizing the rele-
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Source: Hambrick, Donald C. and Charles C. Snow. "A 
Contextual Model of Strategic Decision Making in 
Organizations." Academy of t~anagement Proceedings, 
1977, p. 110. 
Figure 6. A Contextual Model of Strategic Decision Making 
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Duncan (1972, p. 325) also suggests that the environmental 
characteristics are 11 dependent on the perception of organizational 
members and thus can vary in their incidence to ,the extent that 
individuals differ in their perceptions ... 
Accardi ng to Starbuck (1976), organizations se 1 ect those aspects 
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of the environment with which they would deal based on their perceptions 
of the environment. Thus the organizational strategies to deal with the 
environment are based on the process of selection and perception of 
environment. This is similar to Weick's (1969, 1977) contention that 
organizations do not merely respond to their external environments; 
they in fact 11 enacC or shape their own environments through a series 
of strategic decisions over a period of time. 
The recognizable pattern of an organization•s responses to environ-
mental issues, according to Miles, Snow and Pfeffer (1974), Child (1972a), 
and Richards (1973), is determined, not so much by the objective 
characteristics of organization-environment interactions as by the 
managerial perceptions of the environmental conditions. This study's 
approach is based on the managerial perceptions of the strategic signi-
ficance of key result areas in different organizational functions. 
Various authors (e.g., Emery and Trist, Thompson, Burns and 
Stalker, Lawrence and Lersch, Duncan, and Downey et al.) have tried to 
describe and measure the environment in a manner that is conceptually 
and analytically useful. Generally the attention is focused on change 
as an important dimension. However, some authors have not recognized 
the distinction between the rate of environmental change and the degree 
of environmental uncertainty or the unpredictability of change. Where 
an organization is faced with rapid but mostly predictable change in 
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the environment; such an organization is not really faced with environ-
mental uncertainty, since it can predict reasonably well the kind of 
environmental conditions it will have to face in the future. This 
study will utilize Miles and Snow•s (1978, Ch. 12) framework for 
determining the managerial perceptions of environmental uncertainty, in 
which the behavior of the various sub-environments will be rated on the 
degree of their predictabi"lity (or certainty). 
Technology 
The primary production system employed by the organization signi-
ficantly affects the strategic, structural and scale (size) aspects of 
the organization, it also affects the strategic mix of organizational 
functions through its impact on the degree of labor intensity, capital 
intensity (and therefore automation), knowledge (and therefore research) 
intensity, and energy intensity. Woodward (1965) suggests that a 
relationship exists between the organization•s technology and its 
control system, and therefore structural dimensions of an organization 
might be related to the level of its technical achievement. 
Perrow (1970) has classified organizations into four technology 
types based on the analyzability of the search process and the number 
and frequency of exceptions to normal problem-solving processes. These 
four technology types are: (1) Craft, (2) Nonroutine, (3) Routine and 
(4) Engineering. Perrow contends that problems faced by each organiza-
tion type are differ·ent and therefore the technological and structural 
requirements of each are also different. 
The predominant production system used in the organization deter-
mines the nature of its technological subenvironment as also the pattern 
of organization's responses to that subenvironment. For instance in 
the Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) study, the findings indicated that 
Special organizational divisions were established (research 
and development) to keep the organization current; in other 
organizations, departments such as indust~ial engineering, 
management analysis, and so on, are so designated (Hall, 1977, 
p. 304). 
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Thompson (1967) developed a series of propositions about organiza-
tions with technology as a major determinant of structure. He examined 
the interrelationships between technology and other variables like size, 
environment, and structure. He classified technology into three basic 
groups: mediating, intensive and long linked. The efforts needed 
to coordinate and control the organization's "technical core" are 
different for each and therefore the technology employed significantly 
impacts the structural dimensions and processes. 
Murphy (1972) investigated the effects of technology on 
organizational decentralization and concluded that the change and 
complexity arising from the adoption of new technological processes 
have a direct and specific impact on the decentralization in the 
organization. His findings suggest, 
.... that other things being equal: (1) firms with a more 
complex technological process tend to be more decentralized 
.than firms with a less complex technological process, and 
(2) firms with a more dynamic technological process tend to 
be more decentralized than firms with a less dynamic tech-
nological process (p. 65). 
Hickson, Pugh and Pheysey (1969) in their study of work organization 
in Birmingham, England found no support for the sweeping "technological 
imperative" hypothesis that technology and structure are strongly 
related. However, the technology-structure relationship was more 
profound and pervasive in small organizations. In large organizations, 
operations technology was shown to affect only those variables related 
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to the workflow rather than the broader administrative and hierarchical 
aspects of structure. 
Daft and Mcintosh (1978) based on Perrow•s work, developed a 
technology grid by combining two dimensions of technology: (1) task 
knowledge (known ways of responding to problems) and (2) task variety 
(frequency of unexpected and novel problems). The grid then forms the 
basis for classifying work unit technology into four categories -
programmable, technical-professional, research, and craft (see Figure 7). 
Woodwarct•s classification scheme was chosen for this study because 
it is the least abstract and almost self-explanatory and therefore 
the practicing executives would be able to identify their predominant 
production systems without the need for lengthy explanation of terms used. 
Size and Structure 
Size of the organization also has important influence on the 
various strategic and structural variables. It dictates organization•s 
strategic postures and affects such variables as complexity, span of 
control of senior executives, management levels and the size of the 
administrative component. Besides, size maybe a function of age, 
orga~ization•s past strategies and performance, and the stage the 
organization finds itself in the organizational life cycle. Size is 
also interrelated with the industry structure (Burack, 1975) 
and the predominant production system used in the organization. 
However, most of the empirical work in the area of organizational size 
relates to its impact on organizational structure. The research 
findings suggest that size cannot be considered as the major determinant 
of structure. Other variables must be taken into account for understand-
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Figure 7. Classification of Work Unit Technologies 
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The Aston group2 found technology to be of much less importance 
than size to organization structure. However, Aldrich (1972) 
reanalyzed the Aston group findings using path analysis and technology 
emerged as a variable of major importance. 
In a survey article on the role of size as a variable in studies 
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of organization structure, Kimberly (1976, p. 571) argues 11 that size has 
generally been defined in terms too global to permit its relation to 
organizational structure to be understood adequately.•• He advocates 
the need for a more differentiated view of size, so that researchers can 
study differential relationships between different aspects of size and 
different dimensions of structure. And therefore, 
A more flexible view in which at certain times and under 
certain conditions certain aspects of size may be conceptual-
ized as dimensions of context seems preferable. The question 
of causality, of the causal connection between size and 
structure, becomes similarly redefined. No longer does it 
make sense to ask whether size causes structure or structure 
causes size, but rather under what conditions aspects of size 
are determinants of dimensions of structure, under what condi-
tions the two covary, and under what conditions dimensions of 
structure are determinants of aspects of size (p. 594). 
Pugh et al. (1969) analyzed the relationships between the structure 
of an organization and the context in which it functions. Using con-
textual variables as independent variables in a multivariate prediction 
analysis of the structural factors, the researchers found size to be 
the first predictor (r = 0.69) of structuring of activities; however with 
workflow integration (a technological dimension) added as a predictor, 
the multiple correlation increased to 0.75. The researchers concluded 
that, 
The size of the correlations inevitably raise the question of 
causal implications. It is tempting to argue that these clear 
relationships are causal - in particular, that size, dependence, 
and the· charter-technology-location nexus largely determine 
structure (p. 112). 
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Child (1975) investigated the nature of influence of company 
performance and .environmental variability on the rate of development 
in organization structure as company size increases. He found that the 
different categories of companies could be arranged in the following 
sequence (p. 22): 
1. ·Below average performers 
in stable environments 
2. Below average performers 
in variable environments 
3. Above average performers 
in variable environments 
4. Above average performers 
in stable environments 
Child (1975) further observes: 
Rate of development in 
organization structure 
as company size increases 
Low 
The relative order of high performers in variable and stable 
environments suggests that environmental contingencies may 
interact with scale contingencies ... It appears, then, that 
management has to pay regard to multiple contingencies, such 
as those of environment and scale together, when planning the 
design of its organization {pp. 22-24). 
Child (1970) (as q·uoted in Child, 1972b, p. 174) in 
relating the concepts of structuring of activities and decentralization 
with strategies of administrative control offers an alternative inter-
pretation of the Aston group's3 findihgs: 
... within certain limits imposed by the organization's 
operating situation, managers appear to have a choice between: 
(a) maintaining control directly by confining decisions to 
fairly senior levels. This economizes on the need for systems 
of procedures and paperwork and reduces the overhead of 
indirect specialized personnel to operate and maintain the 
systems, or (b) maintaining control indirectly by relying on 
the use of procedures, paper records, and on the employment 
of expert specialists to take decisions at lower levels (with-
in the limits on discretion imposed by the indirect controls) 
(p. 378). 
Theoretical Synthesis of the Concepts of Size, 
Technology, Environment and Structure 
In a review of literature pertaining to the influence of three 
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contingency variables - size, technology and environment - on different 
dimentions of organization structure, Ford and Slocum (1977) summarize 
the relationship between structure and contingency variables (see 
Table VI). As is evident from Table VI, each of the three contingency 
variables can offer similar predictions of structural dimensions. It is 
therefore possible that relationships observed in studies that considered 
only one contingency variable might be attributable to one (or two) of 
the contingency variables not considered by the researcher. Since few 
studies considered all three contingency variables simultaneously the 
patterns of contingency-structure causality are far from clear. Aside 
from the issue of effect independence, there is also a high degree of 
interrelationships between technology, size and environmental uncertainty, 
the researcher must therefore consider the interrelationships and their 
impact on the contingency-structure relationships. Aside from this 
problem of independence, Ford and Slocum identified two other problems 
in previous research. First, all the variables involved (technology, 
size, environment and structure) have serious measurement problems; and 
second, units and levels of analysis are different in different research 
studies. Ford and Slocum conclude their review with the following 
remarks: 
Additional research might be directed toward better 
understanding the relationship between contingency variables 
and structure, and toward understanding the interrelation-
ships among the contingency variables themselves. That 
these variables are significantly interrelated and appear to 
influence each other's relationship to structure indicates 
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Dewar and Hage (1978, p. 132) contend that 11 the relationships 
among size, complexity, techno·logy, and structural differentiation are 
more complex than has been previously thought. 11 They offer theo1·etical 
arguments (summarized in Table VII ) relating levels and rates of 
technology and size to complexity and structural differentiation. 
Their findings suggest that task scope (a technological dimension) and 
not organizational size, is the most important determinant of differ-
entiation in the division of labor. Dewar and Hage (1978) conclude 
that 
... by exam1n1ng associations of levels and change rates 
it is possible to better understand how growth and increase 
in task scope affect both the complexity of the division of 
labor and structural differentiation ... Their indicators 
are different; the causal arguments are different; and the 
relative importance of size and technology as causal forces 
are different. Thus, we need to develop theories for each 
of these processes. They cannot, at least at this point, 
be theoretically synthesized (p. 129). 
Strategy and Structur~ 
The importance of organization structure in strategic planning 
emanates primarily from the fact that strategic planning is essentially 
an organization-wide activity rather than something done merely by the 
planning department staff. As Cleland and King (1974) so 
rightly point out: 
... strategic planning is a job to be performed by managers -
not for them. However critical the role of professional 
planning staff is to an effective strategic planning process, 
professional planners are not the doers of planning ... ; 
rather, they are the facilitators. The doers of strategic 
planning are managers - both top managers and lower-level 
line managers - thereby ensuring that the people who will be 
charged with implementing the plans are those who have 
generated the goals and developed and approved the plans (p. 26). 
TABLE VII 
A THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS OF THE CONCEPTS OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL SIZE, TECHNOLOGY, 
COMPLEXITY, AND STRUCTURAL 
DIFFERENTIATION 
Independent\! a riable Dependent Variable 
1. Level of task scope Level of complexity 
Posrtrvely related !Jecause the gre;Her the number of clients and depth of 
involvement wrth them or the greater the va11ety of products and the cJrl frculty 
of producrng them. the grerner the number of technologies and thus different 
occupatronal specraltres because of the l11nrts uf cogn1tron 
2. Rate of task scope change Rate of complexity change 
Posrtively related because the additron of new clients or products requrres new 
technologies, whrch 1n turn requ:re new oCCIJpatron<JI speC1<Jit1es. 
3. Level of size Level of complexity 
Posrtrvely reiJted only because large orgrlfll/iltrons i1d11eve cconon1ICS of scale 
that result 1n advantages in hnrng occupational spec1alues 1n admin1stratrve 
areas. 
4. Rate of size change Rate of complexity change 
No relatronshrp because the hrrrng of new per sonnf!i docs not necess<Hiiy 
mean the hiring of new occupational specralties 
5. Level of task scope Level of veritical differentiation 
Small posrtrve relatronshrp because technological complexny decreases spans 
and necessitates more levels. 
6. Rate of task scope change Rate of vertical differentiation change 
No relatronshrp because new technologres are usually added horrzontally, not 
vertically. 
7. Level of size Level of vertical differentiation 
Pos1t1vely related because largr" number'; require rnar,y superv1sors; there rs a 
limit to the span of control. 
8. Rate of size change Rate of vertical differentiation change 
Small positive relatronshrp becJuse the h1rrng of new people. unless there are a 
large number of them, does not stress sp<ms su!hcrentiy to necessitate 
addrtton of new levels. 
9. Level of task scope Level of horizontal differentiation 
Posrtively related because different clrents or products and/or tech nologres are 
usually housed rn d1fferent departments for socl31 3nc.1 ecolog1cal reasons. 
10. Rate of task scope change Rate of horizontal differentiation change 
Positively re.lated because new clients or products and/or technologres are 
usually housecJ 1n new departments 
11. Level of size Level of horizontal differentiation 
Small posrttve rei<Jtronshrp because of econorn1es of scale that permrt the h1ring 
of ancillary specralists that are located :n new depilrtments. 
12. Rate of size change Rate of horizontal differentiation change 
No relationshrp because tile addrtron of new people has no necessary 
relatronshrp w1111 the aclcJrtron of departments 
Source: Dewar, Robert and Jerald Hage. "Size, 
Technology and Structural Differentiation: 
Toward a Theoretical Synthesis. 11 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 23 
(1978), p. 115. 
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In order to ensure successful implementation of strategies, 
Koontz (1976, p. 47) h·ighlights the need for making organization struc-
ture fit p 1 anni ng needs: "The organization structure should be designed 
to support the accomplishment of goals and the making of decisions to 
implement strategies. 11 
Based on Chandler's (1962) pioneering study of strategy and structure, 
many researchers notably from Harvard Business School have attempted to 
examine the interrelationship between diversification strategy (similar 
to corporate diversity in this study) and organizational structure. 
Chandler showed how different strategies posed different degree of 
administrative complexity and therefore tended to require different types 
of organizational structure. Rumelt (1974, p. 149) in his study, found 
"that data gave strong support to Chandler's proposition that 'structure 
follows strategy' but forced the addition of 'structure also follows 
fashion. Ill According to Galbraith and r~athanson (1978), 
three main principles can be identified in Chandler's 
·work: (1) Organization structure follows the growth strategy 
pursued by the firm; (2) American firms have followed a 
pattern of stagewise development from unifunctional structure, 
to the functional organization, to the multi-divisional struc-
ture; (3) The change from one stage to another occurred only 
after provocation, because the strategy formulator and organ-
izational innovator were different types of people (p. 16). 
When a strategy-structure fit is disturbed in any organization, its 
. performance tends to decline. However, Galbraith and Nathanson intra-
duced competition as a mediating variable in the re1ationship between 
strategy and structure and thus modified Chandler's proposition. They 
stated that "only under competitive conditions does a mismatch between 
strategy and structure lead to ineffective performance" (p. 139). 
Fouraker and Stopford (1968) found that the organizations pursuing 
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multinational growth strategy tend to have highly diversified domestic 
business with a proven R&D leadership; decentralized, divisionalized 
structure; and the ability to produce international general managers 
capable of controlling and guiding a highly diversified organization. 
Khandwalla (1974) developed a model of organizational adaptation to 
mass output technology (see Figure 8) which was supported by data for 79 
manufacturing firms. According to Khandwalla, the causal arrow in the 
model should be viewed 
... as going from technology to vertical integration to 
organizational differentiation and decentralization of author-
ity to the use of sophisticated controls as a powerful inte-
grative and coordinating device ... The model incorporates 
three basic hypotheses for manufacturing organizations: (1) 
the more mass-output oriented the technology used by an organ-
ization, the more vertically integrated it is likely to be, 
(2) the more vertically integrated the organization is, the more 
decentralized is its top-level decision making likely to be, and 
(3) the more decentralized the top-level decision making, the 
more the organization is likely to use sophisticated controls to 
coordinate the activities of the organization (p. 79). 
Therefore, Khandwalla•s (1974) study established a special form of 
technology-strategy-structure relationships; where the use of mass-
output technology leads to the pursuit of vertical integration (a growth 
strategy), which in turn requires certain changes in the organizational 
structure and decision-making. Such relationships were found to be more 
pronounced for high-profit firms. 
In his study of corporate technological staff size in 21 large 
diversified firms, Pitts (1977) found systematic structural differences 
between firms pursuing two different diversification strategies -
internal diversification and acquisitive diversification (in terms of 
this study, internal growth strategy and external acquisitive growth 
strategy, respectively). These differences are depicted schematically 
in Figure 9. 
The Use of Mass Need to Insulate the 
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Source: Khandwalla, Pradip N. "Mass Output Orientation of Operations 
Technology and Organizational Structure,'' Administrative 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 19 (1974), p. 79. 
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Source: Pitts, Robert A. 11 Strategi es and Structures for Di versifi ca-
tion.11 Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 20 (1977), p. 199. 
Figure 9. Structura 1 Differences in Firms Pursuing 
Different Diversification Strategies 
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Miller and Springate (1978), in a study of functionally and divi-
sionallyorgariized firms in the retailing industry found that in product-
divisional organizational structures, comparable decisions tend to be 
made at lower levels of the organization than in functional organiza-
tional structures. As regards performance measurement and control 
systems, product-divisional organizations were found to rely more on 
predetermined and clearly specified norms of performance. Miller and 
Springate (1978) conclude that 
In essence, the general pattern established has been that 
product divisionals operate with a markedly different set of 
management, process and decision making especially as regards 
the •autonomy• of certain management roles, particular'ly at 
lower levels in the organization {p. 125).· 
Out of Chandler•s (1962) research, a group of theorists called 
11 stages of growth and development theorists 11 have developed different 
stages of growth models. These models go beyond a mere examination of 
strategy-structure relationships and develop a concept of corporate 
life cycle with distinct stages of corporate development. 
On the basis of the Scott model (1973), Tuason (1973) has identi-
fied three stages of corporate life cycle, each stage having different 
company characteristics (see Table VIII). 
Glueck (1976) has summarized Cannon•s (1968) theory of 
five stages of development in the form of a table (see Table IX). 
Glueck observes: 
Cannon does not contend that companies move through these 
stages in sequence, or that they move through all the stages. 
It is not clear how and why firms decentralize or why they 
go through these stages. What Cannon does say is that if 
the firm is in Stage II, the organizational characteristic 
of specialization by function is present (p. 237). 
Thain (1969) has identified three main stages.of corporate 
development (see Table X) • Stage I companies are generally simple and 
TABLE VIII 
CORPORATE LIFE CYCLE: THREE STAGES AND COMPANY CHARACTERISTICS 
Company 
Characteristics 













a. Control system 
9. Operating decisions 
lO.Strategic choices 
Stage I Company 
(or Small Company) 
Single product or 
single product line 
One channel or set 
of channels 
Little formal struc-
ture; one-man show 









Personal control of 
strategic decisions 
Personal control of 
operating decisions 
Needs of owner versus 
needs of company 
Stages in Corporate Life Cycle 
Stage II Company 
(or Integrated Company) 
Single product line 
One set of channels 
Specialization based 









Systematic with emphasis 
on stability and service 
Personal control of 
stra~egic decisions 
Increasing delegation of 
operating decisions thru 
policy 
Degree of integration, 
market share objective; 
breadth of productline 
Stage III Company 
(or Diversified Company) 
Multiple product lines 
Multiple channels 
Specialization based on 
market-product relationships 
Non-integrated, pattern of 
transactions 
Institutionalized search 
for new products as well 
as for improvements 
Increasingly impersonal, 
using market criteria 
(ROI, market share) 
Systematic with variability 
related to performance 
Indirect control based on 
analysis of "results" 
Delegation of market-
product decisions within 
existing businesses 
Entry and exit from in-
dustries; allocation of re-
sources by industry; rate 
of growth 
Source: Tuason, Roman V. Jr. 11 Corporate Life Cycle and the Evaluation of Corporate 
Strategy. 11 Academy of Management Proceedings, 1973, p. 37. Adapted from Scott, 
B. R. 11 The Industrial State: Old Myths and New Realities. 11 Harvard Business 



























Made more and May have 11 loss 11 
more by of control 11 
other 
managers 
Specializa- To cope with 
tion based problems of 
on func- functionaliza-
tions tion 





t ion is 
important is 
difficult 
Concerned Problems with 






Corporate staff Corporate manage-
assists in ment makes the 
decisions decisions 
Corporate staff Similar to 




may result in 
slower commun-
ications 
May be problems Tightening of 
between line control 
and staff 
Source: Glueck, William F. Business Policy: Strategy Formation and Management Action. New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1976, p. 237. 
TABLE X 
KEY FACTORS IN TOP MANAGEMENT PROCESS IN 
STAGE I, II AND III COMPANIES 
Key factors in 
management 
process 

















Survival and growth. 
dealing with short-term 
operating problems 
Personal and subjective 
Implicit and personal: 
exploitation of imme-
diate opportunities seen 
by owner-manager 
One unit ''one man 
show" 
Personal. subjective. 
control based on simple 
accounting system and 
daily communication and 
observation 
Personal cr1teria. rela-
tionships with owner. 
operating efficiency. 
ability to solve oper-
ating problems 
Informal. personal. sub-
jective. used to main-
tain control and divide 
small pool of resources 
to provide personal in-




and expansion of re-
sources. providmg for 
adequate attention to 
product problems 
Profits and meeting func-
tionally oriented bud-
gets and performance 
targets 
Functionally oriented 
moves restricted to "one 
product" scope; exploi-
tation of one bas1c prod-
uct or service field 
One unit functionally 
specwl1zed group 
Control grows beyond 
one man. assessment of 
functional operations 
necessary. structured 
control systems evolve 
Functional and Internal 
criteria such as sales. 
performance compared 
to budget. size of empire. 
status in group. personal 
relationships. etc. 
More .structured. usually 
based to a greater ex-
tent on agreed polic1es 





ment and investment and 
control of large. in-
creasing. and diversi-
fied resources. Also. 
important to diagnose 
and take action on prob-
lems at d1vis1on level 
ROl. profits. earnings 
per share 
Growth and product diver-
sification; explo1tat1on 
of general bus1ness op-
portunities 
Mult1unit generAl staff 
office a11d decentral-
IZed operat1ng divisions 
Complex formal system 
geared to comparative 
assessment of perform-
ance measures. indicating 
problems and opportuni-
ties and assess1ng man-
agement abil1ty of division 
managers 
More 1mpersonal applica-
tion of comparisons such 
as profits. ROl. P/E 
ratio. sales. market share. 
productivity. product lead-
ership. personnel develop-
ment. employee attitudes. 
public responsibility 
Allotment by "due proc-
ess" of a wide va rrety of 
different rewards and 
punishments on a formal 
and systematic bas1s. Com-
pany-wide pol1cies usually 
apply to many different 
classes of managers and 
workers w1th few major 
exceptions lor individual 
cases 
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Source: Thain, Donald H. 11 Stages of Corporate Development 11 in Glueck, 
William F. Business Policy: Strategy Formation and Management 
Action, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976, p. 248. 
small, whereas Stage III companies are large and complex. Thain 
concedes that not all companies can be classified in any one of the 
stages, since many companies would be in a phase of transition from 
Stage I to II or from Stage II to III. 
Smith and Charmoz (1975) provide a good example of a growth and 
development model for a multinational corporation. Figure 10 
illustrates their five-phase model of evolution of control, coordina-
tion and organizational crises in the development of MNC (Galbraith 
and Nathanson, 1978, pp. 107-110). 
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Galbraith and Nathanson (1978) offer their own considerably 
refined model of corporate growth and development (see Figure 11). It 
essentially summarizes the main concepts of the earlier models and 
builds on the available empirical evidence. The stages of growth in 
this model are neither discrete nor sequential thereby permitting 
alternate paths through the developmental sequence. Besides, the model 
also empirically illustrates the dominant (not universal) growth path 
taken by the U.S. firms. 
Based on the empirical research of, and theoretical models 
developed by, organization theorists as also business policy researchers, 
Litschert and Bonham (1978) develop a conceptual model of strategy 
formation (see Figure 12), where "organization slack" 4 is a crucial 
moderator variable influencing the necessary fit between structure and 
contextual variables (technology and environment) and ultimately the 
causal direction of the strategy-structure relationship. Thus, the 
level of organizational slack is a major determinant of the contingent 
nature of strategy. The authors contend that 
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Phase Ill 
Development lnternatio11al Global 
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Mutual Adjustment (Coordination by checking only as problems arise) 
= = = = Planning (Coordination through tops down planning) 
Crises 
Policy and Procedure ICoorduiJIIOn tluough establishment of polic1es JIHI procedures) 
Source: Smith, William and R. Charmoz. "Coordinate 
Line Management." Working Paper, Searle Inter-
national, Chicago, Feb. 1975. Reproduced from 
Galbraith, Jay R. and Daniel A. Nathanson. 
Strategy Implementation: The Role of Structure 
and Process. St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing 
Co., 1978, p. 108. 
Figure 10. Evolution of Control, Coordination and 
Organizational Crises in the 
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Source: Galbraith; Jay R. and Daniel A. Nathanson. Strategy 
Implementation: The Role of Structure and Process. 
St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1978, p. 115. 
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Source: Litschert, Robert J. 
Strategy Formation. 11 
p. 216 
and T. W. Bonham. 11 A Conceptual Model of 
Academy of Management Review, Vol. 3 (1978), 
Figure 12. The Role of Organizational Slack and the Contingent Nature 
of Strategy and Structure 
... slack affects the direction of the strategy-structure 
relationship by influencing the necessary fit between 
organization structure and the interactive effects of 
technologies and environments. When slack is low, there are 
no excess resources to pay the price of a structural design 
different from that dictated by the interactive effects of 
these contextual variables. Necessary fit is tight, and 
strategy is determined by structul·e, at least in part. When 
slack is relatively high, excess resources are available to 
pay the price of a structural design which may stray from 
the contingent requirements of contextual variables. In 
this case, necessary fit may be loose because economic sacri-
fice is minimized, and strategy is likely to be more contin-
gent on the ideological values of the dominant coalition 
(p. 217). 
The contingency theory of organizational structure states that 
there is no one best way to organize, nor are all ways of organizing 
equally effective. Organization theorists, notably Burns and Stalker, 
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and Lawrence and Lorsch, consi~er the rate of change in the environment 
as a determinant of the organizational form. This point of view is 
consistent with Chandler•s strategy-structure hypothesis, since 
organizations, rather than responding to their given external environ-
ments, 11 enact 11 (Weick) 1969, 1977) or shape their own envil~onments 
through a series of strategic decisions over a period of time. A 
high degree of corporate diversity (itself the result of past strategies 
and performance) means that the organization is simultaneously operating 
in many different product-market domains. As Khandwall a (1977, p. 337) 
points out: 11 Typically but not exclusively, diversified organizations 
tend to have highly variegated environments.~~ Thus the rate as also 
the predictability of the environmental changes are very often 
determined by the strategies pursued by the organization. As organiza-
tions grow in size and become more diverse through the adoptinn of 
certain strategies, more decentralized subunits are formed for 
effective strategy-implementation. The extent of decentralization 
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(which is an important characteristic of organizational structure) 
depends on the need for environmental adaptability, and therefore 
subunit autonomy, of differentiated subunits as also the need for 
integration of subunits (for attainment of overall corporate goals) for 
effectively managing greater diversity. The contingency paradigm, as 
presented by Khandwalla (1977, p. 236), is shown below: 
Differences in organizational 
sit~ations or contexts (such 
as in external environment, 
size of organization, 
technology, etc.) 




their structures I 
The relationships between corporate strategy and structural and 
admi ni strati ve decisions (advoca.ted by Chandler, 1962 and others); and 
the relationships between a firm's structural and administrative deci-
sions and its environmental complexity and uncertainty (advocated by 
organizational theorists, like Burns and Stalker, 1961, Lawrence and 
Lersch, 1969, Woodward, 1965 and others) are gradually evolving into a 
contingency theory of the firm that looks like the one charted by Ward 
(1976, p. 219) in Table XI. 
As Richards (1978) points out, the organizational structure is 
important in the formulation and implementation of strategy, 
... because tbe locus of planning, goal setting and decision-
making is dependent upon the type of structure in which the 
planning is done ... The hierachical nature of goals and 
subgoals stems from organizational hierarchy. Much of the 
planning that is performed at the product division level in 
the larger diversified organizations is performed at the 
corporate level in single product functionally organized organ-
izations (Galbraith and Nathanson, 1978). Additionally, there 
is a correspondence between the hierarachy of organization 
structure and the hierarchy of-strategies (p. 25). 
Organizational Administration 
structure 
organizational decision making 









goals and objectives 
policies and actions 
= f(Environment and Corporate Resources) 
uncertainty 
human needs 




Source: Ward, John L. 11The Opportunity to Measure Strategic Variables: An Attempt to Quantify 
Product-Market Diversity_.~ Journal of Economics and Business, Vol 28 (Spring-Summer 1976), 
p. 219. 
Therefore, in corporate strategy research the interactions between 
size, diversity and structure assume considerable importance. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to survey the relevant 
literature from business policy and organization theory to provide a 
proper theoretical base for the study. The theoretical and empirical 
literature, pertaining to the key concepts relevant to the development 
of this study•s conceptual framework, has been broadly reviewed. 
The definitions and operational measures of specific concepts 
directly relevant to this study•s conceptual framework are explained 
in Chapter III. Chapter IV describes the study•s conceptual frame-




1The 1967 data are taken from a survey of 471 of the largest 
companies in the United States conducted by Heidrick & Struggles. 
The 1971 data are taken from an analysis o·l" data published by Forbes 
(May 1972) covering the 724 largest companies in the United States. -
The results of both surveys are summarized in ~1anagement Practice 
(Summer 1972). 
2Research on organization structure carried on by D. S. Pugh and 
his colleagues at the University of Aston in England. 
4organizational slack is a hypothetical construct developed by 
the well-known troika of organization theorists, Cyert, March and Simon. 
March and Simon (1958, p. 126) define organizational slack as the 
11 difference between the resources available to the organization and the 
total requirements of the members of the organizational coalition. 11 
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CHAPTER III 
DEFINITIONS, CONCEPTS AND MEASURES 
Introduction 
There are no generally accepted definitions or measures of most 
of the concepts constituting this study•s conceptual framework. The 
lack of clear-cut definitions and operational measures of research 
variables has been a major contributing factor in the slow development 
of the substantive area of business policy. The data for this study 
was to be collected through mail questionnaires designed to be filled 
out by senior corporate executives. It was therefore essential that 
the concepts and measurement techniques be formulated in a manner that 
would be managerially meaningful, and which would accurately (and in 
the least possible time) capture the essence of top management•s 
assertions and perceptions about various aspects of their firm•s oper-
ations and environments. This chapter explains the definitions and 
measures of eight key concepts underlying this study•s conceptual 
framework outlined in Figure 1. 
Grand Corporate Strategy 
The grand corporate strategy for the purpose of this study is 
defined as the major plan of action for achieving the sales and earnings 
goals for the company as a whole (rather than a product, division or 
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market segment}. In other words, the grand corporate strategy is the 
overall, primary, predominant, the single most important and vital or 
master strategy of the firm. As Newman (1971, p. 70) points out, the 
"master strategl' refers to the entire pattern of company's basic 
mission, purposes, objectives, policies and specific resource deploy-
ment (Steiner and Miner, 1977, p. 20--emphasis provided). Paine and 
Naumes (1974) define an overall (or corporate) strategy 
... as a plan which encompasses not only the mission, 
policies, objectives and more specific goals of the organi-
zation, but also a plan of action for achieving these 
objectives and goals ... An overall strategy, then, is 
the sum total or pattern of ... past and present actions 
or decisions (p. 7). 
Other well-known definitions of corporate strategies implicitly 
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relate to grand corporate strategies discussed earlier because of their 
overall corporate orientation. Consider for instance, definitions by 
Chandler and Glueck. Chandler (1962, p. 16) defined strategy as "the 
determination of basic long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise, 
and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources 
necessary for carrying out these goals." Glueck (1976, p. 3) defines a 
strategy as "a unified comprehensive and integrated plan designed to 
assure that the basic objectives of the enterprise are achieved." Thus, 
the definition of grand corporate strategy used in this study is con-
sistent with the definitions used by the well-known authors in the field 
of business policy. 
It should also be clear that the definition of grand corporate 
strategy is based on scope. For this reason such a strategy is 
formulated for, and encompasses the activities of, the company as a 
whole rather than a business, or a division, or a product or a market 
or a functional area. Thus a conglomerate wi 11 have different business 
strategies, but wi 11 have only one grand corporate strategy. Simi 1 arly, 
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a multi-divisional company will have different divisional strategies 
but will still have only one grand corporate strategy for achieving the 
sales and earnings goals of the company as a whole. In fact, the grand 
corporate strategy provides a groundwork from which different sub-
strategies are derived. The survey respondents (chief executive 
officers) were asked to identify their primary or single most important 
strategy as their grand corporate strategy from a normative classifica-
tion of grand corporate strategies derived from Glueck (1976) and 
delineated in Appendix C (Chief Executive Officer's Questionnaire). 
The strategies are classified under four broad heads: 
(1) Stability Strategies 
(2) Internal Growth Strategies 
(3) External Acquisitive Growth Strategies 
(4) Retrenchment Strategies 
This normative list of strategies classifies strategies as to 
purpose and function. Since the strategies follow corporate objectives 
or more precisely, since strategies are plans of action to achieve 
certain specific corporate objectives, they are naturally functional 
(meant to do certain things) and purpose-oriented. Based on the 
respondents' identification, the subject firms were therefore classi- · 
fied into four categories of grand corporate strategies. 
Relative Strategic Significance of Different 
Organizational Functions 
This study explores the nature of relationships between the grand 
corporate strategies pursued by industrial firms and their top managers' 
perceptions of the relative importance (to effective strategy 
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implementation) of different organizational functions. For this purpose 
the following seven organizational functions were identified: 
l. General Administration 
2. Production/Operations 




7. Public and Government Relations 
However, the senior executives were not asked to merely rank these 
functions in order of importance or to evaluate each function in terms 
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of its strategic significance on a Likert-type rating scale. A norma-
tive list of functionally grouped key result areas or strategic factors 
was developed and the senior executives were asked to rate each key 
result area separately in terms of its strategic significance. Initially, 
a very detailed checklist of ninety-nine key result areas relevant to 
industrial firms was prepared. This checklist is presented in Appendix 
A. However, it was readily apparent that to ensure adequate response 
from the participating firms, the list should be kept to a manageable 
length. Ultimately, the number of key result areas was reduced by 
almost fifty percent and a revised normative list of functionally grouped 
key result areas, as shown in Appendix C (Senior Executive•s Question-
aire), was used in the study. 
Key result areas, when classified in this manner, reflect the 
functional goals, strategies, policies, programs, roles and structure. 
The key result areas have a significant impact on corporate performance 
and are therefore critical to the firm•s success or failure. The key 
result areas are key organizational variables; they may also be called 
11 Strategic factors, .. 11 Critical factors, .. 11 key success factors, 11 
"performance variables," "pulse points," 11 limiting factors," (Anthony, 
1976, p. 139), and CSFs or 11 critical success factors .. (Rockart, 1979). 
According to Steiner (1969a): 
Strategic factor refers to an action, element or condition 
which for a business may be of critical importance in its 
success or failure. It can refer both to a force outside 
the company as well as one within the enterprise. Success, 
as the word is used in this survey refers to the desired 
achievement of major objectives and goals established for 
your company (p. 2). 
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A company's performance in its different key result areas should 
determine the effective implementation of its grand corporate strategy. 
However, the relative strategic significance of different key result 
areas would be different for companies having different grand corporate 
strategies, therefore top managers of different firms having different 
grand corporate strategies would perceive the relative strategic signi-
ficance of key result areas in the various organizational functions 
differently. 
Since each company has a distinct identity, each company must 
determine its own key result areas in different organizational functions. 
However, a list of these key result areas common to all industrial com-
panies (the subject of this study), can be prepared on the basis of past 
studies, research and managerial experience. Key result areas listed in 
Appendix A and in Appendix C are derived primarily from Steiner's (l969a) 
empirical study of strategic factors in business success, as also from 
the works of Glueck (1976), Anthony and Dearden (1976), Paine and 
Naumes (1974), Stevenson (1976), Murdic et al. (1976), Buchele (1962), 
Sproul (1960), American Institute of ~1anagement (Management Audit 
Questionnaires, Series 11, 1961), and Rockart (1979). 
The evaluation of each key result area in terms of its strategic 
significance (to effective implementation of grand corporate strategy) 
is based upon a 7-point rating scale as shown below: 
1 - completely strategically insignificant 
2- of very little strategic significance 
3 - of somewhat less than average strategic significance 
4 - of average strategic significance 
5 - of somewhat more than average strategic significance 
6 - of very great strategic significance 
7 - of th~ greatest strategic significance 
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The rating scale in this study is a slightly modified version of 
Steiner•s (1969a) measur~. Steiner used a 6-point scale of values from 
zero to five, _for the purpose of evaluating (1) the current performance) 
and (2) the future importance of each strategic factor. 
However, the analysis of data on the basis of strategic significance 
score of each key result area would make the analysis too unwieldy. 
Besides, the focus of this study is on the strategic significance mix 
of different organizational functions. Therefore for each subject firm, 
the strategic significance score is computed for each organizational 
function by adding up the scores of respective key result areas and 
dividing the sum by the number of key result areas in that functional 
category. This approach provides more reliable and logically consistent 
results than mere rankings of the seven organizational functions in order 
of importance for each firm. 
Firm Size 
Sales volume, total assets and number of employees, have 
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traditionally been considered as effective indicators of size. The 
authoritative annual Fortune directories rank the top 1000 U.S. 
industrial corporations on the basis of their annual sales volume; for 
this purpose the sales are defined as annual sales revenue inclusive of 
service and rental revenues but exclusive of dividends, interests and 
other non-operating revenues and excise taxes. Based on this most 
widely accepted definition of "sales," the :subject firms (the 1000 
largest U.S. industrial incorporations as listed in the 1978 Fortune 
Directories) are classified by the survey respondents into the follow-
ing three categories as per their sales: 
Firm Size 
Sma 11 






600 and over 
This classification scheme divides the 1978 Fortune 1000 firms 
into three more or less equal groups. The breaking points of $201 
million and $600 million represent the sales of 688th largest firm (69th 
percentile) and 342nd largest firm (34th percentile), respectively. 
Categories of Corporate Diversity 
The extent of diversity of a firm 1 s current operations is a 
function of the success of the degree and ~ of product-market 
diversification strategies pursued by the firm in the past. Thus, if 
a company has pursued the strategy of concentrating on a single 
business, such a company would be a single business firm. On the 
other hand, a company with a history of aggressive diversification into 
new products and markets unrelated to its primary end product business 
would be an unrelated business firm or a conglomerate. Therefore, the 
concept of corporate diversity is a reflection of a firm's concept of 
its own strategic posture. 
Wrigley (1970) used a random sample of 100 firms from the 1967 
Fortune 500 firms and classified these firms into the following four 
categories of diversity: 
(1) Single Product- no diversification, primary commitment to a 
single business. 
(2) Dominant Product - primary commitment to a single business 
and diversification to a small degree. 
(3) Related Product - diversification into new areas concen-
trically related (by market or technology) to the primary end product 
business. 
(4) Unrelated Product - diversification into new areas without 
regard to such relationships. 
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Rumelt (1974) modified and expanded Wrigley's classification system 
and introduced the concept of "specialization rati0 11 as the primary 
measure of corporate diversity. He defined specialization ratio . 
. . . as the proportion of a firm•s revenues that is attri-
butable to its largest discrete product-market activity. A 
'discrete business' (or product-market activity) is one that 
is strategically independent of the firm's other businesses 
in that basic changes in its nature and scope can be made 
without meeting constraints imposed by other of the firm's 
businesses and without materially affecting the operation 
and strategic direction of other of the firm's businesses 
(p. 29). 
The categories of corporate diversity developed for this study are 


















Source: Derived from Rumelt, Richard P. Strategy, Structure, and 
Economic Performance. Boston: Division of Research, Harvard 
Business School, 1974, p. 30 
Figure 13. The Process of Assigning Corporate Diversity 
Categories on the Basis of Specialization 
Ratio (SR) and the Nature of Diversification 
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flow diagram that describes the process of categorizing a firm. The 
survey respondents (senior executives) were therefore asked to indicate 
the extent of their corporate diversity from a classification of 
diversity shown in Appendix C (Senior Executives•s Questionnaire). 
Categories of Industry 
The Fortune directories classify the companies (1000 largest 
United States industrial corporations) into 28 industry groups based on 
the industry code numbers established by the United States Office of 
Management and Budget and issued by the Federal Statistical Policy 
and Standards Office. However, the firms in this study were classi-
fied into four broad categories on the basis of their principal industry 
(representing the largest percentage of company sales) as shown below: 
1. Consumer nondurable goods industries 
2. Consumer durable goods industries 
3. Capital goods industries 
4. Producer goods (raw materials, components and supplies) 
industries 
The above classification scheme is derived from Khandv,mlla (1977) 
and Schoeffler et al. (PIMS Study, 1974). The survey respondents were 
therefore asked to identify their industry from among the above four 
categories. 
Categories of Production System 
The following classification system, developed by Woodward (1965), 
is used in the study: 
1. Unit and small batch production 
2. Large batch and mass production 
3. Continuous process production 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter II the reason for choosing 
Woodward 1 s production system classification scheme is that it is the 
least abstract and can be easily explained. Therefore, it was hoped 
the practicing executives would be able to identify their predominant 
production system without the need for lengthy explanation of terms 
used. 
Categories of Organizational Structure 
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In Chapter II the relevant literature pertaining to the strategy-
structure relationship has already been reviewed. Some corporate 
growth and development paradigms developed by the Harvard researchers 
were also briefly described earlier. Analyses of the history of 
American and West European industrial enterprises have shown a gradual 
but unmistakable evolution of organizations from functional to multi-
divisional forms. With the increase in the volume and diversity of 
product-market activities successful firms have tended to make suitable 
changes in the design of their organizational structure. 
A recent effort at building a conceptual model of different types 
of organization is exemplified by Galbraith and Nathanson {1978, p. 
118). Their model of five organizational types relates the organiza-
tional form to strategy and structural characteristics as outlined in 
Table XII. Besides structure and strategy the model also describes 
some other characteristics (e.g. R&D, inter-unit and market relations, 
performance measurement, leader style and control), of each organiza-
tional form. As Galbraith and Nathanson (1978) point out: 
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TABLE XII 
STRATEGY AND STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS 
OF FIVE ORGANIZATIONAL TYPES 








Single Product and 
Vertical Integration 
Growth by Acquisition 
Unrelated Diversity 




















Product or Area 
Divisions 
Source: Derived from Galbraith, Jay R. and Daniel A. Nathanson. 
Strategy Implementation: The Role of Structure and Process. 
St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1978, p. 118. 
The firm changes all these characteristics when moving 
from one form to another. Collectively, the characteristics 
constitute the way of life of the organization. They form 
an integrated whole which fit together to permit effective 
implementation of the respective strategies. When the 
organization changes strategies, these characteristics must 
be disengaged, realigned, and reconnected. This change 
constitutes a metamorphosis (p. 120). 
Rumelt (1974, pp. 33-40), for his longtitudinal study of the 
evolution of large U.S. industrial companies developed the following 
five categories of organizational structure: 
1 . Function a 1 
2. Functional with one or more product divisions 
or subsidiaries 
3. Product Division 
4. Geographic Division 
5. Holding Company 
Rumelt's classification system was used in this study (see 
Appendix C- Senior Executive's Questionnaire) to enable survey 
respondents to identify their firm's organizational structure. 
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty 
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The definition and operational measure of this variable is adopted 
from Miles and Snow (1978). According to Miles and Snow, 11 perceived 
environmental uncertainty refers ... to the predictability of con-
ditions in the organization's environment .. (p. 195). It was mev.sured 
in this study on the basis of their perceived environmental uncertainty 
questionnaire (see Appendix C- Senior Executive's Questionnaire), which 
has a 7-point rating scale questions 
... that corresponded to six major sectors of the industrial 
organization's environment: (l) relations with raw material 
suppliers, (2) competitors' product price, quality and design 
changes, (3) customer demand, (4) relations with financial 
suppliers, (5) relations with governmental regulatory agencies, 
and (6) relations with labor unions. These environmental 
dimensions were suggested by previous theory and research by 
Dill (1958), Katz and Kahn (1966), Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) 
and Thompson {1967) (pp. 195-196). 
83 
For each subject firm, the PEU {perceived environmental uncertainty) 
score was computed by adding up the scores of all the twenty-five 
sectors of the external environment and dividing the sum by 25. The 
subject firms were then divided into two classes: (1) firms with high 
perceived environmental uncertainty; and (2) firms with low perceived 
environmental uncertainty by dichotomizing the PEU scores at the mean 
value of 4. Thus a firm with PEU score of less than or equal to 4 
would have low PEU, whereas a firm with PEU score of greater than 4 
would be considered as having high PEU. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to explain the definitions and 
measures of eight key concepts underlying this study's conceptual 
framework. The schemes for categorizing grand corporate strategy, 
firm size, corporate diversity, industry, pr·oduction system, and 
organizational structure; and the schemes for measuring the relative 
strategic significance of different organizational functions, and 
perceived environmental uncertainty have been explained. Chapter IV 
describes the study's conceptual framework and poses and discusses the 




The purpose of this chapter is to describe the conceptual frame-
work which the study will examine. This chapter will include an 
overview and a separate discussion for each research question investi-
gated by the study. While explaining the nature and the objectives of 
the study in Chapter I, the study 1 s conceptual framework in a summary 
form was presented in Figure l (p. 6) to provide a bird 1 S eye view of 
the whole study. Since the definitions and measures of concepts used 
in the study have already been explained in the previous chapter, the 
detailed conceptual framework showing the interrelationships between 
variables involved in the study is depicted in Figure 14. 
Overview 
The basic assumption of this study is that in an industrial firm 
seven major organizational functions, namely: (1) General Administration, 
(2) Production/Operations, (3) Engineering and R&D, (4) Marketing, (5) 
Finance, (6) Personnel and (7) Public and Government Relations can have 
significant influence on the effective inplementation of the firm 1 s 
grand corporate strategy. However, the relative strategic significance 
of different organizational functions or the strategic mix of organiza-
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perceptions of rela-
tive strategic signifi-
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plementation of the 
Grand Corporate Strat-
egy pursued) of fifty-
five Key Result Areas 
grouped into the fol-










7) Public and Govern-
ment Relations 
Figure 14. The Conceptual Framework Showing the Interrelationships 
Between Variables Involved in the Study 
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·corporate strategies. And since no two firms are exactly alike, even 
for firms purusing identical grand corporate strategy we would expect 
that the strategic mixes of organizational functions would be different 
for firms: (a) of different size, (b) with different degree of corporate 
diversity, (c) in different industries, (d) with different production 
systems, (e) with different organizational structures, and (f) with 
different managerial perceptions of environmental uncertainty. The 
study probes the relative strategic significance of each of the seven 
functional tasks to the effective implementation of the grand corporate 
strategy pursued by the firm. This would help us to understand the 
nature in which the influence of all seven organizational functions in a 
firm combine. The particular combination of the influences of all the 
seven functions is what we call the strategic mix of organizational 
functions. The functional tasks' influence-mix approach to the study 
of corporate strategy is the central approach of this study. 
To the extent that a valid theory has the attributes of exp'li-
cability, generalizability, replicability and predictability, this 
study's conceptual framework is not a theory. This study is exploratory, 
in that the attempt is to develop a better understanding of the concept 
of corporate strategy. First, the intent is to establish the relation-
ships between grand corporate strategies and the strategic mixes of 
organizational functions. Secondly, the study will attempt to identify 
the nature of influence of size, corporate diversity, industry type, 
production system, organizational structure, and perceived environmental 
uncertainty, on the interrelationships between the grand corporate 
strategies pursued and the relative importance of different functional 
tasks. Thus, the aim of this study is to provide understanding rather 
than to provide generalizations or predict causality between different 
variables involved in the study. 
The conceptual framework of the study will now be discussed. The 
specific areas of study will be discussed later and the research 
questions presented. 
In the process of corporate strategy formulation and implementa-
tion, there emerges a means-end chain of relationships and a hierarchy 
of different phases as shown below (Paine and Naumes, 1974): 
1. Basic corporate mission 
2. Corporate objectives 
3. Corporate goals 
4. Corporate strategies and policies 
. 5. Corporate organizational structure 
6. Functional objectives, goals, strategies, policies, programs, 
roles, tasks and structures. 
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The first three phases provide the ends that the organization 
seeks to achieve; the last three phases provide the means for achieving 
these ends. Corporate strategies and policies provide a blueprint, or 
plans of actions for achieving organizational goals, which are made 
specific and time-bound. Corporate strategies and policies influence 
the organizational structure that provides a medium within which the 
corporate strategies are deployed. The last phase provides for the 
processes and structures involved in the detailed implementation of 
corporate strategies pursued by the organization. 
Some twenty years ago, Hill (1959) outlined four phases of prepar-
ing a long-range profit plan (see Table XIII), in the last phase, he 
laid down the planning requirements of each of the five principal 
TABLE XIII 
FOUR STAGES IN LONG-RANGE PROFIT PLANNING 
Phase I - Corporate Profit Objectives 
Analysis of record of operations 
Establishment of standards for future profits 
Projection of present operations 
Measurement of extent of need for new products 
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Preparation of 5 and 10-year corporate objectives of sales, profits, 
capital requirements for present and new products 
Phase I I -· Proprietary Directions for Corporate Growth 
Audit of corporate skills, resources and limitations 
Position of company in its total industry structure 
Changing end-use markets, technologies and competitive integration, 
affecting industry structure and company position 
Alternative directions for company evolution and growth 
Selection of most proprietary directions to maintain and optimize 
profits 
Phase III - Planning New Products 
Selection of product fields to fulfill corporate objectives of 
Phase I within selected directions of Phase II 
Determination of approach to new fields - by acquisition, internal 
research, joint ventures, etc. 
Programming of specific product lines. 
Scheduling of realization of new products in relation to financial 
and management feasibility 
Phase IV - Programming Requirements of Business Functions 
Marketing - Focusing market development plans and programming 
(products, merchandising, pricing, field sales, etc.) on consumer 
requirements 
Organization - Scheduling, recruitment and development of manpower 
requirements (management, other personnel) to staff long-rangeprogram 
R&D - Relating research and development to divisional and corporate 
present product maintenance and new product realization. 
Manufacturing- Scheduling further development of present and new 
plants and low-cost equipment programs 
Financial - Budgeting of capital requirements and development of 
financial resources 
Planning of Other Requirements 
Source: Hill, William E. "Planning for Profits: A Four-Stage Method. 11 
California Management _Review, Vol. 1 (Spring 1959), p. 32. 
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business functions, namely, marketing, organization, R&D, manufacturing 
and finance. 
Murdick (1964) advocated corporate planning based on a planning 
matrix consisting of three orthogonal vectors (or planning approaches) -
product planning, elements-of-cost planning and functional planning -
with the "corporate mold" providing the basic shape or limitations of 
the planning matrix. Thus, for every product, planning was done by 
functions and cost elements with the corporate level planning laying 
down the principles and policies which provide rational and ethical 
guidelines for action for attaining company objectives and goals. For 
functional planning the following tasks were identified: Marketing, 
.Engineering and Research, Production, Employee Relations, and Finance. 
·According to Vancil and Lorange (1975) the process of 
formulation of corporate strategy, business strategy, and functional 
strategy takes place at the three organizational levels: headquarters, 
division, and department, respectively. 
The planning processes leading to the formulation of these 
strategies can be labeled in parallel fashion as corporate 
planning, business planning, and functional planning ... 
In functional planning, the departments develop a set of 
feasible action programs to implement division strategy, while 
the division selects - in the light of its objectives - the 
subset of programs to be executed and coordinates the action 
programs of the functional departments. Strategy formulation 
involves selecting objectives and goals for each functional 
area (marketing, production, finance, research, and so on) 
and determining the nature and sequence of actions to be taken 
by each area t0 achieve its objectives and goals. Programs are 
the building blocks of strategic functional plans (p. 82). 
Hofer (1973) also describes the "strategy set .. as consisting 
of firm's objectives, strategy and functional policies. 
The strategic planning phase does not end with the formulation of 
strategy. It has been said that for achieving any objective one has to 
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do two things: (l) make a plan and (2) make that plan work.· President 
Carter, now in the third year of his office, has learned at great cost 
that making his plans work is much more difficult and at least as 
crucial (if not more) as developing the plans. A plan or a strategy, 
·until it is properly implemented, remains nothing but pious intentions, 
laudable aspirations or virtuous ends. Therefore, a strategy or a 
plan of action, in and of itself, is not capable of self-implementation. 
Thus, strategy-implementation is as important as strategy formulation. 
In fact, most of the issues pertaining to implementation are inter-
related with formulation. As Learned et al. (1969) observe, 
... in real life the process of formulation and implementa-
tion are intertwined. Feedback from operations gives notice 
of changing environmental factors to which strategy should be 
adjusted. The formulation of strategy is not finished when 
implementation begins (p. 571 ). 
Mason, Harris and Mclaughlin (1971) have developed a framework 
based on the dual axes of strategy formulation and implementation. The 
conceptual scheme illustrated in Figure 15, indicates the funnel concept 
and shows the many different elements which enter into the formulation 
and implementation of corporate strategy. It also indicates that a 
firm could be subjectively placed on the Formulation-Implementation 
(or the F-I) line at the point of convergence of the subjective 
ratings (high or low) of its strategy-formulation and strategy-
implementation processes. If a firm is positioned farther out on the 
line (high ratings for both formulation and implementation), it is more 
likely to be a growing and successful firm. Conversely, a more close-
in positioning of a firm (low ratings for both formulation and implementa-
tion) spells out impending failure. 
According to Steiner and Miner (1977, p. 608), 
Goal idenlificolion 
Envlronmenlal faclors 
Assessment of capobill ties 
Molivalions 
1- -Choice among alternatives 
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Source: Mason, R. H., J. Harris and J. Mclaughlin. "Corporate 
Strategy: A Point of View." California Management Review, 
Vol. 13 (Spring 1971), p. 11. 
Figure 15. The Formulation - Implementation Line 
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••implementation encompasses all functions of management, of both 
strategic and operational management ... They identified four important 
characteristics of policy/strategy implementation: 
First, it is clear that the focus is on design and integra-
tion of major mechanisms, philosophies, structures and 
personal interrelationships. Second, many different disci-
plines are involved in the design, operation and use of 
integrating systems. Third, conflicts inevitably arise and 
must be solved ... Fourth, the discharge of responsibilities 
listed requires the exercise of all functions of management 
(emphases provided) (p. 609). 
Thus, the designing of the organization structure merely sets a 
stage for organizational implementation of strategy in a very broad 
. . 
sense. The development of functional goals, strategies and policies 
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is necessary to make sure that the corporate strategy is implemented at 
all levels in the organization. The extent of formalization of functional 
policies is bound to vary with the size, diversity and complexity of the 
firm. As Glueck (1976) points out: 
... companies have policies about every major aspect of the 
firm (operations, finance, marketing, etc.) as well as general 
management ... The minimal policies which must be developed 
are the key functional decisions necessary in the following 
areas: (1) operations, (2) finance and accounting, (3) person-
nel, (4} marketing and logistics, and (5) research and develop-
ment (p. 234). 
According to Hake (1974), the preparation of an overall corporate 
plan requires that a firm be divided into the following separate 
planning areas and that a plan be prepared for each such area: (1) 
marketing, (2) finance, (3) product development, (4) production, (5) 
organization, and (6) manpower. 
Functional specialization in business organization dates back to 
the time when people perceived distinct advantages in operationalizing 
the concepts of specialization and division of labor in all areas of 
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·human activity. It also provides for an effective device to obviate the 
problems inherent to our 11 bounded rationality 11 (March and Simon, 1958}. 
Moreover, since every functional task enacts its own relevant sub-
environment (Weick, 1969, 1977), the prob 1 em of effective management of 
the organization-environment interaction for the organization as a 
whole is broken down into certain specific manageable components, and 
each of which is dealt with in a more specialized and competent manner. 
It is also important to bear in mind that divisionalization (on 
product or geographic lines} of an organization structure does not do 
away with the functional management concept. On the contrary, it adds 
another layer of functional managers to each division. Similarly) the 
matrix from involving project or product management creates another 
function (of liaison or coordination} within the general management 
category. 
The functional management concept is therefore very much an organi-
zational reality and furnishes a useful approach to the study of many 
organizational problems. 
The strategic significance of each of the seven organizational 
functions in this study is not directly determined through managerial 
perceptions. It is, on the other hand, derived from the managerial 
perceptions of strategic significance of key result areas in each of 
the functional tasks. These key result areas reflect nothing but the 
functional goals, strategies and policies necessary for effective 
implementation of corporate strategy. 
It is conceptualized in this study that for each of the four grand 
corporate strategies, the strategic significance of key result areas in 
different functional tasks is different. However, it is recognized 
94 
that these relationships are influenced by a vast variety of organiza-
tional and environmental variables. The "total" theory to explain and 
predict such relationships in terms of the influence of all possible 
mediating variables, cannot be developed on the basis of our existing 
knowledge. All mediating variables are not of equal importance nor are 
they all relevant to the study•s specific research objectives. There-
fore~ the influence of only six mediating variables (size, corporate 
diversity, industry, production system, organizational structure and 
perceived environmental uncertainty) on interrelationships between the 
effective implementation of grand corporate strategy and the relative 
strategic significance of key result areas in different functional tasks, 
has been made the subject of this study. Besides, the influence of 
these mediating or contextual variables have been shown by the litera-
ture as being highly significant in a study of this nature. The under-
lying assumptions of the theory of this study are derived from the con-
ceptual discussion covered earlier in this sub-section along with the 
literature reviewed earlier in Chapter II. 
Grand Corporate Strategy and Relative Strategic 
Significance of Different Organizational 
Functions 
Glueck (1976, p. 265) concludes from Steiner•s (l969a) study of 
strategic factors for current and future bus ·iness success that ••the 
crucial aspects of strategy that need to be evaluated are (1) Management 
quality and development, (2) Environmental appraisal, especially 
market tidings, and (3) Financial return. 11 Therefore, Steiner found 
general management, marketing and finance as strategically significant 
organizational functions. Godiwalla (1977) on the other hand, 
identified marketing, finance and production as three functional 
managements having the greatest influence upon the overall corporate 
strategy; however, he excluded administration or general management 
from his definition of functional managements. 
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The firm's grand corporate strategy (both past and current) 
determines the nature of the firm's relevant environment and the result-
ing organizational states, it also suggests the range of viable options 
for the finn's organization and management.· Allen (1972) found that 
the environmental requirements, organizational choices, and the 
resulting organizational states were significantly different for high 
performing conglomerates and vertically integrated companies. In his 
research study of corporate acquisitions, Kitching (1967) found that 
finance had the highest payoff in all types of mergers except one -
horizontal mergers - where marketing had the highest payoff followed very 
closely by finance. Besides, in finance it was easiest to release 
synergy in all types of mergers except concentric technology mergers. 
Heau (1976) identified production and finance as the critical functions 
for firms pursuing vertical integration and conglomerate diversification, 
respectively, Miles and Snow's (1978) typology of organizations indicate 
that each organization type has its own strategy for responding to the 
environment, and has a particular combination of technology, structure, 
and management process consistent with its strategy. 
These research studies fail to address to the basic research 
question of this study, namely: Is the relative importance of 
different functional tasks different for firms pursuing different grand 
corporate strategies? However, the available literature does seem to 
indicate that the senior executives of industrial firms pursuing 
different grand corporate strategies would have different perceptions 
about the relative importance of different functions in their firms. 
The Research Question 1 outlined below seeks to develop a normative 
framework, grounded in sophisticated description, of effective prior-
itization of strategic organizational functions for different grand 
corporate strategies. 
Research Question 1 
Is the relative stragetic significance of the seven different 
organizational functions different for firms pursuing different grand 
corporate strategies? 
Strategy, Size and Strategic Mixes of 
Organizational Functions 
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Steiner (1969a), did not analyze the strategic factors for business 
success differently for firms of varying size. Godiwalla (1977) found 
finance to be the "strategic functional management'' for large size 
firms (sales exceeding $250 million) and marketing to be the "signifi-
cantly strategic functional management'' for both small and medium size 
firms. Again, he excluded general management from the definition of 
functional managements. 
According to the organization theory literature, size of the 
organization has a significant influence on the various strategic and 
structural variables. Size in most cases may be a function of age, 
organization's past strategies and performance, and the stage of the 
organizational life cycle. Size is also interrelated with the structure 
of the firm's industry as also the firm's technology and capital 
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·intensity. Size also affects the environmental complexity and the 
organization•s structural design and the management processes to deal 
with the complexity and uncertainty, since for most large industrial 
firms environmental contingencies may interact with scale contingencies. 
The pertinent organization theory literature reviewed in Chapter II 
emphasizes the importance of size as a crucial contextual variable in 
any corporate strategy research. Research evidence seems to indicate 
that even for firms pursuing identical grand corporate strategy there 
would be differences in the managerial perceptions of the strategic 
mixes of organizational functions in firms of different size. Therefore, 
Research Question 2 seeks to establish the relationship between the 
type of grand corporate strategy pursued and the identity of functional 
areas perceived to be strategically significant for effective strategy-
implementation in firms of different size. 
Research Question 2 
For firms pursuing a particular grand corporate strategy, is the 
relative strategic significane of the seven different organizational 
functions different for firms of different size? 
Strategy, Corporate Diversity and Strategic Mixes 
of Organizational Functions 
Rumelt (1974) in his study examined the relationship between 
diversification strategy and organization structure and the association 
between these two key variables and economic performance in large 
American industrial corporations. Other researchers inspired (like 
Rumelt) by Chandler•s strategy-structure thesis, have also studied the 
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·impact of corporate diversity on organizational structure and performace. 
A high degree of corporate diversity (itself the result of past 
strategies and performance) means that the organization is simultan-
eously operating in many different product-market domains. As Khandwa1la 
(1977, p. 337) points out: 11 Typically but not exclusively, diversified 
organizations tend to have highly variegated environments." The degree 
of corporate diversity is also related to the organization 1 S internal 
structure, decision-making processes, environmental complexity and 
uncertainty, and the nature of boundary-spanning activities. 
Kitching (1967) in his study of firms (45% of which were conglomer-
ates - unrelated business firms) following external acquisitive growth 
strategies found that effective management of finance function is very 
crucial to the success of mergers. 
Allen (1972) found that the high performing conglomerates 
(unre 1 a ted business firms) and vertically integrated firms (probably 
dominant business firms) were faced with different organizational 
choices and the resulting organizational states. 
Fouraker and Stopford (1968) found that the org~nizations pursuing 
multinational growth strategy tend to have a highly diversified 
domestic business with a proven R&D leadership. 
Heau (1 976) observes: 
... corporate structure in terms of corporate staff~ infor-
mation flow and corporate culture is presumably related to 
strategy defined in terms of product relatedness. The more 
related the businesses (vertical integration being the 
extreme case} the larger the corporate staff, the more operation-
oriented the infm~mation flow and the more industry-minded top 
management. The more unrelated the businesses (conglomerates 
being here the other extreme), the smaller the corporate staff, 
the more financially-oriented the information flow and the 
corporate structure (Ch. IV, p. 10}. 
For each class of firms, the corporate culture or the orientation of 





















With the increasing trend toward milti-plant operations, especially 
in large multi-industry and multi-national firms, the benefits of 
financial synergy ~eem to outweigh the economies of scale in production, 
marketing and management. According to Pohl (1973), there is a 
noticeable trend toward an increase in direct involvement of the chief 
financial officers in the strategic issues handled by the top management. 
In Miles and Snow's (1978) typology of organizations, each type 
has its own strategy. Thus, for example, "Defenders" organizations are 
risk-avert outside their narrow product-market domains, whereas "Analyzers" 
organizations pursue growth strategies in concentrically related areas. 
One would therefore find differences in the structural characteristics, 
corporate diversity and management processes in these two types of 
organizations. 
However, no research seems to have focused on identifying the 
strategic mixes of organizational functions for effective implementation 
of grand corporate strategies in firms with different degrees of corpor-
ate diversity. Therefore, our area of inquiry would be: For firms 
pursuing a particular grand corporate strategy, are the strategic mixes 
of organizational functions different for firms with the varying degrees 
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of corporate diversity? For instance, if we consider two firms pursuing 
internal growth strategy, one of which is a "single business .. firm 
whereas the other is a 11 related business 11 firm; can we expect their 
top managers to prioritize their strategic organizational functions in 
the same or different manner? Research Question 3 is stated below. 
Research Question 3 
For firms pursuing a particular grand corporate strategy, is the 
relative strategic significance of the seven different organizational 
functions different for firms with different degrees of corporate 
diversity? 
Strategy, Industry and Strategic Mixes of 
Organizational Functions 
Miles and Snow (1978, p. 196) in their study of electronics and 
food processing industry developed the concept of 11 strategi c function 11 
as that 11 functional area within the organization considered by members 
of the dominant coalition to be of strategic importance to successful 
competition in their industry.~~ The chief executives 1 ranking of top 
three strategic functions (by industry) and their equivalent counterparts 
in terms of this study 1 s classification of functional areas are shown 
below: 
Food Processing 
Sales and marketing (marketing) 
Production 
Long-range planning (general admin.) 
Electronics 
Sales and marketing 
(marketing) 
Research and development 
(engineering and R&D) 
Product engineering 
(engineering and R&D) 
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Lawrence and Lorsch (1967b) found 11 that marketing had more influ-
ence than production in both container-manufacturing and food-processing 
firms, apparently because of its involvement in innovations and with 
customers 11 (Hicksonet al., 1971, p. 219). 
The influence of industry type as a contextual variable may in 
fact be a composite influence of interaction between size, technological, 
environmental, and structural contingencies. But industries differ! 
primarily in their environmental complexity and uncertainty. And 
therefore, the works of organization theorists like Thompson, Burns and 
Stalker, Emery and Trist, Lawrence and Lorsch,and Duncan, cited earlier 
in Chapter II provide a strong (albeit indirect) support for the 
inclusion of industry type as a mediating variable in any corporate 
strategy research. 
In the absence of any multiple industry studies, it is not possible 
to test a specific hypothesis; therefore, Research Question 4 presents 
an area of inquiry: Is the functional tasks 1 strategic significance 
mix for a particular grand corporate strategy different for different 
industries? 
Research Q~estion 4 
For firms pursuing a particular grand corporate strategy, is the 
relative strategic significance of the seven differ·ent organizational 
functions different for firms in different industries? 
Strategy, Production System and Strategic Mixes 
of Organizational Functions 
Technology and its relationship to other key organizational and 
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environmental variables have been the subject of numerous empirical 
studies in organization theory. Woodward (1965), in one of the earliest 
studies of this kind, examined the relationship between technology 
(production system) and organizational structure. In that study, 
Woodward also tried to identify the 11 Critical function 11 from among 
three functions--development, production and marketing--for each type 
of production system. She classified the production systems into three 
broad categories and identified the critical function (or strategically 
significant functional area) for each type of production system: 
Types of Production System 
1. Unit and small batch 







According to Woodward (1965, p. 128) for each type of production 
. system 11 thel~e seemed to be one function that was central and critical 
in that it had the greatest effect on success and survival. 11 As far as 
the applicability of Woodward's findings to this study is concerned, 
two points need to be noted: (1) Woodward included only three functions 
and (2) she did not distinguish between the firms pursuing different 
grand corporate strategies, which although irrelevant to her study, is 
the main point of this study. 
Godiwalla (1977) in his study of functional managements' 
(excluding general management) influence on overall corporate strategy 
found that for firms having 11 Unit and sma 11 batch 11 production system, 
marketing was the significantly strategic functional management; this 
was also the case for firms whose predominant production system was 
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large batch and mass manufacturing. But for firms having process type 
of production, marketing was found to be the significantly strategic 
functional management. 
Kitching (1967) found technology to:be the function in which it 
was easiest to release synergy in concentric technology mergers. 
Heau (1976) identified engineering and R&D as the critical function 
for firms pursuing growth strategy of conc~ntric technology diversifi-
cation. 
Perrow (1970) classified orga11izations into four technology types 
and contended that problems faced by each organization type are differ-
ent and therefore the technological and structural requirements of each 
are also different. · 
Thompson (1967) developed a series of propositions about organiza-
tions with technology as a major determinant of structure. He classified 
technology into three types -mediating, intensive and long-linked, and 
suggested that the efforts needed to coordinate and control the organi-
zation's 11 technical core 11 are different for each and therefore the 
technology employed significantly impacts the structural dimensions and 
processes. 
Khandwalla(l974) established a special form of technology-strategy-
structure relationships, where the use of mass-output technology leads 
to the pursuit of vertical integration (a growth strategy) which in 
turn requires certain changes in the organizational structure and 
decision-making. 
The organization's primary production system influences the strategic, 
structural and scale aspects of the organization, it also affects the 
strategic mix of organizational functions through its impact on the 
degree of labor intensity , capital intensity (PH1S study, 1974), 
knowledge (and therefore R&D) intensity, and energy intensity. 
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The primary production system used in the organization determines 
the nature of its technological subenvironment as also the pattern of 
organization's strategic responses to that subenvironment (Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967). 
The pertinent organization theory literature, therefore, highlights 
the importance of production system as a crucial contextual variable 
in a study of this type. Research evidence seems to indicate that even 
for firms purusing identical grand corporate strategy there would be 
differences in the managerial perceptions of the strategic mixes. of 
organizational functions in firms having different production systems. 
Research Question 5 attempts to examine the relationship between the 
type of grand corporate strategy pursued and the identity of functional 
areas perceived to be strategically significant for effective strategy-
implementation in firms having different production systems. 
Research Question 5 
For firms pursuing a particular grand corporate strategy, is the 
relative strategic significance of the seven different organizational 
functions different for firms with different production systems? 
Strategy, Organizational Structure, and Strategic 
Mixes of Organizational Functions 
The interrelationship between diversification strategy and organi-
zational structure has been a subject of many researchers notably from 
Harvard Business School. Chandler (1962) showed how different 
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strategies posed different degree of admi1iistrative complexity and 
therefore tended to require different typ~s of organizational structure, 
in most cases the organization structure was found to follow the growth 
strategy pursued by the firm. 
Fouraker and Stopford (1968) found that organizations pursuing 
multinational growth strategy tend to have decentralized, divisionalized 
structure and the ability to produce international general managers 
capable of controlling and guiding a highly diversified organization. 
Heau (1976) grouped the firms into four different types of 
strategy categories and contended that a comparison along their 
corporate organizational structure would show differing tendencies; 
in particular, the functions existing at the top would be different 
for all four types. 
Pitts {1977) found systematic structural differences between 
internal diversifiers and acquisitive diversifiers. 
Khandwalla's {1974) study established a special form of technology-
strategy-structure relationships, where the adoption of mass-output 
technology leads to the pursuit of vertical integration, which in turn 
requires certain changes in the organizational structure and decision-
making. 
Miller and Springate (1978) found that in_product-divisional 
organizational structures comparable decisions tend to be made at 
lower levels of the organization than in the functional organizational 
structures. 
Litschert and Bonham (1978) considered the level of organizational 
slack as a major determinant of the contingent nature of strategy. In 
their conceptual model of strategy formation, organizational slack as 
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a crucial moderator variable influences the necessary fit between 
structure and contextual variables and ultimately the causal direction 
of the strategy-structure relationship. 
The 11 stages of growth and development .. theorists (Cannon, Thain, 
Tuason, Galbraith and Nathanson, and others) have developed conceptual 
models of corporate life cycle with distinct stages of corporate 
development. 
t 
The strategy and structural characteristics of firms in 
different stages of growth are different. 
The crucial significance of organizational structure in corporate 
planning emanates primarily from the fact that corporate planning, as 
the name suggests, is essentially an organization-wide activity rather 
than something done merely by the corporate planning staff. The 
effective implementation of corporate strategies, therefore, requires 
that the organization structure must fit the firm's planning needs. 
As Koontz (1976, p. 47) points out: 11 The organizational structure 
should be designed to support the accomplishment of goals and the 
making of decisions to implement strategies ... According to Richards 
(1978), the organizational structure is important i~ the formulation 
and implementation of strategy, 
... because the locus of planning, goal setting and decision-
making is dependent upon the type of structure in which the 
planning is done .... Additionally, there is a correspondence 
between the hierarchy of organizational structure and the 
hierarchy of strategies (p. 25). 
The relationships between corporate strategy and structural and 
administrative decisions (advocated by Chandler, Rumelt and others); and 
the relationships between a firm's structural and administrative 
decisions and its environmental complexity and uncertainty (advocated 
by organization theorists, like Burns and Stalker, Woodward, Lawrence 
and Lorsch, and others) are gradually emerging into a contingency 
theory of the firm (Ward, 1976), where the organizational administra~ 
tion (structure, decision-making process, etc.) is a function of the 
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firm's strategic choice, which in turn is a function of the environment 
and the corporate resources. 
The pertinent literature from both business policy and organiza-
tion theory, therefore, seem to indicate that the influence of 
organizational structure as a mediating or contextual variable, would 
be highly significant in a study of this nature. Thus, we could 
expect differences in the strategic mixes of organizational functions in 
firms pursuing identical grand corporate strategy but having different 
types of organizational structures. Hence, for Research Question 6 our 
area of inquiry would be: For the firms pursuing a particular grand 
corporate strategy, is the strategic significance of different organiza-
tional functions different for firms with different types of organiza-
tional structure? In other words, if we consider two firms pursuing, 
say, internal growth strategy, one of which is organized on functional 
lines, and the other has a product-divisional organization structure; 
can we expect their top managers to prioritize their strategic organi-
zational functions in the same or different manner? Research Question 
• 
6 is stated below. 
Research Question 6 
For firms pursuing a particular grand corporate strategy, is the 
relative strategic significance of the seven different organizational 
functions different for firms with different types of organizational 
structures? 
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Strategy, Perceived Environmental Uncertainty, 
and Strategic Mixes of Organizational 
Functions 
Organization-environment interaction has been a favorite theme of 
organization theorists for quite some time, however only recently the 
researchers have come to a conclusion that organizations do not respond 
in a predictable manner to their given external environments: in fact 
organizations 11 enact 11 (Weick, 1969, 1977) or shape their own environments 
through a series of strategic decisions culminating into an identifiable 
pattern or configuration. Thus, if vJe study two corporations over a 
period of time and identify the strategy-set of each, we can determine 
the nature of their external environments as also ascertain the ways in 
which the top managers relate their firms to their respective environ-
. ments. A firm 1 s product-market domain primarily determines the 1 i nkage 
bebo~een the firm and its external environment. The determination of 
the product-market domain is itself a matter of a series of conscious 
strategic choices or decisions. 
Organization-environment interaction is perhaps one area where 
the fields of organization theory and strategy/policy show a great deal 
of similarity. After defining corporate strategy, Aguilar (1967) goes 
on to add that: 
Strategy should be responsive to both the risks and 
opportunities confronting the company in its external 
environment and the strengths and weaknesses--present 
and potential--within the firm itself (p. 4). 
According to Taylor (1973b, p. 37), strategic decisions are 11 concerned 
with effecting major changes in the 'linkages• between the enterprise 
and its environment. 11 A fir·m's grand corporate strategy therefore 
sets the stage for organizational adaptation to its environment. 
Lorsch (1973), commenting on the Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1967) study states that 
... each functional unit (e.g. sales, production, and 
research) must have internal characteristics consistent with 
the demands of its particular sector of the total environment 
... [and] ... the total organization must achieve, in 
spite of the differentiation among its units the pattern of 
integration required by the total environment (p. 132). 
According to Hickson et al. (1971, p. 220): 11 The more a subunit 
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copes with uncertainty, the greater its power within the organization." 
The source of power, therefore, lies in the subunit•s ability to cope 
effectively with high uncertainty and in its role of a "shock absorber 11 
for the whole organization. 
Salancik, Pfeffer and Kelly (1974, p. 55) contend that the source 
of influence in organizational decision-making is determined "through 
a communication process which serves to define the source of uncertainty 
and to locate individuals capable of coping with the uncertainty. 11 
One might well ask: Is the functional areas• influence mix 
approach relevant to the study of organization-environment interaction? 
The relevance of this approach becomes obvious when one considers each 
functional area as a specialized internal sub-system organized to 
interact effectively with its relevant (external) sub-environment. 
Therefore, the nature of a firm•s relevant (or enacted) sub-environments 
determines the relative strategic importance of different functional 
tasks. And the recognizable pattern of organization•s responses to 
environmental issues, according to Miles, Snow and Pfeffer (1974), 
Child (1972a), and Richards (1973), is determined not so much by the 
objective characteristics of organization-environment interactions as 
by the managerial perceptions of the strategic significance of key 
result areas in different organizational functions. 
Miies and Snow (1978) exam·ined the relationship between the 
managerial perceptions of environmental uncertainty and the relative. 
strategic importance of different organizational functions and found 
some support for the contention 
... that when the organization faces high environmental 
uncertainty, it places greater emphasis on externally 
oriented functions such as market research and product 
development ... Conversely when an organization faces low 
uncertainty, internally oriented function (such as production) 
assumes strategic importance (p. 213). 
Therefore, both high and low perceived environmental uncertainty tend 
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to produce identifiable but different strategic mixes of organizational 
functions. When the perceived uncertainty in a sub-environment is 
high, the functional area responsible for managing the interface with 
that sub-environment has to concentrate on effective avoidance/reduction 
of critical uncertainties to ensure the firm's survival and growth. 
Therefore, in the firm's internal power structure and the resource-
allocation process that functional area is likely to acquire a command-
ing position. 
However, in this study, perceived environmental uncertainty is 
not the independent variable. The research evidence cited earlier 
does not tell us whether for the firms pursuing a particular grand 
corporate strategy, the ranking of organizational functions in terms of 
their strategic significance would be different for firms with high and 
low perceived environmental uncertainty. Research Question 7 is stated 
below. 
Research Question I 
For firms pursuing a particular grand corporate strategy, is the 
relative strategic significance of the seven different organizational 




The state of our existing knowledge in the field of business policy 
and corporate strategy, precludes us from setting forth with any reason-
able degree of certainty 11 a contingency theory or even a set of limited -- --
domain theories 11 (Steiner and Miner, 1977, p. 781). Conceptua 11 y, 
theoretically, as well as empirically, business policy is a newly 
emerging discipline, which highlights the need for more exploratory 
research in the early stages of its development as the field gradually 
moves toward conceptual and theoretical maturity. As Galbraith (1967) 
in his controversial book 11 The New Industrial State 11 points out: 
Few subjects of earnest inquiry have been more unproductive 
than a study of the modern large corporation. The reasons 
are clear. A vivid image of what should exist acts as a 
surrogate for reality. Pursuit of the image then prevents 
pursuit of the reality {p. 72). 
As Steiner and Miner (1977) point out, the research in any field 
generally goes through three distinct phases. 
As research in a field develops it tends to appear first in 
the form of surveys dealing with practice, attitudes, and 
intentions; then in the form of correlational or correlational-
type analyses relating key variables to each other; and 
finally in the form of experimental studies that establish 
causal relationships. The field of policy-strategy is now 
moving into the second of these phases, although certain of 
its subat'eas are still in the initial survey phase (p. 781). 
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Therefore, we have a long way to go before we can say with confi-
dence to a top manager: If your firm has adopted grand corporate 
strategy X, if it is large, is a dominant business undertaking, is in 
consumer non-durable goods industry, has continuous process production 
system, is organized on product division lines and if the top manage-
ment's perception of environmental uncertainty is high; then implementa-
tion of your grand corporate strategy X will be more effective and 
successful if you closely monitor and evaluate performance in the key 
result areas in strategically significant or critical functions v1 and 
v2. For we have yet to develop a theory embodying an empirically tested 
set of nor'mati ve contingency hypotheses in the area of effective 
implementation of different grand corporate strategies. 
This study, which is a logical extension, amplification and 
refinement of similar studies by Steiner (l969a), Godiwalla (1977), 
and Miles and Snow (1978), raises (and seeks answers through empirical 
analysis) a set of seven specific research questions. This exploratory 
study attempts to develop a better understanding of strategic mixes of 
organizational functions for different grand corporate strategies and 
thereby hopes to contribute to the development of substantive area of 
policy/strategy. 
\ 
To conclude, the theoretical background of this study's conceptual 
framework, derived from the relevant parts of Chapter II on literature 
review, has been discussed in this chapter and research questions in the 
seven specific areas of study have been presented. The research 
methodology, related to the data collection and the data analyses forinves-




Research in the field of corporate strategy is conceptually and 
methodologically more difficult than in other more developed fields. 
The knowledge about corporate strategy is available in many different 
form and styles. As Bowman (1974) observes: 
Synthesis or design, especially in the policy of an 
organization, however, requires the consideration of most/ 
many of the aspects of the situation ... Many facts about 
the world and about a firm are important for making decisions 
about corporate strategy. It is rather difficult to attempt 
many generalizations ... in a field as imp~rfect as corpor-
ate strategy. Much of what now exists as an academic field 
of corporate strategy (and business policy) should probably 
be thought of as •contingency theory. • The ideas, recommenda-
tions, or generalizations are rather dependent (contingent) 
for their truth and their relevance on the specific situational 
factors (p. 36). 
According to Bowman, there are many d·i fferent approaches to the 
understanding and knowledge of corporate strategy (see Figure 16). 
In view of the embryonic nature of the field, his recommendation is 
' 
to adopt them all. 
For this business policy thesis, the nature of policy/strategy 
area and the current state of its development imposes certain inherent 
limitations on the choice of appropriate research design. The theory-


















Source: Bowman, Edward H. '1 Epistemology, Corporate Strategy~ and 
Academe. 11 Sloan Management Review, Vol. 15 (Winter 1974), 
p. 36. 
Figure 16. Organized Taxonomy of Approaches to the Under-
standing, and Knowledge of Corporate Strategy 
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11.5 
Kerlinger (1973, p. 405) defines field studies as 11 ex post facto 
scientific inquiries aimed at discovering the relationships and inter-
actions among sociological, psychological, and educational variables in 
real social structures ... Since this research study does not involve 
the manipulation of independent variables, the experimental research 
(involving laboratory or field experiments) would not be appropriate. 
Ex post facto research by definition is 11 Systematic empirical inquiry in 
which the scientist does not have direct control of independent variables 
because their manifestations have already occurred or because they are 
inherently not manipulable .. (Kerlinger, p. 379). The data for this 
field study were obtained through the use of survey-type instruments 
(mail questionnaires). 
This study is exploratory in nature and is intended to reveal more 
fully the r·elationships between the variables involved. The exploratory 
type of study 11 Seeks what is rather than predicts relations to be found; 11 
such a study has 11 three purposes: to discover significant variables in 
the field situation, to discover relations among variables and to lay 
the groundwork for later, more systematic and rigorous testing of 
hypotheses 11 (Kerlinger, 1973, p. 406). 
Sample Organizations 
The sample organizations for this study consisted of 1000 largest 
United States industrial corporations as listed in the 1978 Fortune 
Directories. The list therefore included only manufacturing industries 
and did not include banking, financial, utilities, transportation, 
wholesale and retail trade, and other service industries. 
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Data Collection Procedures 
f~ost business policy research studies rely on field surveys for 
collection of relevant data. Field surveys are normally classified on 
the basis of the following methods used for obtaining information: 
• 
1. Personal Interview 
2. Telephone Interview 
3. Mail Questionnaire 
4. Controlled Observations 
The information obtained may or may not be supplemented by the 
examination and collection of available (secondary) data germane to the 
study. 
A field survey utilizing personal interview was ruled out because 
of inordinately high costs and the length of time required. Also, the 
inaccessibility of data sources because of the reluctance on the part 
of senior executives to grant interviews was an important consideration. 
A telephone survey was also not practical since the nature of the 
study calls for data which cannot be collected by telephone. The wide 
geographic dispersion of respondents (the top 1000 United States 
industrial corporations), nature of the data, and budget and time 
limitations all dictated a mail survey, which has an additional 
advantage of giving the respondents a feeling of anonymity and security 
to respond to questions of highly confidential nature. 
The data for the study were collected through mail questionnaires 
designed to be filled out by senior executives having adequate familiar-
ity with the firm•s overall operations and its business environment. 
The first draft of the questionnaire was tested for question content, 
question wording and response structure among a group of researchers 
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familiar with the problems of field surveys in the ar~a of business 
policy. After this in-house testing, the questionnaire was revised. 
This revised questionnaire was retested by administering it to a small 
pilot sample to ascertain the rate and the quality of response. 
In the pilot study (by mail questionnaire), an attempt was made to 
determine the respondents' feelings and reactions to the questioning 
process and the specific questions in the instrument so that the 
instrument could then be revised. The intent was to ensure that the 
respondents understand the meaning and intent of the questions and that 
the questions themselves are capable of obtaining the information and 
perceptions sought by the researcher. 
The pilot study was necessary to determine the potential for an 
adequate response rate and to determine the reliability and validity 
of the survey instrument. As Nachmias and Nachmias (1976, pp. 107-108) 
point out, 11 The main problem with mail questionnaires is that of 
obtaining an adequate response rate ... The typical response rate 
for a mail survey is between 20 and 40 percent. 11 A corporate mail 
survey of 11 FORTUNE 500 11 companies by Gaedeke and Tootelian (1976) 
resulted in a response rate of 22% of which 20.47% accounted for 
completed questionnaires. In most mail questionnaire surveys in 
corporate strategy research, the respondents are usually extremely 
busy and highly-paid corporate executives, and the information sought 
is highly confidential in nature. The response rate in such surveys 
varies from 20 to 30 percent. In view of these ~onstraints, a response 
rate of about 25 percent is expected in a study of this nature. 
While designing the mail survey the findings of the research by 
Gaedeke and Tootelian (1976) were carefully considered. They found 
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that 11 negati ve response toward mail quest·i onna ire surveys were indicated 
almost three times as frequently as positive ones 11 (p. 285). Table XIV 
reveals what corporate executives like most and least about academic 
mail surveys. Their findings also indicate the importance of different 
factors in influencing the response rate (see Table XV); the first four 
factors listed in the table were found to be especially important. 
Gaedeke and Tootelian conclude that the findings of their study 
... indicate that Fortune 11 500 11 List may be an 1 endangered 
species 1 for academicians.- The tendency of academicians has 
been to exploit this rich base of primary data to the point 
where few if any, benefits are accruing to the recipients of 
mail questionnaires. If value is to be derived by the re-
cipient, researchers should drastically reduce the frequency 
of using the 11 500 11 List except for highly pertinent survey 
research that is clearly of benefit to corporate management 
( pp. 286- 287) . 
The Pilot _?tudy 
~s stated earlier, various research methodology considerations 
highlighted the need for a pilot study. The two important objectives 
of the pilot study were: (1) to determine whether the study would 
generate enough interest among the senior executives to motivate their 
participation in the survey, and (2) to determine the reliability and 
validity of the survey instrument. In their research on academic mail 
surveys of 11 FORTUNE 500 11 companies Gaedeke and Tootelian (1976) found 
that: (1) 75 out of 94 (or roughly 80%) ex~cutive officers considered 
sender 1 S reputation or position an important factor in influencing the 
response rate; and (2) 11 When the respondents were asked for suggestions 
for improving academic mail surveys, approximately half of the executive 
officers favored their screening and approval by colleges, universities, 
or professional associations 11 (p. 286). Consequently, institutional 
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TABLE XIV 
THINGS LIKED MOST AND LEAST ABOUT ACADEMIC 
~1AI L SURVEYS 
Things Liked Most 
Provides valuable information 
Opportunity to help academic community 
Displays interest in business/company 
Chance to tell company•s story 
11 Feel 11 for academic thinking 
Thought provoking for own company 
Total 
Things Liked Least 
Inordinate amount of time to complete/ 
questionnaire too long 
Subject matter not relevant to company 
Poor questionnaire 
Questions too general 
Attitude of researcher 
Subject or questionnaire too complex 
Total 
a Respondents were asked: What two 
academic mail surveys? 
bRespondents were asked: What two 





































do you 1 ike r10ST about 
do you like LEAST about 
clndicates percent of times mentioned by the 102 respondents. 
Source: Gaedeke, Ralph N. and Dennis H. Tootelian. 11 The Fortune 11 500 11 
List- An Endangered Species for Academic Research. 11 Journal 
of Busine~~ Research, Vol. 4 (1976), p. 286. 
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TABLE XV 
IMPORTANCE OF FACTORS INFLUENCING 
THE RESPONSE RATE 
Number of Responses 
Weighted Very Somewhat Not Total 
Factors Averagea Important Important Important b Responses 
Am~unt and type of 
statistical data 
called for l. 79 80 19 3 102 
Stated purpose of 
survey 1. 65 72 21 2 95 
Subject matter of 
survey l. 63 70 23 3 96 
Length of 
questionnaire 1. 57 68 21 7 96 
Number of open-
ended questions l. 29 48 33 13 94 
Assurance of 
confidentiality 1 . 12 41 30 20 91 
Accompanying 
letter 1.10 32 36 23 91 
Sender•s reputation 
or position 1.05 30 45 19 94 
Promise to receive 
survey results .78 20 38 36 94 
aWeighted averages are: 2 for very important, 1 for somewhat 
important, 0 for not important. 
bsome factors were not marked by the respondents. 
Source: Gaedeke, Ralph t1. and Dennis H. Tootelian. 11 The Fortune 11 500 11 
List- An Endangered Species for Academic Research. 11 Journal 
of Business Research, Vol. 4 (1976), p. 287. 
sponsorship for this study was obtained from the College of Business 
Administration, Oklahoma State University. 
For the pilot study, 60 industrial firms in the southwest region 
were picked randomly from the Moody's Industrial and OTC Industrial 
Manuals. Since the quality of academic education and research at 
Oklahoma State University is better known in the southwest region of 
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the United States, it was thought that the senior executives from this 
region would be more inclined to participate in the research efforts 
sponsored by Oklahoma State University. As the pilot study envisaged 
completion of two long questionnaires from each company and all partici-
pating companies were asked to reveal their identities (participants 
were not provided with a choice to respond anonymously); the respondents' 
familiarity with the University was an obviously crucial consideration. 
During the third week of July, 1978, a xeroxed "form" letter on the 
official stationery was sent to the chief executive officers of 60 
industrial firms individually typed with the CEO's address, individual-
ized salutation, and handwritten signatures of the researchers. Two 
copies of a six-page questionnaire called "Corporate Strategy Question-
naire for Senior Executives," accompanied by xeroxed "form" cover letters 
with handwritten signatures of the researchers, were also enclosed. The 
names of the chief executive officers were obtained from the Moody's 
Industrial and OTC Industrial Manuals. In the cover letter, the CEO was 
asked to have two senior executives of his company, familiar with its 
overall operations and its overall business environment, complete the 
enclosed two copies of the questionnaire independently of each other, 
and return the questionnaires in the enclosed self-addressed stamped 
envelopes. The first mailing yielded only 9 (15%) returns. After a 
period of seven weeks, a follow-up letter and questionnaires were sent 
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to the CEOs of those companies that had not yet responded. The cover 
letters and the questionnaire used in the pilot study are presented in 
Appendix B. 
The pilot survey resulted in 27 returns (45%), of-\<Jhich four 
companies declined to participate for various reasons, and in case of 
two firms only one completed questionnaire was received. Thus in case 
of 21 companies (35%), separate questionnaires were filled out 
independently by two senior executives. This response rate and the 
reliability and validity of variables computed from the pilot study 
data (to be discussed later in this chapter) were thought to be 
encouraging enough to pursue with the mail questionnaire survey method 
for the main, nationwide field study. 
The pilot study•s outcome necessitated the making of certain 
changes. The senior executive•s identification of his firm•s grand 
corporate strategy was considered very crucial to this study. However, 
some doubts were raised as to whether the executives would identify 
their grand strategies in a disinterested manner with complete 
objectivity, since the terms used to label the grand corporate 
strategies were essentially value-laden. It was therefore argued that 
very likely most executives would identify growth strategies as their 
grand corporate strategies, and almost no executive would admit that 
his firm pursues a retrenchment strategy. Accordingly, most executives 
would identify grand corpor~te strategies that they perceive as 
desirable or respectable rather than grand corporate strategies actually 
being pursued by their firms. This might give rise to an incongruity 
between their identification of grand corporate strategies and their 
stated perceptions of relative strategic significance of different 
functional tasks. Also, this possible incongruity arising from a 
response bias could raise serious doubts about the validity of the 
research findings. To avoid a potential response bias, the survey 
instrument used in the pilot study was divided into two separate 
questionnaires. The first questionnaire, called the Chief Executive 
Officer's Questionnaire, consisted of a one-page question about the 
grand corporate strategy pursued by the firm that was to be answered 
by the CEO himself. The second questionnaire, called the Senior 
Executive's Questionnaire was to be filled out by a senior executive 
familiar with the firm's overall operations and its overall business 
environment. It was thought this would greatly reduce the risk of 
incongruity between the respondent's assertions (about their grand 
corporate strategies) and perceptious (of various aspects of their 
organizations and environments). 
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Another change was necessary because of a higher-than-average 
disagreement between the two senior executives in identifying their 
organizational structure (see Table XVIII). It was thought that an 
important reason for such disagreement might be due to the fact that 
the respondents - all busy executives - did not take the time to read 
the definitions of each type of organization structure. Therefore to 
minimize the occurrence of this problem in the main study, key words 
considered to be the distinguishing features of each type of structure 
were underscored. 
Another minor change was made in the question dealing with industry 
classification. One of the respondents had made a telephone call to 
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determine what exactly was meant by the term 11 Capital goods 11 industry. 
Therefore, the question was modified to include two examples of products 
from the capital goods industry. 
By the third week of December 1978, a xeroxed "form 11 letter on 
the official stationery individually typed with the CEo•s address, 
individualized salutation, and handwritten signatures of the researchers 
was sent to the chief executive officers of the 1000 largest U. S. 
industrial corporations as listed in the 1978 fortune Directories, 
with a copy each of the Chief Executive Officer•s Questionnaire and the 
Senior Executive•s Questionnaire and a self-addressed stamped envelope. 
The cover letter and the two survey instruments are presented in 
Appendix C. The names and company addresses of the CEOs were obtained 
from the Standard & Poor•s Register of Corporations and the Dun & 
Bradstreet Million Dollar Directory. 
Of the 1000 companies asked to participate in the study, the 
response indicated an overall return rate of 29% (see Table XVI). 
The survey resulted in a sample of 249 usable questionnaires (25%). 
The sample characteristics (profile of the companies responding) are 
presented in Table XVII. There were no follow-ups in the main study 
because it was thought that a response rate of 25% yielding 249 usable 
questionnaires was sufficient for data analyses purposes. 
A total of 29 senior executives declined to participate on account 
of corporate policy or other reasons, the relevant excerpts from some 
of their letters are reproduced in Appendix D. Many responding firms 
enclosed a copy of their annual report, some even sent a copy of their 
Form 10-K Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
TABLE XVI 
ANALYSIS OF RETURN RATES 
Two completed questionnaires received 
(usable) 
Two completed questionnaires received 
(unusable) 
Only one (either the Chief Executive 
Officer•s Questionnaire or the Senior 
Executive•s Questionnaire-} completed 
questionnaire received (unusable)a 
Unwilling to participate in the survey 
(non-returned questionnaires): 
(a) On account of corporate policy 
of not participating in 
academic mail surveys. 
(b) Other reasons 
Overall return rateb 
Return Percen~ 
249/1000 = 24.9 
8 /1000 = 0. 8 
4 /1000 = 0.4 
19/1000 = 1.9 
1 o I 1000 = 1. o 
290 /1000 = 29.0 
ain case of anonymously completed questionnaires, each of these 
two questionnaires might poss·ib1y be from the same company. 
' bit is important to recognize the possibility that some of the 
firms that did not respond may, in fact, have been following their 
company policies of not responding to any questionnaires. 
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TABLE XVII 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE 
. (N = 249) 
Grand Corporate Strategy Pursued: 
Stabi 1 ity 
I nterna 1 Growth 
External Acquisitive Growth 
Retrenchment 
Firm Size ( annua 1 sa 1 es revenue): 
$200 million and less 
$201 million to $599 million 
$600 million and over 
Corporate Diversity: 
Single Business Firms 
Dominant Business Firms 
Related Business Firms 
Unrelated Business Firms 
Predominant Production System: 
Unit and Small Batch Production 
Large Batch and Mass Production 
Continuous Process Production 
Principal Industry: 
Consumer Nondurable Goods Industries 
Consumer Durable Goods Industries 
Capital Goods Industries 
Producer Goods Industries 
Firm Organizational Structure 
Functional 






























Reliability and Validity of Survey Instruments 
One of the reasons for undertaking the pilot study, was to 
determine the reliability and validity of the survey instrument used. 
In any field study using survey-type instrument, the reliability and 
validity measures often determine the methodological soundness of the 
whole study. The concepts of reliability and validity and their 
relevance to this study would be briefly discussed in this section 
before a discussion of the reliability and validity measures obtained 
from the pilot study. 
According to Kerlinger (1973, p. 442): 11 Concern for reliability 
comes from the necessity for dependability in measurement ... There are 
several techniques for estimating reliability of measuring instruments 
(Anastasi, 1968, Ch. 4): 
1. Test-Retest: administration of measuring instrument at two 
different times. 
2. Parallel-Form (Delayed): administration of two alternate 
forms of a measuring instrument at two different times. 
3. Parallel-Form (Immediate): administration of two alternate 
forms of a measuring instrument at the same time. 
In all the three measures, the reliability coefficient is obtained 
by computing the correlation between the two sets of observations 
obtained. Other methods of ascertaining reliability--Split-Half, 
Kuder-Richardson, and Scorer reliability coefficients--are not 
relevant to this study .. It should also be noted that the · 
coefficient measures (expressed in numbers) give a false sense of 
precision, as a matter of fact, none of the reliability estimates are 
foolproof. Thus, in case of Test-Retest method the error variance may 
·be caused mainly by temporal fluctuations (time sampling). The 
reliability coefficient, of a measuring instrument used for measuring 
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a dynamic concept (perceived environmental uncertainty, or relative 
strategic importance of different organizational functions to effective 
implementation of grand corporate strategy pursued), obviously has a 
limited utility. In the Parallel-Form {Delayed) technique the error 
variance may be caused not only by time sampling (temporal fluctuations) 
but also by content sampling (the two alternate forms of an instrument 
may not in fact be parallel). 
It is therefore hardly surprising that in almost all published 
research in the area of corporate strategy, the reliability measures 
are not revealed by the researchers. This does not, however, mean the 
irrelevance of the concept of reliability, it merely underscores the 
fact that meaningful reliability measures are difficult to obtain. 
In this study, we are concerned with three forms of validity: 
Face validity, Content validity and Construct validity; since Pragmatic 
. validity is more ex post facto in nature. 
In corporate strategy research, where standardized validated 
measures are not always available, the researcher has at times to 
devise his own measure perhaps by modifying some existing measures. 
Such 11 measures which are applied directly to the phenomenon or behavior 
in which the researcher is interested are said to have face va1idity 11 
(Murdick, 1969, p. 48). 
It is contended that the instruments used in the study have content 
validity since they apparently provide a sufficient coverage of the 
research problems. 11 If the questionnaire adequately covers the topics 
which have been defined as the relevant dimensions, we conclude that 
the instrument has good content validity 11 (Emory, 1976, pp. 120-121). 
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The judgmental nature of the determination of content validity becomes 
obvious. As Emory (1976) further points out: 
First, the designer may, himself, determine the val·idity 
through a careful definition of the topic of concern, the 
items to be scaled, and the scales to be used. This logical 
process is somewhat intuitive and is unique to each designer 
•.. A second way to determine content validity is to use 
a panel of persons to judge how well the instrument meets 
the standards (p. 121). 
As stated earlier, the survey instruments shown in Appendix C are 
carefully pretested, revised versions. 
Anastasi (1969, p. 114) defines the construct validity of a test 
as ••the extent to which the test may be said to measure a theoretical 
construct or trait. 11 As Murdick (1969, p. 48) points out: .. Construct 
validity must be concerned with both the measuring instrument and the 
theory underlying the construct ... Thus in this study the measures of 
corporate diversity, production system, organizational structure and 
perceived environmental uncertainty are borrowed from those used by 
Rumelt, Woodward, Rumelt, and Miles and Snow, respectively, in the 
I 
development of their conceptual frameworks pertaining to these 
variables. Whereas the measures of grand corporate strategy, industry 
and the relative strategic importance of different organizational 
functions are derived from the works of Glueck, Khandwalla and PIMS, 
and Steiner, respectively. 
The concepts of validity and reliability are therefore closely 
interlinked but the operational requirements of the study call for 
practicality, thus economy (in terms of time and money) and convenience 
of data collection, along with the accessibility of data sources 
assuming considerable practical significance. To sum up in Bowman•s 
(1974) words: 
Ep·istemology is defined by Webster as, •the theory or science 
of the method and grounds of knowledge, especially with 
reference to its 1 imits and validity. • The view taken here 
is that knowledge about corporate strategy, imperfect as it 
may be, is available in highly different forms and style. 
While science (e.g., behavioral theory and economics) is the 
most formalized and trustworthy means of generating and 
testing knowledge, practice as captured in cases and histories 
yields a more particular and sometimes more relevant or useable 
form of knowledge. The normative methodologies of the analyti-
cal approach and management science offer knowledge-based 
procedures for grappling with new situations. All of the 
approaches to understanding and knowledge have their advantages 
and their limitations. Validity must be in part in the eye of 
the beholder, i.e., what pragmatic difference does it make to 
him? (p. 49). 
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For the purpose of this study, in the case of the pilot sample of 
21 firms separate questionnaires were filled out independently by two 
senior executives. The pilot sample data was analyzed by utilizing a 
modified version of Parallel-Form (Immediate) method to ascertain 
11 interjudge reliability ... Thus instead of two parallel or alternate 
forms, two identical copies of the survey instrument were completed by 
two senior executives independently of each other. The extent of 
agreement (correlation) between these two sets of responses provided a 
measure of 11 interjudge reliability ... 
It may also be noted that almost all the measures of the variables 
involved in the study are 11 borrowed 11 from, or are modified versions of, 
previously established and used measures. Besides, the data collected 
in the pilot survey were found to be consistent with the published 
information. Earlier, we contended that the degree of agreement between 
the responses of two senior executives of a company would provide a 
measure of 11 interjudge reliability ... A high degree of agreement between 
the two senior executives also provides evidence that suggests that the 
pretested and revised instrument does measure what it is intended to 
measure. Therefore, as Khandwalla (1977, p. 658) points out, a high 
degree of 11 interjudge reliability~~ may also provide a measure of 
va 1 i dity. 
131 
Estimates of reliability and validity of variables, generated from 
the data collected in the pilot study, are presented in Table XVIII. 
It is important to note that the variables were measured on a 7 point 
rating scale. The number of items in each measure influences its 
reliability. Thus if two measures have the same average correlations, 
the one having more items will have a higher reliability. This fact 
becomes obvious when one considers the "customers" component of 
perceived environmental uncertainty, it is the only variable with a 
less than acceptable reliability coefficient. This outcome may be 
partially the result of so few items (two) in the scale. 
· Research Questions 
The research questions developed from the conceptual framework 
discussed earlier in Chapter IV are presented together herein below: 
Research Question 1. Is the relative strategic significance of the 
seven different organizational functions different for firms purusing 
different grand corporate strategies? 
Research Question 2. For firms pursuing a particular grand 
corporate strategy, is the relative strategic significance of the seven 
different organizational functions different for firms of different 
size? 
Research Question 3. For firms pursuing a particular grand 
corporate strategy, is the relative strategic significance of the seven 
different organizational functions different for firms with different 
TABLE XVII I 
RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF VARIABLES 
(BASED ON THE PILOT STUDY SAMPLE 
OF 21 FIRt·1S) 
A. Variables (Nominal Scales) as reported by two senior executives 
from each firm and the degree of ~reement between pairs of 
responses: 
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Variable Agreement Disagreement Total 
1. Grand Corporate Strategy 19 2 21 
2. Size 20 1 21 
3. Corporate Diversity 17 4 21 
4. Industry 19 2 21 
5. Production System 19 2 21 
6. Organization Structure 16 5 21 
Total 110 16 126 
Interjudge Reliability or the degree of 
agreement between pairs of senior executives 110 or 87.3% from the same company: 126 
Comments: "To the extent that senior executives are experts on their 
firms, the degree of agreement on the information they provide is 
perhaps one measure also of the validity of the variables. That is, 
a high degree of agreement, in the absence of ambiguities in the 
way questions are phrased, bolsters our confidence that the variables 
do indeed measure what they are intended to measure."a In addition, 
the data collected from the responding companies regarding the 
above-mentioned variables were found to be consistent with the 
published information.-
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TABLE XVII.I (Continued) 
B. Variables (Ordinal-Likert Scales) as reported by two executives 
from each firm on a seven-point rating scale: 
Average Correlation 
• Reliability of Between the Responses 
(1) Perceived Environmental Multi -item · oJ 1wo· Executives 
Uncertainty: variablesb (N = 21) 
1. Suppliers (4 items) 0.79 0.49 
2. Competitors ( 4 items) 0.82 0.53 
3. Customers (2 items) 0.46 0.30 
4. Financial/Capital Market 
( 6 i terns) 0.84 0.46 
5. Government Regulatory 
Agencies (6 items) 0.88 0.56 
6. Actions of Labor Unions 
( 3 i terns) 0. 76 0. 51 
(2) Relative Strategic Signifi-
cance of Key Result Areas in 
Different Organizational 
Functions: 
1. General Administration 
(10 items) 0.86 0.38 
2. Production/Operations 
(10 items) 0.94 0.59 
3. Engineering and R&D 
(5 items) 0.83 0.49 
4. Marketing (8 items) 0.92 0.58 
5. Finance (11 items) 0.92 0.50 
6. Personnel ( 7 i terns) 0.88 o. 50 
7. Public & Government 
Relations ( 4 items) 0.85 0.59 
aPradip N. Khandwalla. The Design of Organizations, New York: 
Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1977, p. 658. 
bSee Jum C. Nunnally. Psychometric Theory. 
1967: (i) Computational formula (p. 193): 
New York: McGraw-Hill, 
kr· · lJ 
r -kk - 1 + ( k-1) r .. 
. lJ 
TABLE XVIII (Continued) 
where 
rkk ==reliability or reproducibility of a multi-item measure 
k == number of items in the measure 
r .. == the average correlation among the items lJ 
(ii) According to Nunnally (p. 226), in the early stages of the 
research, reliabilities of 0.50 to 0.60 are quite adequate. 
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degrees of corporate diversity? 
Research Question 4. For firms pursuing a particular grand 
corporate strategy, is the relative strategic significance of the 
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seven different organizational functions different for firms in differ-
ent industries? 
Research Question 5. For firms pursuing a particular grand 
corporate strategy, is the relative strategic significance of the seven 
different organizational functions different for firms with different 
production systems? 
Research Question 6. For firms pursuing a particular grand 
corporate strategy, is the relative strategic significance of the seven 
different organizational functions different for firms with different 
types of organizational structures? 
Research Question 7. For firms pursuing a particular grand 
corporate strategy, is the relative strategic significance of the seven 
different organizational functions different for firms with different 
degrees of perceived environmental uncertainty? 
Data Analysis Procedures 
After the strategic significance scores for each of the seven 
organizational functions (computed by adding up the scores of key 
result areas in a particular function and dividing the sum by the 
number of key result areas in that particular functional category) 
were obtained, the firms were grouped on the basis of their grand 
corporate strategy. Within each group, mean strategic significance 
scores were computed for each of the seven organizational functions. 
Similar mean scores (grand means) were also computed for the entire 
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sample of 249 firms. In each strategy group, as also for the overall 
sample, the seven organizational functions \-Jere ranked by their mean 
strategic significance scores. Within each group, the differences in 
mean values were ascertained by paired t-tests in the form of approxi-
mate Least Significant Difference (LSD) tests. Additionally, for each 
group an F ratio was calculated, using the repeated measures design, 
from an analysis of variance (one-way classification by organizational 
function) for the strategic significance score (grand mean). This F 
ratio indicates the magnitude of differences between mean scores of 
different functions in each strategy group. 
The approximate LSD tests and the one-way AOV as a repeated 
measures design were used separately for each of the four strategy 
types as also for the overall sample. Additionally, F ratios were also 
calculated from analysis of variance (one-way classification of 249 
firms by grand corporate strategy) for the mean strategic significance 
scores of each of the seven different organizational functions. These 
F ratios would indicate whether there do exist significant differences 
among the mean strategic significance scores of each function attri-
butable to the grand corporate strategies. These analyses provided 
pertinent data for testing Research Question 1. 
Data aggregated by each of the four strategy types were further 
analyzed by size, corporate diversity, industry, production system, 
organizational structure, and perceived environmental uncertainty and 
subjected to the same analysis as described earlier. Thus analysis of 
subject firms (for the purpose of testing Research Question 2) by firm 
size yielded a 3x4 factorial design of firm size x grand corporate 
strategy. Within each of the 12 cells of that factorial design, the 
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seven organizational functions were ranked by their mean strategic 
significance scores. Within each cell, the differences in mean values 
were ascertained by paired t-tests in the form of approximate LSD 
tests. For row mean scores in each size group, an F ratio was calcu~ 
lated from an AOV (one-way classification by organizational function) 
in the nature of a repeated measures design. F ratios were also com-
puted from AOV (one-way classification of 249 firms by size) for the 
mean strategic significance scores of each of the seven functions. And 
finally, F ratios were computed from unweighted AOV (two way classifi-
cation of 249 firms by size and grand corporate strategy) for the mean 
strategic significance scores of each of the seven functions. These 
analyses provided pertinent data for testing Research Question 2. 
Similarly, Research Question 3 was tested by analyzing a 4 x 4 
factorial design of Strategy x Corporate Diversity; Research Question 4 
by a 4 x 4 factorial design of Strategy x Industry; Research Question 5 
by a 4 x 3 factorial design of Strategy x Production System; and 
Research Question 6 by a 4 x 5 factorial design of Strategy x Organiza-
tional Structure. However, for the purpose of testing Research 
Question 7, the subject firms were divided into two classes (l) firms 
with high perceived environmental uncertainty and (2) firms with low 
perceived environmental uncertainty by dichotomizing PEU scores at the 
mean value 4. Thus, a firm with PEU score of less than or equal to 4 
would have low PEU, whereas a firm with PEU score of greater than 4 
would be considered as having high PEU. Research Question 7 was then 
tested by analyzing a 4 x 2 factorial design of Strategy x PEU. 
The analysis of data on the lines indicated above has provided an 
effective way for seeking answers to the seven research questions 
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raised in this study. The strategic significance mixes of organization-
al functions were thus determined by using observational ranking and 
approximate least significant difference (LSD) tests along with the 
analysis of variance. Kendall and Buckland (1971) define a Least 
Significant Difference test as 
... a test for comparing mean values ar1s1ng in analysis of 
variance. It is an extension of the standard t-test for the 
difference between two specified mean values. Because the 
tests between pairs are not independent the error rate is 
difficult to assess exactiy (p. 83). 
The theoretical limits and the critical values of the LSD test1 are 
the same as those of a t-test. 
In view of the objectives of this study and the nature of the data 
involved, the LSD test seems best suited for data analysis. A valid 
LSD test can be constructed notwithstanding unequal sample size in 
different cells of a factorial design. Other alternative tests (namely, 
Duncan's new multiple-range test, Tukey's W-procedure or Honestly 
Significant Difference (HSD) procedure and Student-Newman-Keuls' test) 
only provide an approximate test statistic for unequal sample size. The 
LSD test on the other hand, provides an exact statistic for unequal 
sample size. A question might arise as to the appropriateness of this 
parametric test since most of the data for this study would be collected 
using the Ukert scale involving non-normal distributions. However the 
LSD test is still valid since as per the Central Limit Theorem, so long 
as the distribution of observations satisfies certain assumptions (like 
c-is finite) then the distribution of X would be approximately normal 
for large sample sizes. A mere ranking of functions would ignore the 
magnitude of differences between mean scores of different functions. 
Using LSD tests, we would be in a better position to identify the 
strategic significance mixes of different functional tasks for firms 
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pursuing different grand corporate strategies. 
Since the LSD test can be and often is misused, statisticians 
caution against the indiscriminate use of the LSD test. In this study, 
in view of the nature of the data involved, a watered-down version of 
the LSD test will be used. The test used would not be a true or 
legitimate LSD test, it would only be an 11 approximate 11 LSD test since 
a set of means would be compared using the same technique but with a 
few assumptions. For one thing, in any data analysis repeated measures 
tend to cause some dependence, however, the usual LSD test assumes 
independence. Therefore, our assumption of independence would provide 
an 11 approximate 11 LSD test statistic. This approximation would make 
our LSD test more conservative in the sense that we would not be over-
stating the significance; that is if the test shows no significance 
there might be some significance but the test would not show significance 
when in fact there is none. In view of the constraints imposed by the 
nature of data involved in the study, the investigator believes that 
the use of approximate LSD tests and the analysis of variance will 
provide the best available techniques for data analyses in this study. 
Problems and Limitations 
This study focuses primarily on top managers' perceptions of the 
relative importance of key result areas in different organizational 
functions to effective implementation of different grand corporate 
strategies. It seeks to identify critical or strategically significant 
function(s) for effective implementation of each type of grand 
corporate strategy. Therefore, the scope of this study is specific 
and limited. It does not purport to investigate the entire gamut of 
140 
problems involved in the field of corporate strategy. It concentrates 
only on the problems of corporate strategy-implementation; and although 
it utilizes the functional tasks' influence-mix approach to corporate 
strategy, only the influence of organizational functions on corporate 
strategy implementation is examined. Their influence on the formulation 
and evaluation of corporate strategy does not come within the purview 
of this study. 
The field of business policy focuses on the total organization and 
deals with the problems and functions of the top management. It is 
therefore apparent that any business policy phenomenon involves a vast 
array of variables, most of which are difficult to isolate, define and 
me-asure. Steiner and Miner (1977, pp. 607 and 608) point out, "The 
scope of managerial activities associated with implementation is 
virtually coextensive with the entire process of management." In large 
corporations, according to Mintzberg (1977, p. 93), "research shows that 
most work processes of senior managers are unstructured and that they 
require a profound integration of various aspects of the organization 
and its environment." The variables involved in the field of business 
policy are therefore not easily amenable to clear-cut cause-and-effect 
relationships. Even when the independent and dependent variables are 
clearly isolated and defined, they are influenced by a vast array of 
mediating or intervening variables that cannot be ignored without making 
the study too simplistic or unrealistic, nor can they all be considered 
without making the study too unwieldy and therefore infeasible. This 
study, therefore, examines the influence of six key mediating variables: 
size, corporate diversity, industry, production system, organizational 
structure and perceived environmental uncertainty; it does not analyze 
141 
the influence of all other possible mediating variables. 
Another limitation of this cross-sectional study is that it 
addresses itself to the corporate strategies of large (the top 1000) 
American industrial corporations only and therefore the conclusions 
derived from this study are not necessarily applicable to corporate 
strategies of firms in non-industrial sector such as transportation, 
utilities, banking, and insurance. The findings may not also necessarily 
apply to smaller industrial firms (less than $lOa million in annual 
sales). 
However, the major limitation of this study is that it involves a 
static analysis of corporate strategy, which is an inherently dynamic 
concept. The study therefore is not longitudinal in scope and 
nature. A longitudinal study is beyond the scope of this thesis~ 
however it is extremely important to bear in mind that even for the same 
firm, even without a change in the grand corporate strategy, the same 
top manager may perceive the functional tasks 1 strategic significance 
mix differently at two different points of time. 
And finally, the study 1 S findings are based on senior executive 1 s 
perceptions and opinions rather than on the actual observations of 
real world actions and results. Therefore, this study is marked by 
a total reliance on top-level executives for data-gathering. There are 
various reasons why this reliance on top-level executives is essential 
and inevitable. Top management by its very nature is still very much 
an art and this makes top-management planning a highly individualized 
process . 
. The 11 theory 11 of business policy is yet to evolve, although some 
contingency paradigms have been developed in recent times. In business 
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policy, like in any other emerging discipline, sophisticated observa-
tion and description must precede normative prescription. There is a 
need in the business policy literature for mor0 rigorous, empirical 
studies of corporations and top executives, so that their collective 
wisdom can be effectively crystalized (by ident-ifying patterns) into a 
systematized common body of knowledge, that is useful for both theory 
and practice. 
Another reason for reliance on top-level t•xecutives for data 
gathering is to be found in the nature of the l'ield itself. The field of 
business policY focuses on the organization a~~ a whole. And only 
people at the top have this overall, organization-wide perspective. 
Most successful top executives are said to havt the "helicopter quality" -
an ability to see problems from an overall per•;pective. Besides their 
responsibilities require that they have an acct'ss to information about 
how the entire organization operates. TherefO\'e, top-level executives 
(unlike divisional or functional managers) are the most knowledgeable 
people to provide reliable and meaningful infOl'mation about their firm's 
overall operations and environments. This factor becomes equally 
important in case of managerial perceptions of their firm•s environments. 
Unlike divisional or functional managers, the boundary spanning role of 
top-level executives is not restricted or partial. As grand strategists, 
they are responsible for an on-going appraisal of the total environment 
and for formulating appropriate strategic responses for the accomplish-
ment of corporate goals. 
And finally, one important reason why the data for this study was 
gathered from top-level executives is that in case of most variables, 
this was the only feasible way. For variables like size, industry 
~ 
classification or the predominant production system, the research 
investigator can obtain measures of these variables through personal 
observations or through data collected by independent and reliable 
secondary sources. Therefore, measurement of such variables do not 
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pose any problems, and where respondents are asked, as a matter of 
convenience, to give such information about their organizations, its 
veracity can be easily verified by reference to the relevant secondary 
data. Such verification, of course, was not possible in this study 
since the respondents had a choice to remain anonymous, and without 
which most top-level executives would have been reluctant to give any 
information about their companies, making data collection (and therefore, 
the entire study) an almost impossible task. 
However, variables like the grand corporate strategy currently 
pursued by the firm can only be measured by the top-level executives of 
the firm itself. If the research investigator were to do this himself 
he would have to spend an inordinate amount of time going through the 
various company records and talking to different top managers; assuming 
of course that he is allowed an access to these sources by all the 
firms in his study sample, which would of necessity be very small. 
Clearly, this has to be ruled out. Secondly, available published data 
also cannot be used for this purpose. For one thing, most published 
data relates to past performance rather than the current grand strategy 
of the firm. And thirdly, given our current knowledge and understand-
ing about corporate strategy, determination of a firm•s grand corporate 
strategy is impossible to measure on a nominal scale by a set of 
objective indicators that do not rely on top management•s perceptions 
and assertions. Thus, the only feasible approach was to have the senior 
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executives evaluate their own firms. Accordingly, the chief executive 
officer of each firm was asked on the questionnaire to identify the 
grand corporate strategy currently being pursued by his firm by using 
detailed descriptions of the four types of grand corporate strategies. 
Conclusion 
This chapter described the research methodology used in this study, 
it also provided detailed explanations for the data collection and 
analysis procedures. The results of the statistical analysis of data 
are presented in the following chapter. 
FOOTNOTE 
1For an extended discussion of least significant difference (LSD) 
tests see: (1) Steel, Robert G. D. and James H. Torrie. Principles 
and Procedures of Statistics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960, pp. 106-
107. (2) Snedecor, George W. and William G. Cochran. Statistical 
Methods, Sixth Edition, Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State University Press,. 
1973, pp. 271-275. (3) Smith, Lee H. and Donald R. Williams. 
Statistical Anal~sis for Business Decisions: ~Conceptual Approach. 
Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1971, pp. 462-468. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ANALYSES OF DATA 
Having set forth the nature of this study•s research methodology 
in the previous chapter, this chapter deals with the analyses of data 
relevant to the research questions delineated in Chapter IV and Chapter 
V. Additional analyses of data not directly related to the research 
questions raised in this study are also presented. The significance 
and implications of the results will be discussed in Chapter VII. 
Research Question 1 
Research Question 1. Is the relative strategic significance of the 
seven different organizational functions different for firms pursuing 
different grand corporate strategies? 
For this research question, the study•s sample of 2t,g firms was 
categorized by grand corporate strategy and for each category the 
seven organizational functions were ranked by their mean strategic 
significance scores. As shown in Table XIX, General Administration 
was the top-ranked function for the overall sample followed by Finance, 
Personnel, and ~arketing. The top three functions in each of the four 
classes of grand corporate strategy were different from those in the 
overall sample. Only General Administration was ranked among the top 
three functions in each type. 
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TABLE XIX 
RANKINGS OF THE SEVEN ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTIONS BY THEIR 
MEAN STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE SCORES WITHIN EACH OFTHE 
4 CELLS IN A ONE-WAY CLASSIFICATION BY GRAND 
CORPORATE STRATEGY 
Grand Corporate Strategy 
External 
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I nterna 1 Acquisitive All Firms 
Stabi 1 i ty Growth Growth Retrenchment (Grand ~1eans) 
Nl = 29 N2 = 104 N = 96 3 N = 20 4 N = 249 
GADM 4.97 GADM 5.02 MKTG 4.71 MKTG 4.56 GAD!1 4.79 
PERS 4. 74 PERS 4.83 GADM 4.66 PERS -3.96 FIN 4.55 --
PGR 4.70 FIN 4.77 FIN 4.44 GADM 3.94 PERS 4.47 
FIN 4.65 ERD 4.69 PERS 4.12 FIN 3.79 MKTG 4.47 
ERD 4.52 PGR 4. 51 PGR 4.08 PROD 3.50 ERD 4.28 
PROD 4.44 MKTG 4.28 ERD 3.93 ERD 3.50 PGR 4.28 --
MKTG 4. 31 PROD 4.19 PROD 3.84 PGR 3.44 PROD 4.03 
F = l. 51 F = 10. 06** F = 21.01** F = 4.7* F = 16.97** 
* Significant at p < . 05 1 eve 1 . 
** ·significant at p < . 01 1 eve 1 . 
Note: (1) Scores are based on a 7-point Likert-type rating scale where, 
1 =completely strategically insignificant, and 7 =of the 
greatest strategic significance. 
(2) Legend: GADM = General Administration, PROD = Production/ 
Operations, ERD = Engineering and R&D, MKTG = Marketing, 
FIN= Finance, PERS =Personnel, and PGR =Public & Govern-
ment Relations. · 
(3) In each cell, the horizontal dividing line(s) indicate that 
the set of mean values above that line (or between two such 
1 i nes) are not s i gni fi ca.ntly -different from each other but are 
significantly different from the mean values below that line. 
This was ascertained by administering in each-cell paired t-
tests (significant at p < .05 level) as approximate Least 
Significant Difference (LSD) tests. If a particular cell has 
no horizontal dividing lines, it means that in that cell the 
paired t-tests resulted in overlapping paired differences, 
with the result no mean value(s) emerged as significantly 
different from the rest. 
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For each of the five cells in Table XIX, an attempt was made to 
determine the mean values that were significantly different from others 
(see note 3 to the Table). This was done by administering in each cell 
paired t-tests (significant at p < .05 level) as 11 approximate 11 Least 
Significant Difference (LSD) tests. The results are shown in Table 
XIX. 
For firms pursuing Stability strategy, the paired t-tests resulted 
in overlapping paired differences with the result that no function(s) 
emerged as having a mean score(s) significantly different from the rest. 
For firms pursuing Internal GrovJth strategy, the mean score of 
General Administration was found to be significantly different from 
the mean scores of all the other functions. Thus, for firms pursuing 
Internal Growth strategy, General Administration was found to have the 
highest strategic significance. 
For firms pursuing External Acquisitive Growth strategy, there was 
no significant difference between the mean scores of the two top-ranked 
functions, Marketing and General Administration. However, their mean 
scores were significantly different from the mean scores of the remain-
ing five functions. Similarly, the mean score of Finance was signifi-
cantly different from all the others. 
For firms pursuing Retrenchment strategy, the mean score of 
Marketing was found to be significantly different from the mean scores 
of all the other functions . Thus, for such firms Marketing was found 
to have the highest strategic significance. 
For all firms considered together, the mean strategic significance 
score of General Administration was found to be significantly different 
from the mean scores of all the other functions. The mean scores of 
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Finance, Personnel and Marketing were not significantly different from 
each other, but as a group their mean scores were significantly differ-
ent from the remaining four functions. The mean score of the last-
ranked function Production was significantly different from the six 
higher-ranked functions. Thus, for all industrial firms General 
Administration was found to have the highest strategic significance; 
the next three strategically significant functions were Finance, 
Personnel, and Marketing. Of all the seven functions, Production was 
found to have the lowest strategic significance. 
In addition to the approximate LSD tests for each cell in Table 
XIX, an F ratio was also calculated from an analysis of variance (one-
way classification by organizational function) for the strate~ic 
significance score (grand mean) in each cell. The F ratios shown in 
Table XIX were calculated on the assumption that the mean strategic 
significance scores of each of the seven organizational functions came 
from seven independent samples rather than from the same sample (a 
repeat~d measures design); thus it was assumed that the mean scores in 
each cell were independent. This necessitated a change in the degrees 
of freedom from the calculated F ratios for ascertaining the critical 
values. Thus in a repeated measures AOV test, our assumption of 
independence yeilds critical values (for F ratios) that are approximate 
but conservative, in the sense that significance is never likely to be 
overstated. 
From Table XIX we find that F ratios are significant (at p < .05 
level) for all cells except cell 1 (Stability strategy). For firms 
pursuing Stability strategy, the means scores of the seven functions 
were not significantly different. Whereas for firms pursuing the other 
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three grand corporate strategies and also for all the firms in the 
sample (N = 249), the mean scores of the seven functions were signifi-
cantly different (at p < .05 level). These F ratios, therefore, indicate 
the magnitude of differences between mean scores of different functions 
in each cell. 
Finally, as shown in Table XX (column AOVI), an analysis of 
variance (one-way classification by Grand Corporate Strategy) for the 
mean strategic significance scores of eac~ of the seven different organ-
izational functions indicated significant differences (at p < .01 level). 
In fact, the actual critical value for the F ratio of each function 
(except Marketing) was p < .005, indicating highly significant differ-
ences. The data presented in Table XX clearly indicate that significant 
differences do exist among the mean strategic significance socre of each 
function attributable to the grand corporate strategies. 
Thus, the results of these analyses provide evidence that the 
strategic significance of each organizational function is not the same 
for the four types of grand corporate strategies. 
Research Question 2 
Research Question 2. For firms pursuing a particular grand 
corporate strategy, is the relative strategic significance of the seven 
different organizational functions different for firms of different 
size? 
For this research question, the study's sample of 249 firms was 
categorized into 12 cells by means of a 3 x 4 factorial design of 
Firm Size x Grand Corporate Strategy. As shown in Table XXI, within 
each of the 12 cells, and the overall column and row cells, the seven 
TABLE XX 
CALCULATED F RATIOS FROM ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (N=249) FOR THE MEAN STRATEGIC 
SIGNIFICANCE SCORES OF EACH OF THE SEVEN DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTIONS 
AOV I AOV II AOV II I AOV IV AOV V AOV VI AOV VI I 








General Administration 17. 02** 0.56 0.98 
Production/Operations 7.74** 1.17 0.35 
Engineering and R&D 14.58** 6.21** 2.74* 
Marketing 3.90** 0.34 0.21 
Finance 9.76** 5. 17** 1. 90 
Personnel 18. 28** 0.43 0.62 
Public & Government 
Relations 8.20** 12. 38** 2.79* 
AOV I = one-way classification by grand corporate strategy 
AOV II = one-way classification by firm size 
AOV III = one way classification by corporate diversity 
AOV IV = one-way classification by industry 
AOV V = one-way classification by production system 








AOVVII =one way classification by perceived environmental uncertainty 
*significant at p <.05 level 
**significant at p <.01 level 
3.18* 0.40 0.18 
1.62 0.45 2.21 
4.96** 2.59* 0.11 
4.09* 0.95 6.73** 
1.14 2.73* ·o.sg 
2.38 0.71 1. 50 
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TABLE XXI 
RANKINGS OF THE SEVEN ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTIONS 
BY THEIR MEAN STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE SCORES 
WITHIN EACH OF THE 12 CELLS IN A 3 X 4 
FACTORIAL DESIGN OF FIRM SIZE X 
GRAND CORPORATE STRATEGY 
Grand Corporate Strategy 
External Over a 11 
Internal Acquisitive Row 
Stability Growth Growth Retrenchment Means 
Nll o 5 N12 o 24 Nl3 o 22 Nl4 o 9 R1 = 60 
GADM 4.40 GAOM 5.14 MKTG 4.52 MKTG 4. 31 GADM 4.71 
FIN 4. 13 PERS 4.89 GAOM 4.52 PERS 4.22 MKTG 4.49 
FERS 3.86 FIN 4.86 FIN 4. 31 GADM 4.18 PERS 4.44 
Small PROD 3.76 ERD 4.80 PERS 4.16 PROD 3.86 FIN 4. 41 
MKTG 3.40 MKTG 4.76 PROD 3. 91 FIN 3.62 PROD 4.13 
ERD 3.24 PROD 4. 51 ERD 3. 74 PGR 3.17 ERD 4. 03 
PGR 2.95 PGR 4.19 PGR 3.72 ERD 3.11 PGR 3.76 
F = 5.57* 
N21 = 9 N22 = 35 N23 = 34 N24 = 6 R2 = 84 
GADM 5.28 GADM 4.87 GADM 4.75 MKTG 4. 75 GADM 4.79 
PERS 5.27 PERS 4. 77 MKTG 4.70 ERD 3.93 PERS 4.43 
PGR 5.11 FIN 4. 57 FIN no FIN 3.91 FIN 4.41 
Medium PROD 4. 96 PGR 4.42 PERS 4.00 GADM 3.82 MKTG 4. 40 
ERD 4.69 ERD 4.29 PGR 3.95 PERS 3.60 PGR 4.23' 
FIN 4.55 MKTG 4.01 ERD 3.83 PGR 3.42 ERD 4.12 
MKTG 4.54 PROD 3.87 PROD 3.81 PROD 3.27 PROD 3.92 
F = 8.11** 
N31 = 15 N32 = 45 N33 = 40 N34 = 5 R3 = 105 
PGR 5.03 GADM 5.06 MKTG 4.81 HKTG 4.78 GADM 4.83 
GADM 4.98 ERD d.95 GADM 4.67 FIN 3.96 FIN 4.74 
FIN 4.88 FIN 4. 87 FIN 4.65 PGR 3.95 PGR 4.62 
large ERD 4.85 PERS 4.84 PGR 4.40 PERS 3.94 ERD 4.55 
PER 4.72 PGR 4.74 PFJ<S 4.19 ERD 3.68 PERS 4.53 
MKTG 4.48 PROlJ 4-:26 ERD 4.11 GADM 3.64 MKTG 4.51 
PROD 4.35 MKTG 4.23 PROD 3.84 PROD 3.14 PROD 4.D6 
F = 9. 14** 
c1 = 29 c2 = 104 . c3 = 96 (;4 = 20 N = 249 
GADM 4.97 GADr-1 5.02 MKTG 4.71 MKTG 4.56 GAOM 4. 79 
Overall PERS 4.74 PERS 4.83 GADM 4.66 PERS 3.96 FIN 4.55 
Column PGR 4.70 FIN 4. 77 FIN 4.44 GADM 3.94 PERS 4.47 
Means FIN 4.65 ERD 4.69 PERS 4.12 FIN 3.79 MKTG 4.47 ERD 4.52 PGR 4.51 PGR 4.08 PROD 3.50 ERD 4.i8 
PROD 4.44 MKTG 4.28 ERD 3.93 ERD 3.50 PGR 4.28 
MKTG 4.31 PROD 4.19 PROD 3.84 PGR 3.44 PROD 4.03 
F = 1.51 F = 10.06** F = 21.01** F = 4. 7* F = 16.97** 
* See notes to Table XIX Significant at p < .05 level 
** Signi"icant at p < .01 level 
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organizational functions were ranked by their mean strategic signifi-
cance scores. 
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The results of approximate LSD tests showed significant differences 
in mean values for only 3 cells. For large firms with Internal Growth 
strategies, the lowest-ranked Production and Marketing had mean scores 
significantly different from those of the five higher-ranked functions. 
For medium-sized firms with External Acquisitive Growth strategies the 
mean scores of the top-ranked General Administration and Marketing 
were found to be significantly different from the mean scores of the 
other five functions; the third-ranked Finance had a mean score signi-
ficantly different from the rest. For large firms with External 
Acquisitive Growth strategies, the cellar function Production had a 
mean score significantly different from all the other higher-ranked 
functions. 
However, the same tests showed significant differences for the 
overall row means. For both small and medium-sized firms, the top-
ranked General Administration had mean scores significantly different 
from all oth~r functions; Marketing, Personnel, and Finance had mean 
scores that were not significantly different from one another, but were 
significantly different from those of the four other functions. In 
large firms the lowest-ranked Production had a mean score significantly 
different from all the other higher-ranked functions. 
The F ratios for all the three size groups were significant at 
p < .05 level (see Table XXI). Thus, the mean scores of the seven 
functions in each size group were significantly different. 
However, the F ratios from one-way analysis of variance by size 
for the mean strategic significance score of each function showed 
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significance (at p < .01 level) for only three functions: Engineering 
and R&D, Finance, and Public and Government Relations (see Table XX). 
Thus it appears that there do exist significant differences among the 
mean strategic significance score of each of these three functions 
attributable to firm size. On the other hand, the strategic signifi-
cance of General Administration, Production/Operations, Marketing, and 
Personnel appears to be the same for the three size categories. 
An unweighted AOV for the mean strategic significance score of 
each function in the factorial design shown in Table XXII, showed 
significance (at p < .01 level) for only two functions -Engineering 
and R&D, and Public & Government Relations -when the effect of size 
were considered. The effect of size on Finance was found to be 
significant at only p < .1 level. The results of these unweighted 
factorial AOVs, in so far as they relate to the effect of size, cor-
roborate the results of one-way AOVs by size discussed in the preced-
ing paragraph. F ratios for the effect of grand corporate strategy 
showed significance (at p < .05 level) for all the seven functions. 
Similarly, the F ratios for the interaction effect of size and grand 
corporate strategy were also significant (at p < .05 level) for all 
functions except Finance (F = 0.68, p > .5). 
To sum up, the results seem to indicate that when the effects of 
firm size and grand corporate strategy are considered, with the 
exception of Finance, there do exist significant differences among the 
mean strategic significance score of each function. The strategic 
significance of Finance, on the other hand, does not seem to differ in 
industrial firms when the interacting effects of size and grand 
corporate strategy are considered. 
l. 
TABLE XXII 
CALCULATED F RATIOS FROM UNWEIGHTED ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
FOR THE MEAN STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE SCORES OF EACH OF 
THE SEVEN DIFFERENT ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTIONS IN 
EACH OF THE SIX DIFFERENT FACTORIAL DESIGNS 
USED IN DATA ANALYSES 
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4 x 3 Fa.ctorial Design of Grand Cor~orate Strateg~ X Firm Size: 
Effect of Effect of Interaction 
GCS Size Effect 
~rganizationa1 Function F3,237 F2,237 F6,237 
l. General Administration 20.82** 0.42 2.58* 
2. Production/Operations 8.97** 0.22 3.41** 
3. Engineering and R & D 8. 38** 5.88** 2.64* 
4. Marketing. 2.62* 1. 66 . 2. 46* 
5. Finance 9. 1 0** 2.68 0.68 
6. Personnel 10.76** 0.48 3.94** 
7. Public and Government 
Relations 5.95** 12.11 ** 2.73* 
* significant at p < .05 level 
** significant at p < .01 level 
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TABLE XXII (continued) 
2. 4 x 4 Factorial Desi~ Grand Corpor~te Strategy X Corporate 
Divers iiY_: 
Effect of 
Effect of Corporate Interaction 
GCS Diversity Effect 
Organizational Function F3,233 F3,233 F9,231 
l. Genera 1 Administration 17.07** 0.27 0. 76 
2. Production/Operations 7.74** 0.15 0.59 
3. Engineering and R & D 8.41** 2.09 2.64** 
4. Marketing. 1.40 0.69 l. Ol 
5. Finance l 0. 24·** 1.46 0.68 
6. Personnel ll. 59** 0.57 0.97 
7. Public & Government 
Relations 8.69** 2.69* 3.88** 
3. 4 X 4 Factorial D~ of Grand CoCP_orate StrategY X Industry: 
Effect of Effect of Int~raction 
GCS Industrt Effect 
Organizational Function F3,233 F3,233 F9,233 
l. General Administration 17.91** 2.29 l. 94* 
2. Production/Operatio~s ll. 36** 4.54** 1.36 
3. Engineering and R & 0 10:75** 2.27 0.46 
4. Marketing l. 02 3.08* 0.44 
5. Finance 11 . l 0** 0.21 0.78 
6. Personnel 12.35** 0.29 l. 38 
7. Public & Government 
Relations 10.59** l. 91 1.38 
* significant at p < .05 level 
** significant at p < .01 level 
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TABLE XXII (continued) 
4. 4 x 3 Factorial Design of Grand Co!:'_porate Strategy X Production System: 
Organizational Function 
1. General Administration 
2. Production/Operations 




































5. 4 x 5 Factorial Design of Grand Corporate Strategy X Organizational 
Structure: 
Organizational Function 
.1. General Administration 
2. Production/Operation 




7. Public & Government 
Relations 
*'. significant at p < .05 level 
** . 
significant at p < .01 level 
Effect of 




























TABLE XXII (continued) 
6. 4 x 2 Factorial_ Design of Grand Corporate Strateg~ X Perceived 
Environmental Uncertainty (PELfr -
Effect of Effect of Interaction 
GCS PEU Effect 
Organizational Function · F3,241 F1,241 F3,241 
l. Genera 1 Administration 11.78** 0.02 0.03 
2. Production/Operations 4.68** 1.12 0.05 
3. Engineering and R & D 3.93** l. 29 2. 12 
4. Marketing 1.26 2.88 0.68 
5. Finance 4.68* 2.48 0.71 
6. Personnel 4.88** 2.02 0.60 
7. Public & Government 
Relations 1.86- . 0.01 5.79** 
* significant at p < .05 level 
** significant at P· < .01 level 
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Research Question 3 
Research Question 3. For firms pursuing a particular grand 
corporate strategy, is the relative strategic significance of the seven 
different organizational functions different for firms with different 
degrees of corporate diversity? 
For this research question, the study•s sample of 249 firms was 
categorized into 16 cells by means of a 4 x 4 factorial design of 
Corporate Diversity x Grand Corporate Strategy. As shown in Table 
XXIII, within each of the 16 cells, and the overall column and row cells, 
the seven organizational functions were ranked by their mean strategic 
significance scores. 
The results of approximate LSD tests showed significant differences 
in mean scores for only seven cells. General Administration•s mean 
score was significantly higher than all other functions for the related 
business firms with Internal Growth strategy. For the dominant 
business firms with External Growth strategy, the mean scores of the 
top-ranked Marketing and General Administration were significantly 
different from the mean scores of the other five functions. The mean 
scores of the top three functions - Marketing, General Administration, 
and Finance - were significantly different from those of the remaining 
four functions in case of both the related and unrelated business firms 
with External Growth strategy. In case of all the related business 
firms, the top-ranked General Administration and lowest-ranked Production 
had mean scores significantly different from all other functions. 
F ratios for the repeated measures AOVs for the four diversity 
groups showed significance (at p < .05 level) only in case of the 
TABLE XXII I 
RANKINGS OF THE SEVEN ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTIONS BY THEIR 
MEAN STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE SCORES WITHIN EACH OF THE 
16 CELLS IN A 4 X 4 FACTORIAL DESIGN OF CORPORATE 
DIVERSITY x GRAND CORPORATE STRATEGY 
Grand Corporate Strategy 
External avera ll 
Internal Acquisitive Row 
Stability Growth Growth Retrenchment Means 
N11 = 5 N12 = l 0 Nl3 = 8 Nl4 = 5 R1 = 28 
PGR 5.30 GADM 5.26 GAD11 4.35 MKTG 4.73 GADM 4.74 
Single GADM 5.00 FIN 5.02 MKTG 4.17 PERS 4.43 PERS 4.57 
Business PERS 5.00 PERS 5. 01 FIN 4.07 GADM 4.06 FIN 4.47 
MKTG 4.63 PGR 4.98 PERS 3.82 Fltl 3. 95 PGR 4.37 
PROD 4.54 PROD 4.25 ERD 3. 75 PGR 3.85 MKTG 4.34 
FIN 4.53 MKTG 4.15 PROD 3.75 PROD 3.76 PROD 4.07 
ERD 4.12 ERD 3.86 PGR 3.34 ERD 3.40 ERD 3.79 
F = l. 83 
N21 = 5 N22 = 20 N23 = 25 N24 = 5 R2 = 55 
ERO 5.00 PERS 4.90 MKTG 4.77 MKTG 3.98 GADM 4.65 
Dominant PERS 4.86 GADM 4.86 GADM 4.62 GADM 3.86 MKTG 4.46 
Business GADM 4.82 ERD 4.76 FIN 4.21 PERS 3.63 PERS 4.38 PGR 4.75 FIN 4.72 PERS 4.02 PROD 3.46 FIN 4.35 
PROD 4.70 PGR 4.46 PGR 4.00 FIN 3.42 ERD 4.19 
FIN 4.47 MKTG 4.31 ERD 3.90 ERD 2.52 PGR 4.09 
MKTG 4.05 PROD 4.12 PROD 3.73 PGR 2.45 PROD 3.93 
F = 4.06 
>- N31 = 14 N32 = 54 N33 = 42 N34 = 6 R3 = 116 !::: 
V> GADM 5. 11 GADM 5.04 MKTG 4. 71 MKTG 4.92 GADM 4.85 "" ...., PGR 5.D7 PERS 4.80 GADM 4.68 ERD 3.97 FIN 4.60 > Related 
c Business ERD 4. 79 ERD 4.70 FIN 4.60 GADM 3.73 PERS 4.53 
"' FIN 4.75 FIN 4.68 PGR 4.33 PERS 3.69 MKTG 4.50 !;;: PERS 4. 71 PGR 4.53 PERS 4.24 FIN 3. 64 PGR 4.47 0:: PROD 4.47 MKTG 4.30 ERD 3.98 PGR 3.54 ERD 4.41 0 "'- MKTG 4.46 PROD 4.10 PROD 3.90 PROD 3.32 PROD 4.03 0:: 0 
u 
F = 9.35** 
N41 = 5 N42 = 20 N43 = 21 N44 = 4 R4 = 50 
GADM 4.70 ERD 5.03 MKTG 4.83 MKTG 4.53 GADM 4.81 
FIN 4.64 GADM 4.97 GADM 4.80 FIN 4.30 FIN 4.69 Unn; 1 a ted PERS 4.46 FIN 4.94 FIN 4.55 PERS 4.21 MKTG 4.48 Bus 1ness PROD 3.98 PERS 4.74 PERS 4.10 GADM 4.18 PERS 4.40 
MKTG 3.85 PROD 4.47 PGR 3.99 ERD 4.15 ERD 4.36 
ERD 3. 72 PGR 4.26 ERD 3.90 PGR 4.00 PROD 4. l 0 
PGR 3.00 MKTG 4.26 PROD 3.90 PROD 3.50 PGR 4.00 
F = 5.62* 
cl = 29 c2 = 1 o4 c3 = 96 c4 = 20 N = 249 
GADM 4.97 GADM 5.02 MKTG 4. 71 MKTG 4.56 GADM 4.79 
PERS 4.74 PERS 4.83 GADM 4.66 PERS 3.96 FIN 4.55 
Overall PGR 4.70 FIN 4. 77 FIN 4.44 GADM 3.94 PERS 4.47 
Column FIN 4.65 ERD 4.69 PERS 4.12 FIN 3.79 MKTG 4.47 
Means ERD 4.52 PGR 4. 51 PGR 4.08 PROD 3.50 ERD 4-:28 
PROD 4.44 MKTG 4.28 ERD 3.93 ERD 3.50 PGR 4.28 
MKTG 4.31 PROD 4.19 PROD 3.84 PGR 3.44 PROD 4.03 
F = 1.51 F = 10.06** F = 21.01** F = 4.7* F = 16.97** 
* See notes to Table XIX Significant at p < .05 level 
** Significant at p < .01 level 
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related and unrelated business firms. Thus, the mean scores of the 
seven functions in these two categories were significantly different. 
Conversely, the mean scores of the seven functions in case of the single 
dominant business firms were not significantly different. 
As shown in Table XX, the F ratios from the AOV (one-way) classi-
fication by corporate diversity) for the mean strategic significance 
score of each function showed significance (at p < .05 level) for 
only two functions: Engineering and R&D, and Public and Government 
Relations. The F ratios for the effect of corporate diversity in an 
unweighted AOV for a 4 x 4 factorial design of Strategy x Diversity 
(Table XXII) showed significance (at p < .05 level) only in the case of 
Public and Government Relations. However, the effect of grand corpor-
ate strategy was significant for all functions except Marketing. The 
F ratios for the interaction effect of grand corporate strategy and 
corporate diversity showed significance only in case of Engineering and 
R&D and Public and Government Relations. F ratios for ~1arketing showed 
no significant effects of strategy, corporate diversity or their 
interaction. 
The results of the analyses by grand corporate strategy and 
corporate diversity indicate that there do not exist significant 
differences among the mean strategic significance score of Marketing 
attributable to grand corporate strategy and/or corporate diversity. 
Conversely, for Public and Government Relations, there do exist 
significant differences among their respective mean scores attributable 
to grand corporate strategy and/or corporate diversity. For General 
Administration, Production/Operations, Finance and Personnel, the effect 
of corporate diversity and the interaction effect of strategy and 
diversity do not seem to show any differences among these functions 1 
mean strategic significance scores. 
Research Question 4 
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Research Question 4. For firms pursuing a particular grand corpor-
ate strategy, is the relative strategic significance of the seven 
different organizational functions different for firms in different 
industries? 
For this research question, the study 1 s sample of 249 firms was 
categorized into 16 cells by means of a 4 x 4 factorial design of 
Industry x Grand Corporate Strategy. As shown in Table XXIV, within 
each of the 16 cells and the overall column and row cells, the seven 
organizational functions were rankeq by their mean strategic signifi-
cance scores. 
The results of approximate LSD tests showed significant differences 
in the mean scores only in a few cases. In case of firms with Stability 
and Retrenchemnt strategies, the sample size in some cells was less 
than 5. For firms in the capital goods industry with Stability strategy, 
the mean scores of the top four functions were significantly different 
from the mean scores of the bottom three functions. The mean scores of 
Marketing, General Administration, and Finance were significantly differ-
ent from the mean scores of the last four functions in both the capital 
and producer goods industries for firms with External Acquisitive Growth 
strategy. Production had significantly lower scores than all other 
functions in both the consumer nondurable and producer goods industries. 
General Administration on the other hand, had significantly higher 



















RANKINGS OF THE SEVEN ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTIONS 
BY THEIR MEAN STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE SCORES 
WITHIN EACH OF THE 16 CELLS IN A 4 X 4 
FACTORIAL DESIGN OF INDUSTRY X GRAND 
CORPORATE STRATEGY 
Grand Corporate Strategy 
External Overa 11 
Internal Acquisitive Row 
Stability Grov1th Growth Retrenchment Means 
N11 = 10 N12 = 32 r1 13 = 25 Nl4 = 6 R1 = 73 
GADM 4. 77 GADM 5.11 MKTG 4.54 MKTG 4.60 GADM 4.70 
PGR .4. 58 FIN 4.92 GADf~ 4.41 PERS 4.24 FIN 4.53 
FIN 4.51 PERS 4.89 FIN 4.23 PGR 3.88 PGR 4.48 
ERD 4.50 PGR 4.84 PGR 4.12 FIN 3.77 MKTG 4.45 
MKTG 4.29 ERD 4.63 PERS 3.95 GADM 3.60 PERS 4.43 
PERS 4.29 MKTG 4.40 ERD 3. 77 PROD 3.33 ERD 4. 21 
PROD 3. 91 PROD 4.11 PROD 3.41 ERD 3.10 PROD 3.78 
F = 7.35** 
Nzl = 4 N22 = 10 N23 = 14 N24 = 6 R2 = 34 
PERS 5.50 ERO 4.94 MKTG 4.79 MKTG 4.88 MKTG 4.76 
GADM 5.48 GADM 4.66 GADM 4.68 ERD 4.07 GADM 4.60 
PROD 5.38 MKTG 4.64 FIN 4.24 PGR 4.04 ERD 4.49 
FIN 5.23 PERS 4.60 ERD 4.19 PERS 3.88 FIN 4.38 
ERD 5.10 FIN 4.55 PERS 4.09 FIN 3.88 PERS 4.37 
MKTG 4.88 PGR 4.53 PROD 4.07 GADM 3. 73 PGR 4.24 
PGR 4. 75 PROD 4.52 PGR 3.98 PROD 3.23 PROD 4.21 
F ; 1. 58 
N31 = 4 N32 = 23 N33 = 24 N34 = 5 R3 ; 6.1 
GADM 5.33 GADM 5.19 MKTG 4.88 MKTG 4.45 GADM 4.95 
PROD 4.85 ERD 4.92 GADM 4. 77 GADM 4.18 MKTG 4.76-
PERS 4.82 FIN 4.84 FIN 4.58 PERS 3.86 FIN 4.64 
FIN 4.68 PERS 4.83 PERS 4.20 PROD 3.84 PERS 4. 50 
MKTG 4.38 MKTG 4.64 PROD 4.19 FIN 3. 76 ERD 4.36 
PGR 4.13 PROD 4.42 PGR 4.13 ERD 3.32 PROD 4. 31 
ERD 4.05 PGR 4.37 ERD 3.98 PGR 2.80 PGR 4.13 
F;5.11* 
N41 = 11 N42 = 34 N43 = 33 N44 = 3 R4 = 81 
PGR 5.00 GADM 4.89 GADM 4.76 GAOr~ 4.60 GADM 4.82 
PERS .4.86 PERS 4.83 ~lUG 4.67 MKTG 4.00 FIN 4.56 
GADM 4.8£· FIN 4.63 FIN 4.59 PROD 3.80 PERS 4.53 
FIN 4.55 ERD 4.44 PERS 4.19 PERS 3.76 PGR 4.23 
ERD 4. 51 PGR 4.30 PGR 4.07 FIN 3.70 ERD 4.19 
PROD 4.43 PROD 3.96 ERD 3.90 ERD 3. 47 ~IKTG 4.19 
MKTG 4.10 MKTG 3.76 PROD 3.82 PGR 2.42 PROD 3.96 
F = 9.21** 
c1 = 29 c2 = 1 o4 c3 = 96 c4 = 20 N = 249 
GADM 4.97 GADM 5.02 MKTG 4.71 MKTG 4. 56 GADM 4.79 
PERS 4.74 PERS 4.83 GADM 4.66 PERS 3~ FIN 4.55 
PGR 4.70 FIN 4. 77 FIN 4.44 GADM 3.94 PERS 4.47 
FIN 4.65 ERD 4.69 PERS 4.12 FIN 3.79 MKTG 4.47 
ERD ~.52 PGR 4.51 PGR 4.08 PROD 3.50 ERD 4.28 
PROD 4.44 MKTG 4.28 ERD 3.93 ERD 3.50 PGR 4.28 
MKTG 4. 31 PROD 4.19 PROD 3.84 PGR 3.44 PROD 4.03" 
F = 1. 51 F = 10.06** F = 21.01** F ; 4. 7* F = 16.97** 
* See notes to Table XIX Significant at p < .05 level 
** Significant at p < .01 level 
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The F·ratios for the repeated measures AOVs for each of the four 
industry groups showed significance (at p < .05 level) in case of the 
consumer nondurable, capital and producer goods industries. Thus, the 
mean scores of the seven functions in these three industries were 
significantly different. On the other hand, the mean scores of the 
seven functions in case of the consumer durable goods industries were 
not significantly different. 
The results of one-way AOVs by Industry (Table XX), and unweighted 
AOVs of the factorial design of Grand Corporate Strategy x Industry 
(Table XXII), for the mean strategic significance score of each 
function showed significance for the effect of industry for only two 
functions: Production/Operations and Marketing. Thus it appears that 
barring these two functions there do not exist significant differences 
in the mean strategic significance scores of different functions. 
The effect of grand corporate strategy (main effect) was found to be 
significant for all functions except Marketing; whereas the interaction 
effect was significant only for General Administration. 
The results of these AOVs seem to indicate significant differences 
among the mean scores of Production/Operations, Marketing, and General 
Administration attributable to grand corporate strategy and/or industry" 
For Engineering and R&D, Finance, Personnel, and Public & Government 
Relations, the effect of industry types and the interaction effect of 
industry and strate9y do not seem to show any differences among these 
functions' mean strategic significance scores. 
Research Question 5 
Research Question 5. For firms pursuing a particular grand 
corporate strategy, is the relative strategic significance of the seven 
different organizational functions different for firms with different 
production systems? 
For this research question, the study•s sample of 249 firms was 
categorized into 12 cells by means of a 3 x 4 factorial design of 
Production System x Grand Corporate Strategy. As shown in Table XXV, 
within each of the 12 cells and the overall column and row cells, the 
seven organizational functions were ranked by their mean strategic 
significance scores. 
The results of approximate LSD tests revealed significant 
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differences in the mean scores of different functions for only 6 cells. 
Engineering and R&D had significantly lower mean score compared to all 
the other functions for firms with Stability strategy and the unit and 
sm~ll batch production system. For firms with Internal Growth strategy, 
General Administration had mean score significantly higher than all other 
functions in case of the large batch and mass production; and Marketing 
had mean score significantly lower than all the functions in case of the 
continuous process production. For firms· with External Growth strategy, 
Marketing and General Administration had mean scores significantly 
higher than the rest for the large batch and mass production; whereas 
Marketing, General Administration, and Finance had mean scores signi-
ficantly higher than four lower-ranked functions in case of the continuous 
process production. In case of the continuous process production firms 
with Retrenchment strategy, Finance, Production, and Engineering and 
R&D has mean scores significantly lower than the other four higher-ranked 
functions. General Administration had significantly higher mean score 
than all other functions for firms with both the small batch and mass 



























RANKINGS OF THE SEVEN ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTIONS 
BY THEIR MEAN STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE SCORES 
WITHIN EACH OF THE 12 CELLS IN A 3 X 4 
FACTORIAL DESIGN OF PRODUCTION SYSTEM 
X GRAND CORPORATE STRATEGY 
Grand Corporate Strategy 
External Overall 
Internal Acquisitive Row 
Stability Growth Growth Retrenchment Means 
Nll = 4 N12 = 17 N13 = 14 Nl4 = 6 R1 = 41 
GADI1 5.33 GAOM 4.76 GAOM 4.96 MKTG 4.29 GADr1 4.80 
PROD 4.85 ERO 4.58 MKTG 4.59 GADM 4.18 MKTG 4.42 
PERS 4.82 FIN 4.50 FIN 4.54 PROD 3.80 FIN 4.41 
FIN 4.68 PERS 4.45 ERD 4.40 PERS 3.79 PERS 4.32 
MKTG 4.38 MKTG 4.32 PERS 4. 24 FJrj 3.67 ERD 4.25 
PGR 4. 13 PROD 4.02 PROD 4.16 ERD 3.10 PROD 4. 12 
ERD 4.05 PGR 3.90 PGR 3.98 PGR 2.79 PGR 3. 79 
F = 3 ~ 79 
N21 = 13 N22 = 66 N23 = 50 N24 = 9 R2 = 138 
GADM 4. 93 GADM 5.14 MKTG 4.80 MKTG 4.67 GADM 4.87 
PERS 4.84 PERS 4.92 GADM 4. 70 PERS 3.94 FIN 4.62 
PGR 4.63 ERD 4.85 FIN 4.46 FIN 3.92 MKTG 4. 61 
FIN 4.62 FIN 4.83 PERS 4.17 GADM 3.84 PERS 4.58 
fRO 4.62 PGR 4. 57 PGR 4.16 ERO 3.80 ERO 4.45 
MKTG 4.29 MKTG 4.53 ERD 4.00 PGR 3.64 PGR 4.37 
PROD 4.28 PROD 4.28 PROD 3.92 PROD 3.23 PROD 4-.oB 
F = 10.44** 
N31 = 12 N32 = 21 N33 = 32 N34 = 5 R3 c 70 
PGR 4.96 GADM 4.84 MKTG 4.62 f~KTG 4.68 GADM 4.61 
GADM 4.90 PERS 4.83 GADM 4.48 PERS 4.23 FIN 4.50 
FIN 4.66 PGR 4. 81 FIN 4.38 PGR 3. 85 PGR 4.40 
PERS 4.62 FIN 4.80 PGR 4.01 GADM 3.80 PERS 4.36 
ERD 4.58 ERD 4.28 PERS 3.98 FIN DT MKTG 4:23 
PROD 4.47 PROD 4.03 ERD 3.61 PROD 3.62 ERD 3.96 
MKTG 4. 31 t1KTG 3.47 PROD 3.58 ERD 3.44 PROD 3.87 
F = 6.75* 
c1 = 29 c2 = 104 c3 = 96 c4 = 20 N = 249 
GADM 4.97 GADM 5.02 MKTG 4. 71 MKTG 4.56 GADM 4.79 
PERS 4.74 PERS 4.83 GI\DM 4.66 PERS 3:-% FIN ~ 
PGR 4.70 FIN 4. 77 FIN 4.44 GADM 3.94 PERS 4.47 
FIN 4.65 ERO 4.69 PERS 4.12 FIN 3.79 MKTG 4.47 
ERD 4.52 PGR 4.51 PGR 4.08 PROD 3.50 ERD 4.28 
PROD 4.44 MKTG 4.28 ERD 3.93 ERD 3.50 PGR 4.28 
~lKTG 4. 31 PROD 4.19 PROD 3.84 PGR 3.44 PROD ~~~ 
F = 1. 51 F = 10.06** F = 21.01** F = 4.7* F = 16.97"* 
* See notes to Table XIX Significant at p • .05 level 
** Significant at p < .01 level 
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system, Production had significantly lower mean score than all other 
functions. 
167 
F ratios for the repeated measures AOVs for each of the three types 
of production system showed significance (at p < .05 level) in case of 
the large batch and mass, and continuous process production systems. 
On the other hand, the mean scores of the seven functions in case of the 
unit and small batch production system were not significantly different. 
The result of unweighted AOVs of the factorial design of Grand 
Corporate Strategy x Production System (see Table XXII) for the mean 
strategic significance score of each function seem to indicate that 
the effect of grand corporate strategy was significant for all functions 
except Marketing; and the effect of production system was significant 
only in the case of Public and Government Relations. The interaction 
effect was not significant for any of the functions. 
The F ratios in one-way AOVs by Production System (Table XX) did 
show significance for four functions: General Administration, 
Engineering and R&D, Marketing, and Public and Government Relations. 
The results seem to indicate that the strategic significance of 
Public and Government Relations seems to vary when effects of strategy 
and production system are considered. For all other functions, when 
firms are classified by strategy and production system the relative 
strategic significance of these functions seem to vary mainly because 
of the differences in their grand corporate strategy and not because 
of the differences in their production systems~ 
Res~arch Question 6 
Research Question 6. For firms pursuing a particular grand corpor-
ate strategy, is the relative strategic significance of the seven 
differentorganizational functions different for firms with different 
types of organizational structures? 
For this research question, the study's sample of 249 firms was 
categorized into 20 cells by means of a 5 x 4 factorial design of 
Organizational Structure x Grand Corporate Strategy. As shown in 
Table XXVI, within each of the 20 cells, and the overall column and 
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row cells, the seven organizational functions were ranked by their mean 
strategic significance scores., In case of firms with Stability and 
Retrenchment strategies, the sample size in many cells was less than 5. 
The results of approximate LSD tests revealed significant differ-
ences in the mean scores of different functions for only a few cells. 
For firms with External Growth strategy, Marketing had significantly 
higher mean scores than all the other functions, in the geographic 
division and holding company structures. In case of Retrenchment 
strategy, for firms whose organizational structure was functional with 
one or more divisions, Marketing had a significantly higher mean score 
than all the other functions. For firms classified as functional with 
one or more product divisions or subsidiaries, General Administration 
had a significantly higher, and Production had a significantly lower, 
mean score than all other functions. In case of the product division 
firms, General Administration and Finance had significantly higher mean 
scores than the other five functions, and Production had a significantly 
lower mean score than all the other functions. 
F ratios for the repeated measures AOVs for each of the five types 
of organizational structure showed significance in case of only one 
type - product division. In other words, with the exception of product 
division, the mean scores of the seven functions in each type of 
TABLE XXVI 
RANKINGS OF THE SEVEN ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTIONS BY 
THEIR MEAN STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE SCORES WITHIN 
EACH OF THE 20 CELLS IN A 5 X 4 FACTORIAL 
DESIGN OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
X GRAND CORPORATE STRATEGY 
Gr1nd CorpQrGU StratEgy 
htHn~l Overill 
lntem41 Acquls It i ve Row 
Stability Growth Growth Retrenchment Means 
1111 • 6 1112 • 7 Mil • 8 1114 • 7 Rl • 28 
GADM 4.65 GADM 5.51 GAO"! 4.28 PERS 4.39 GADM 4.67 
PGR 4.~0 F!N 5.35 HKTG 4.18 HKTG 4. 34 PERS 4.40 
PERS 4.26 PERS 5.29 F!N 3.94 GAOH 4. 29 MKTG 4.24 
Functional PROD 4.23 PGR 5.04 PERS 3. 73 PROD 3.94 f!N 4.17 
ERD 4.17 ERO 4. 57 PROD 3.64 FIN 3.61 PROD 4.05 
MKTG 4.02 PROD 4.47 ERD 3. 43 PGR 3.25 PGR 3.91 
f!N 3.76 HXTG 4.41 PGR 3.06 ERD 3.09 ERD 3. 79 
F • l. 94 
1121 • 11 "zz • 21 N23 • 19 N24 • 6 R2 • 57 
Functional GAOM 5.35 GADM 4.78 GAOM 4.82 MKTG 4.58 GAOH 4.78 
With One PGR 5.20 PERS 4. 71 MKTG 4.65 F!N "3."76 PERS 4:"52 
or More PERS 5.13 ERD 4.48 F!N 4.45 GADM 3.58 FIN 4.45 
Divisions FIN 5.03 PGR 4. 37 PGR 4. 30 ERO 3.57 MKTG 4.41 
or Subs!- ERD 4.91 F!N 4. 34 PERS 4. 26 PERS 3.55 PGR 4. 40 
darles FROD 4.68 PROD 4.07 ERD 4.13 PGR 3.33 ERD 4. 35 
MKTG 4.59 HKTG 4.04 PROD 3.98 PROD 3.25 PROD 4.07 
F • 2. 98 
1131 • 8 N32 • 56 N33 • 44 N34 • 3 R3 • 111 
ERO 4.58 GAOM 4.98 GADM 4.74 MKTG 4. 71 GAOM 4.82 
GADH 4.54 FIN 4.81 MKTG 4. 72 PGR 3.67 FIN 4.69 




1141 • 2 1142 • 14 H43 • 14 N44 • 2 R4 • 32 C> 
~ 
:::! FIN 5.05 PERS 5.30 MKTG 4.89 ERO 4.70 GAOM 4.86 
:z 
Geographic 
GAOM 4. 95 PGR 5.27 GADM 4:57 MKTG 4.63 PERS 4.63 
~ PROD 4.eo GADH 5.20 PGR 4.27 FIN 4.41 HKTG 4.61 a: Division ERD 4.40 FIN 4. 97 FIN 4.21 GAOM 4.40 FIN 4.61 C> 
PERS 4.00 ERO 4. 70 PERS 4.12 PERS 4.07 PGR 4. 52 
MKTG 3.&8 MKTG 4.44 PROO 3. 91 PROD 3.65 ERD 4. 31 
PGR 2.88 PROD 4.42 ERD 3.86 PGR 2.63 PROD 4.18 
F • 1.6 
11s1 • 2 1152 • 6 "s3 • 11 "54 • 2 R5 • 21 
PERS 5.85 GAOM 5.12 MKTG 4.88 MKTG 4.94 GAOM 4.70 
Holding 
GADM 5.60 FIN 4.68 GADM 4.45 PGR 4.88 MKTG 4.69 
FIN 5.27 ERO 4.53 FIN 4.23 PERS 4.64 FIN 4.48 Cooaapny PGR 5.00 PROD 4.52 PGR 4.00 FIN 4.41 PERS 4. 25 
H.qG 4.94 PERS 4. 31 PERS 3.86 ERD 4.10 PGR 4.18 
PROD 4.55 MKTG 4.19 ERD 3. 78 GAOM 3.85 ERO 3. 95 
ERD 3.00 PGR 4.00 PROD 3.54 PROD 3.50 PROD 3. 91 
F • 3.22 
tl • 29 c2 • Jo4 c3 • 96 c4 • 20 N • 249 
GADH 4.91 GADM 5. 02 MKTG 4. 71 MKTG 4. 56 GAOM 4. 79 
PERS 4.74 PERS 4.83 GADM 4. 66 PERS 3.96 FIN 4.55 
Over11l 
PGR 4.70 Fill 4. 77 FIN 4.44 GAOM 3. 94 PERS 4.47 
. ··column FIN 4;65 ERO 4.69 PERS 4.12 FIN 3. 79 MKTG 4.47 
He1ns 
ERO 4. 52 PGR 4. 51 PGR 4.08 PROD 3.50 ERO 4.?.8" 
PROD 4.44 HKTG 4.28 ERD 3.93 ERD 3.50 PGR 4.28 
MKTG 4.31 PROO 4.19 PROD 3.84 PGR 3. 44 PROD 4.03 
F • 1.51 F • 10.06** F • 21..01** F • 4. 7* F • 16.97** 
• Slgntflcant n p < .05 level See Notes to Table XIX 
.. Significant 1t p < .01 level 
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organizational structure were not significantly different. 
The results of one-way AOVs by Organizational Structures (Table 
XX) showed significance for only two functions: Engineering and R&D 
and Finance. The data therefore seem to indicate that for the other 
five functions there do not exist significant differences among their 
mean strategic significance scores attributable to organizational 
structure. 
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The results of unweighted AOVs for the entire factorial design of 
Grand Corporate Strategy x Organizational Structure (Table XXII) for 
the mean strategic significance score of each function seem to indicate 
that the effect of grand corporate strategy was significant for all 
functions except Marketing; and the effect of organizational structure 
was not significant for any function. The interaction effect was 
significant for only three functions: Personnel, Public and Government 
Relations, and Finance. 
The results, therefore, seem to indicate that when industrial 
firms are classified by strategy and structure, the relative strategic 
significance of different functions seem to vary mainly because of the 
differences in- their grand corporate strategies, and not because of the 
differences in their organizational structures. 
Research Question 7 
Research Question 7. For firms pursuing a particular grand 
corporate strategy, is the relative strategic significance of the seven 
different organizational functions different for firms with different 
degrees of perceived environmental uncertainty? 
For this research question, the study•s sample of 249 firms was 
categorized into 8 cells by means of a 2 x 4 factorial design of 
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty (PEU) x Grand Corporate Strategy. 
As shown in Table XXVII, within each of the 8 cells, and the overall 
column and row cells, the seven organizational functions were ranked 
by their mean strategic significance scores. 
171 
For firms with Stability and Retrenchment strategies the functional 
mix was different for firms with high and low PEU. Again, the very 
small sample sizes of firms with high PEU would make any generalization 
misleading. Perhaps the only prudent conclusion seems to be that 
Marketing had the highest strategic significance for firms with Retrench-
ment strategy, in case of both low and high PEU. 
The approximate LSD tests revealed the following results: In case 
of firms with Stability strategy and facing low PEU, Production and 
Marketing had significantly lower mean scores than the other five func-
tions. For firms with Internal Growth strategy facing low PEU, General 
Administration's mean score was significantly higher than all the other 
functions. In case of firms with External Growth strategy facing high 
PEU, Marketing and General Administration had mean scores significantly 
higher than the other five. In case of Retrenchment strategy firms 
facing low PEU, Marketing's mean score was significantly higher than all 
the other functions. Firms facing low PEU had General Administration's 
mean score significantly higher (and Production's mean score significant-
ly lower) than the mean scores of all the other functions~ 
F ratios for the repeated measures AOVs for each of the two PEU 
groups indicated that the mean scores of the seven functions were signi-




























RANKINGS OF THE SEVEN ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTIONS BY 
THEIR MEAN STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE SCORES WITHIN 
EACH OF THE 8 CELLS IN A 2 X 4 FACTORIAL 
DESIGN OF PERCEIVED ENVIRONMENTAL 
UNCERTAINTY X GRAND CORPORATE 
STRATEGY 
Grand Corporate Strategy 
External Over a 11 
Internal Acquisitive Row 
Stabi 1 ity Growth Growth Retrenchment Means 
N11 = 25 N12 = 82 N13 = 70 N14 = 17 Rl = 194 
GADM 4.97 GADM 5.00 MKTG 4.68 MKTG 4.46 GADM 4.78 
PGR 4.91 PERS D8 GADM 4.64 GADM 3.94 FIN 4.53 
low PERS 4.75 FIN 4.75 FIN 4.44 PERS 3.87 PERS 4.44 FIN 4.59 ERD 4.62 PERS 4.07 FIN 3.70 t1KTG 4.39 
ERD 4.56 PGR 4.43 PGR 4.05 PROD 3.47 ERD 4.27 
PROD 4.42 MKTG 4.15 ERD 3.98 ERD 3.33 PGR 4.25 
MKTG 4. 31 PROD 4.12 PROD 3.79 PGR 3.26 PROD 3.98 
F • 14.06** 
N2l = 4 N22 = 22 N23 = 26 N24 = 3 R2 = 55 
FIN 5.02 GADM 5. 05 MKTG 4.79 MKTG 5.13 GADM 4.82 
GAOM 4.98 PERS 5.01 GADM 4.71 PERS 4.48 MKTG 4.76 
PERS 4.71 ERD 4.95 FIN 4.44 ERO 4.47 FIN 4.62 High PROD 4.53 FIN 4.81 PERS 4.25 PGR 4.42 PERS 4.60 
MKTG 4.31 PGR 4.80 PGR 4.17 FIN 4.30 PGR 4.38 
ERD 4. 30 MKTG 4.75 PROD 3.98 GAD11 3.90 ERD 4.32 
PGR 3.38 PROD 4.43 ERD 3.78 PROD 3.67 PROD 4.18 
F = 3. 58 
c1 = 29 c2 = 1 D4 c3 = 96 c4 = 20 N = 249 
GADM 4.97 GADM 5.02 MKTG 4. 71 MKTG 4.56 GADM 4.79 
PERS 4.74 PERS ~83 GADM 4.66 PERS 3.96 FIN 4.55 
Overall PGR 4. 70 F!N 4.77 FIN 4.44 GADM 3.94 PERS 4.47 
Column FIN 4.65 ERD 4.69 PERS 4.12 FIN 3,79 MKTG 4.47 
Means ERD 4.52 PGR 4.51 PGR 4.08 PROD 3.50 ERD 4.28 PROD 4.44 MKTG 4.28 ERD 3.93 ERD 3.50 PGR 4.28 
MKTG 4. 31 PROD 4.19 PROD 3.84 PGR 3.44 PROD 4.03 
F = 1.51 F = lO.G6** F = 21.01** F = 4. 7* F = 16.97** 
• See notes to Table XIX Significant at p < .05 level 
** Significant at p < .01 level 
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The results of one-way AOVs by PEU (Table XX) showed significance 
for only one function: Marketing. Therefore, for the other six 
functions, there do no seem to exist significant differences among their 
mean strategic significance scores attributable to the degree of PEU. 
The results of unweighted AOVs for the entire factorial design of 
Grand Corporate Strategy x PEU (Table XXII) for the mean strategic 
significance score of each function seem to indicate that the effect of 
grand corporate strategy was significant for all functions except 
Marketing, and Public and Government Relations; the effect of PEU was 
not significant for any function. The interaction effect was signifi-
cant for only Public and Government Relations. 
The results therefore seem to indicate that when firms are classi-
fied by strategy and PEU, the relative strategic significance of 
different functions seem to vary mainly because of the differences in 
their grand corporate strategy and not because of the differences in 
the degree of PEU. 
Analyses of Data Not Directly Related to 
the Research Objectives 
For this study, as explained in Chapter III, the responding senior 
executives were not asked to evaluate each of the seven functions in 
terms of its strategic significance on a Likert-type rating scale. 
Instead, a normative list of fifty-five key result areas (grouped under 
seven organizational functions) was developed and the senior executives· 
were asked to rate each key result area separately in terms of its 
strategic significance to effective implementation of the firm's grand 
corporate strategy. The evaluation of each key result area was based 
upon a seven-point rating scale from l to 7. For each firm the stra-
tegic significance of each function was based on the average of the 
ratings of key result areas in that functional category. 
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Although the focus of this study is on the strategic significance 
mix of different functions rather than the strategic significance mix 
of different key result areas, it was thought that additional analyses 
by key result areas would provide some interesting and useful data. 
Appendix E contains tabulation of distribution of responses among rating 
scales and identification of mode and mean ratings and their rankings 
for all key result areas. The top sixteen key result areas, ranked by 
their mean strategic significance scores, are listed in Table XXVIII. 
Each of the seven functions is represented in this list of top sixteen 
(out of a total of fifty-five) key result areas. 
As shown in Table XIX, General Administration had the highest 
strategic significance among all functions for the overall sample. The 
analysis by key result areas makes this fact even more obvious. Three 
out of the top four and five out of the top ten key result areas are 
from the General Administration category .. Interestingly enough, out of 
the five General Administration key result areas (shown in Table XXVIII), 
the following three directly relate to the area of business policy and 
strategic planning. 
1. Ability to perceive new business opportunities and potential 
threats. 
2. Achieving a better overall control of general corporate 
performance. 
3. Developing a more effective company-wide strategic planning 
system for planned overall corporate development. 
TABLE XXVIII 
THE TOP SIXTEEN KEY RESULT AREAS RANKED BY THEIR 
MEAN STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE SCORES 
(N = 249) 
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1. GADM 1 Attracting and retaining well-trained and 
competent top managers 6.06 
2. MKTG 33 Maintaining a highly trained, motivated, 
vigorous and dynamic sales organization 
3. GADM 3 Ability to perceive new business oppor-
5.82 
tunities and potential threats 5.47 
4. GADM 2 Achieving a better overall control of 
general corporate performance 5.33 
5. FIN 38 Sound capital structure allowing flexi-
bility to raise additional capital for 
internal growth and acquisitions 5.26 
6. GADM 5 Abilitytounify conflicting opinions, 
improve coordination and enhance effective 
collaboration between key executives, 
generate enthusiasm and motivate sufficient 
managerial drive for growth and profits. 5.15 
7. ERD 21 Improvement in research and new product 
development capabilities 5.08 
8. t·1KTG 27 Widening the customer base by intensive 
market penetration and development 
9. FIN 34 Improving bond ratings and common stock 
5.06 
market performance 5.00 
10. GADM 6 Developing a more effective company-wide 
strategic planning system for planned 
overall corporate development 5.00 
11. PROD 11 An on~oing plant modernization program 
to keep the efficiency of equipment 
comparable to that of the major competitors 4.87 
12. FIN 39 Strong working capital position allowing 
flexibility to raise short-term capital 
at low cost 4.84 
13. PERS 48 Improved employee motivation, job satis-
faction and morale 4.84 
TABLE XXVIII(Continued) 
Key Result Area 
14. PERS 49 Stimulating and rewarding creativity in 






reward systems 4.79 
15. PERS 46 Effective and efficient personnel policies 
for hiring, training, promotion, compensation 
and employee services 4.79 
16. PGR 55 Improving overall corporate image 4.77 
Legend: GADM = General Administration 
PROD = Production/Operations 
ERD = Engineering and R&D 
f~KTG = Marketing 
FIN = Finance 
PERS = Personnel 
PGR = Public and Government Relations 
Appendix F provides comparisons of the top ten key result areas 
ranked by their mean strategic significance scores and separately 
analyzed by grand corporate strategy, size, corporate diversity, 
industry, production system, organizational structure, and perceived 
environmental uncertainty. Table XXX (included in Appendix F) 
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provides a comparison of the top ten key result areas in firms pursuing 
different grand corporate strategies. In Firms pursuing Stability, 
Internal Growth, and External Growth strategies, the highest importance 
is given to the ability to attract and retain well-trained and competent 
~managers; and only one of the top ten key result areas is not 
included in the overall top sixteen. In firms pursuing Retrenchment 
strategy, the highest importance seems to be given to maintaining a 
highly trained, motivated, vigorous and dynamic sales organization; and 
three of the top ten key result areas are not included in the overall 
top sixteen. These three key result areas, of special importance to 
firms pursuing Retrenchment strategy, relate to the firm's ability to: 
1. use more novel and effective sales promotion and 
advertising campaigns; 
2. maintain effective relations with trade unions; and 
3. widen and improve the product distribution networks and 
improve distributor relations. 
Another major difference lies in the fact that firms with 
Stability, and Internal and External Growth strategies, consider their 
ability to perceive new business opportunities and potential threats 
as one of the top five key result areas. In the case of Retrenchment 
strategy firms, the above-mentioned key result area does not figure in 
the list of the top ten. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the results of analyses of data 
collected for the study. The strategic mixes of organizational func-
tions for effective imolementation of different grand corporate 
strategies have been identified. Statistical tests clearly indicate 
that there do exist significant differences among the mean strategic 
significance score of each function attributable to grand corporate 
strategies pursued by the firms. The co 11 ecti ve perceptions of the 
senior executives in industrial firms seem to suggest that the relative 
strategic significance of the seven different organizational functions 
is different for firms pursuing different grand corporate strategies. 
When the influence of firm size, corporate diversity, industry, 
production system, organizational structure, and perceived environmental 
uncertainty were considered for each type of grand corporate strategy, 
the strategic mixes of organizational functions were found to be 
different. Of the four types of grand corporate strategies, the 
External Acquisitive Growth strategy seemed to be the least vulnerable 
to the influence of these mediating variables. The analyses by grand 
corporate strategy and each of the mediating variables indicated that 
the grand corporate strategy was responsible for most of the explained 
variance of mean strategic significance scores of different organization 
functions. 
With the results of the study having been presented, the next 
chapter will fully discuss these results, provide a summary of findings 
and present some conclusions. 
CHAPTER VI I 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presents a discussion of the results of the study•s 
empirical analyses of data. It provides a summary of the findings, and 
a conclusion to this chapter summarizes the salient features of the 
importance of this study and the implications for further research. 
Discussion of Results 
At the outset, it is important to reiterate that this study•s 
conceptual framework is not a theory in the strict sense of the term. 
This study is exploratory in nature and the aim is to develop a better 
understanding of the concept of corporate strategy. I}t has integrated 
several different concepts from the fields of corporate strategy and 
organization theory. The primary thrust of this study is to investi~ate 
the relationships between grand corporate strategies pursued and the 
,A'\ 
strategic mixes of seven organizational functions in industrial firmsl 
--..: 
The secondary thrust of this study is to identify the nature of influ-
ence of size, corporate diversity, industry type, production system, 
organizational structure, and perceived environmental uncertainty, on 
the interrelationships between the grand corporate strategy pursued 
and the relative importance of different functional tasks. L:hus, the 
aim of the study is to provide understanding - to determine the rela-
tionships that exist, and therefore no cause and effect conclusions can 
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·be drawn. The discussion in this section will be broken down by the 
! 
major areas of the stu~~ 
Relative Strategic Significance of Different 
Organizational Functions 
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For the entire sample of 249 industrial firms, the mean strategic 
significance score of the top-ranked General Administration was signi-
ficantly higher than the remaining six functions (Table XIX). Finance, 
Personnel, and Marketing (ranked second, third, and fourth, respectively), 
had mean strategic significance scores not significantly different from 
one another. The fourth and fifth place went to Engineering and R&D, 
and Public and Government Relations. Production was ranked last among 
the seven functions with mean strategic significance score significantly 
lower than all the others. 
As shown in Table XXVIII, the key result areas included under 
General Administration category account for five of the top ten. Of 
these five key result areas, the first related to the ability to attract 
and retain competent top managers; the second relates to the l~adership 
role of general management in a large organization; and the remaining 
three directly relate to the area of business policy and planning. 
These findings empirically affirm the paramount importance of the general 
management function in large industrial firms. It also highlights the 
top management interest and involvement in strategic planning. It seems 
that the prognosis by many management writers that the decade of 70 1 S 
would go down in the management history as the 11 decade of strategic 
planning, 11 would after all come true. It also suggests that the current 
upsurge in the academic interest in 11 Strategic management 11 is also very 
timely, and none too soon. A need for a clear dichotomy betw-een 
strategic and operating management has never been greater. 
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The highest importance given to general management seems to 
support the findings of Stevenson (1968) and Steiner (l969a). The 
identification of Finance as the second most important function, 
highlights the important contribution that the chief financial officer 
can make to a large industrial firm. It supports Pohl 1 S (1973) con-
tention, that the trend toward a~ increase in the direct involvement of 
the chief financial officers in the strategic issues handled by top 
management is likely to continue. 
Godiwalla (1977) in his study of the influence of functional 
managements (general management excluded) on the overall corporate 
strategy, found marketing, finance, and production as the three most 
crucial functions in order of importance. In this study, after General 
Administration, Finance had the highest strategic significance, 
followed by Personnel and Marketing; Production on the other hand had 
the lowest strategic significance. The study 1 S analyses, therefore do 
not support Godiwalla 1 s findings. The lowest rank of Production seems 
to support Heau 1 S (1976) contention that it is only in the case of 
vertical integration that the top management is production-oriented. 
To sum up, the aggregate analysis of data clearly indicate that 
the relative strategic significance of the seven functions is different 
in industrial firms. The data was further analyzed by grand corporate 
strategy, size, corporate diversity, industry, production system, 
organizational structure, and perceived environmental uncertainty. 
Table XXIX shows the rankings of functions in different schemes of 








RANKINGS OF THE SEVEN ORGANIZATIONAL FUNCTIONS 
BASED ON THE MANAGERIAL PERCEPTIONS OF 
THEIR STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE 
Organizational 
N A B c D - - - -
In firms pursuing different Grand 
Corporate Strategies: 
a) Stability 29 1 6 5 7 
b) Internal Growth 104 1 7 4 6 
c) External Acquisitive Growth 96 2 7 6 1 
d) Retrenchment 20 3 5 6 1 
In firms with different Size 
(Annual Sales revenue in-mTllions): 
a) $200 and less 60 1 5 6 2 
b) $201 - $599 84 1 7 6 4 
c) $600 and over 105 1 7 4 6 
In firms with different degrees 
of Corporate Diversity: 
a) Single Business Firms 28 1 6 7 5 
b) Dominant Business Firms 55 1 7 5 2 
c) Related Business Firms 116 1 7 6 4 
d) Unrelated Business Firms 50 1 6 5 3 
rn· firms in different Industries: 
a) Consumer Nondurable Goods 73 1 7 6 4 
b) Consumer Durable Goods 34 2 7 3 1 
c) Capita 1 Goods 61 1 6 5 2 
d) Producer Goods 81 1 7 5 6 
In firms with different types of 
Production Systems: 
a) Unit and Small Batch 41 1 6 5 2 
b) Large Batch and Mass 138 1 7 5 3 
c) Continuous Process 70 1 7 6 5 
In firms with different types of 
Organizational Structure: 
a) Functional 28 5 7 3 
b) Functional with.one or more 
Product Divisions or 
Subsidiaries 57 1 7 6 4 
c) Product Division 111 1 7 5 3 
d) Geographic Division 32 1 7 6 3 
e) Holding Company 21 1 7 6 2 
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Functions 
E F G - - -
4 2 3 
3 2 5 
3 4 5 
4 2 7 
4 3 7 
3 2 5 
2 5 3 
3 2 4 
4 3 6 
2 3 5 
2 4 7 
2 5 3 
4 5 6 
3 4 7 
2 3 4 
3 4 7 
2 4 6 
2 4 3 
4 2 6 
3 2 5 
2 4 6 
4 2 5 
3 4 5 
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TABLE XXIX (Continued) 
Qr.ganizational Functions 
N A B c 0 E F - - - - - -
7. In firms facing different degrees of 
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty: 
a) Low 194 l 7 5 4 2 3 
b) High 55 1 7 6 2 3 4 
All Firms (Overall) 249 1 7 5 4 2 3 
Note: ("I) Column •w denotes the number of firms sampled in each 
category. 
(2) Legend: A = General Administration 
B = Production/Operations 
C = Engineering and R&D 
0 = Marketing 
E = Finance 
F = Personnel 






had the top rank in all but a few sub-groups. In the next seven 
sections, the results of the analyses of data by strategy, size, 
diversity, industry, production system, organizational structure, and 
PEU, are discussed separately. 
~lysis by Grand Corporate Strat~ 
In this section, the results of the analysis of data by grand 
corporate strategy are discussed first. The effects of further 
analyses by size, corporate diversity, industry, production system, 
organizational structure, and perceived environmental uncertainty are 
then discussed separately. 
When the aggregate data was analyzed by grand corporate strategy, 
the strategic mixes of organizational functions were found to be 
different for each strategy type. As shown in Table XIX, only in the 
case of Internal Growth strategy (General Administration) and Retrench-
ment strategy (Marketing) did the top-ranked function have a signifi-
cantly higher score than all the other functions. In case of External 
Growth strategy, Marketing and General Administration had significantly 
higher scores than the remaining five functions. We can therefore 
conclude that General Administration appears to be a critical function 
for Internal and External Growth strategies~ whereas Marketing is a 
critical function for Retrenchment and External Growth strategies. There 
seems to be no one or two critical functions for firms pursuing 
Stability strategy; although in line with the aggregate data, General 
Administration seems to be strategically very important. The data also 
seem to indicate relatively higher importance for Public and Government 
Relations in the case of firms pursuing Stability strategy. 
~St~tistical analyses discussed in the previous chapter clearly 
indicates that the effect of grand corporate strategy on the relative 
strategic importance of the seven functions is highly significant, it 
is more significant than the effect of any other mediating variable, 
to be discussed later in this section. Almost every function is 
significantly affected by the grand corporate strategy pursued. It 
is therefore extremely important that when a large firm changes its 
grand corporate strategy, it must reevaluate its priority of critical 
functions otherwise the effective implementation of the new grand 
corporate strategy is likely to be hampered. These findings seem to 
support Allen's (1972) study of the differences in conglomerates and 
vertically integrated companies, Heau's (1976) study of the critical 
functions in vertically integrated and conglomerate firms, and Miles 
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and Snow's (1978) typology of organizations with distinguishing features 
consistent with the organizational strategie~J 
----
In the following sections the effects of size, corporate diversity, 
industry type, production system, organizational structure, and per-
~eived environmental uncertainty, on the interrelationships between the 
grand corporate strategy pursued and the relative importance of different 
functional tasks, are examined separately. 
Effect of Size. Table XXI shows the effect on the strategic 
mixes of organizational functions when firms in each of the four 
strategy groups are further analyzed by their size. For each strategy 
group, the rankings of functions in different size categories are 
different. 
In case of Stability strategy, the effect of size seems to the 
most pronounced for Public and Government Relations; and Finance seems 
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to have a relatively higher importance in small-sized firms. However, 
the LSD tests revealed no significant differences in the mean scores 
of the different functions in any size category. 
For firms pursuing Internal Growth strategy, General Administration 
seems to be very important irrespective of firm size. However, the LSD 
tests showed significant differences in mean scores only in the case of 
large firms; the lowest-ranked Production and Marketing had mean scores 
significantly lower than the remaining five functions. 
For firms pursuing External Growth strategy, the results of LSD 
tests indicate that: (l) Production had a mean score significantly 
lower than all the other six functions in the case of large firms; and 
(2) General Administration and Marketing had mean scores significantly 
higher than the remaining five functions in the case of medium-sized 
firms. In the case of small-sized firms, LSD tests showed no signifi-
cant differences. The data seem to suggest that Marketing and General 
Administration are very important functions irrespective of firm size. 
There seems to be no one or two critical functions for firms 
pursuing Retrenchment strategies, although in line with the aggregate 
data, r~arketing seems to be strategically very important. 
The results of unweighted factorial AOVs show that when firms 
pursuing different grand corporate strategies were sub-classified by 
size, the effect of size, on the relative importance of functional 
tasks, was most pro~ounced on two functions: Engineering and R&D, and 
Public and Government Relations .. For the other five functions the 
effect of size showed no significance (at p < .05 level). On the other 
hand ~he effect of grand corporate strategy was significant for all 
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functions. Therefore, grand corporate strategy seems responsible for 
most of the explained variance of mean strategic significance score of 
different organizational functions. 
The findings of this study with regard to the effect of size 
should be interpreted with caution. The study's sample came from a 
population of 1000 largest U.S. industrial firms, the smallest of which 
had annual sales exceeding $100 million. Therefore, the terms "small" 
and "medium," used in this study to distinguish firms in the sample by 
size, have rather specific meaning. This might also. be an important 
reason why the results do not seem to support the importance of size 
as a contextual variable, as suggested by many organization theorists. 
Effect of Corporate Diversity. Table XXIII shows the effect on the 
strategic mixes of organizational functions when firms in each of the 
four strategy groups are further analyzed by corporate diversity. For 
each strategy group, the rankings of functions in different diversity 
categories are different. 
In case of Stability strategy, Public and Government Relations~ 
and Engineering and R&D, seem to be most affected by differences in the 
degree of corporate diversity. However, the LSD tests did not reveal 
any significant differences in the mean scores in any of the four cells. 
In case of Internal Growth strategy, General Administration was 
the critical function for the related business firms. The importance 
of Engineering and R&D seemed to increase with diversity. 
In case of External Growth strategy the analysis by diversity did 
not seem to change the importance of Marketing, General Administration, 
and Finance. Marketing and General Administration were the most 
strategic functions in the dominant business firms. Marketing, General 
Administration, and Finance were the most strategic functions in the 
related and unrelated business firms. 
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In case of Retrenchment strategy, Marketing was given the highest 
importance in the related business firms. In the other three cells,. 
the LSD tests did not reveal any significant differences, although the 
overall trends seem to suggest that Marketing is a crucial function 
irrespective of the degree of corporate diversity. 
The results of unweighted factorial AOVs show that when firms 
pursuing different grand corporate strategies were sub-classified by 
the degree of corporate diversity; the effect of corpor-ate diversi"ty 
was most pronounced on Public and Government Relations and the inter-
action effect (of corporate diversity and grand corporate strategy) was 
most pronounced on Public and Government Relations, and Engineering and 
R&D. On the other hand the effect of grand corporate strategy was 
significant for all functions except Marketing. 
The relative strategic significance of Marketing, therefore, does 
not seem to change in industrial firms when their grand corporate 
strategies and their degree of diversity are taken into account. On 
the other hand, differences in strategy and diversity seem to have a 
considerable influence on the relative strategic significance of Public 
and Government Relations, and Engineering and R&D in industrial firms. 
For General Administration, Production/Operations, Finance, and Person-
nel, strategy and not diversity, seems responsible for most of the 
differences in their relative strategic significance. 
The studies by Chandle~ (1962}, Fouraker and Stopford (1968), 
Rumelt (1974}, Khandwalla (1974), Miller and Springate (1978), 
and Galbraith and Nathanson (1978) found systematic structural 
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differences in firms pursuing different diversification strategies; 
however the data for this study do not show any systematic differences 
in the relative strategic importance of different functional tasks 
when firms in different strategy groups are further analyzed by corporate 
diversity. 
~:ect of Indus~yl Table XXIV shows the effect on the strategic 
mixes of organizational functions when firms in each of the four strategy 
groups are further analyzed by industry. 
In case of Stability strategy, Engineering and R&D, Public and 
Government Relations, and Personnel seemed to be most affected by 
differences in industry types. 
In case of Internal Growth strategy, Engineering and R&D seemed to 
have a relatively higher importance in the consumer durable goods 
industries. 
In case of External Growth strategy, the analysis by industry 
showed little difference. The results of LSD tests showed Marketing, 
General Administration, and Finance as critical functions in the capital 
and producer goods industries. 
In case of Retrenchment strategy, the LSD tests did not reveal any 
significance in any of the four cells. This coupled with the small 
sample size in each cell precludes any generalization. 
The results of unweighted factorial AOVs show that when firms 
pursuing different grand corporate strategies were sub-classified by 
industry the effect of industry was significant only in Production and 
Marketing, and the interaction effect was significant only in case of 
General Administration. The effect of grand corporate strategy was, 
however, significant for all functions except Marketing. 
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To conclude, the differences in strategy and industry have a 
significant effect on the relative importance of Production. The 
relative strategic significance of r~arketing seems to be affected by 
the differences in industry rather than by differences in strategy. 
And, for the remaining five functions, contrary to the findings of 
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) and Miles and Snow (1978), strategy and not 
industry seems to be responsible for most of the differences in their 
relative importance. 
Effect of Production System. Table XXV shows the effect on the 
strategic mixes of organizational functions when firms in each strategy 
group are further analyzed by production system. 
In case of Stability strategy, the results of LSD tests showed 
that Engineering and R&D had a significantly lower mean score than 
all the other six functions in the unit and small batch production 
system. 
In case of Internal Gl~owth strategy, the analyses by LSD tests 
indicated General Administration to be the most strategic function in 
the mass production system, and Marketing to be the least strategic 
function in the process production system. 
In case of External Growth strategy, further analysis by production 
system did not show any major changes; the results of LSD tests showed 
that Marketing and General Administration were the critical functions 
in the mass production and {along with Finance) in the process production 
systems. 
In case of Retrenchment strategy, LSD tests did not reveal any 
critical function(s); however Marketing seemed to be very important, 
irrespective of the type of production system. 
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The results of unweighted factorial AOVs show that when firms 
pursuing different grand corporate strategies were sub-classified by 
production system the effect of production system was significant only 
in Public and Government Relations, the effect of grand corporate 
strategy was significant for all seven functions but Marketing, and the 
interaction effect was not significant in any function. 
Therefore, differences in strategy and production system have a 
significant effect on the relative importance of Public and Government 
Relations; on the other hand, differences in strategy and production 
system do not seem to influence the relative importance of Marketing in 
industrial firms.· For the other five functions, strategy and not 
production system seems responsible for most of the differences in 
their relative importance. 
As per the findings of the organization theorists like Woodward 
(1965), Thompson (1967), Hickson et al. (1969), Perrow (1970) and 
Murphy (1972), the firm's predominant production system affects the 
structural and scale (size) aspects of the organization. The analyses 
of the study 1 s data seem to indicate that compared to the grand 
corporate strategy, the production system seems to have considerably 
less influence on the relative importance of different functional tasks. 
Effect of Organizational Structure. Table XXVI shows the effect 
on the strategic mixes of organizational functions when firms in each 
of four strategy groups are further analyzed by organizational structure. 
In case of firms with Stability and Retrenchment strategies the 
strategic mixes of functions were different in different types of struc-
tures, however, the extremely small sample sizes make the 
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generalizations of findings rather questionable. For firms pursuing 
Retrenchment strategy, the results of LSD tests showed Marketing to be 
the most strategic function in firms whose structure was functional with 
one or more product divisions or subsidiaries. 
In case of Internal Growth strategy, the relative strategic 
significance of different functions seemed to change with structure, but 
General Administration seemed to have very high strategic significance 
irrespective of the type of organizational structure. 
In Case of External Growth strategy, Marketing was the most 
strategic function for firms with both the geographic division and 
the holding company structures. 
The results of unweighted factorial AOVs show that when firms 
pursuing different grand corporate strategies were sub-classified by 
organizational structure, the effect of organizations structure was not 
significant for any function; the effect of grand corporate strategy 
was significant for all functions except Marketing; and the interaction 
effect was significant for Finance, Personnel, and Public and Government 
Relations. 
Therefore, differences in strategy and organizational structure do 
not seem to have any effect on the relative strategic significance of 
Marketing in industrial firms. For the other six functions, strategy 
and not organizational structure seems responsible for most of the 
differences in their relative importance. 
The major research findings in the area of organization theory 
highlight the importance of organizational structure as a crucial 
contextual variable, the business policy research findings also consider 
structure as a crucial variable in the area of strategy implementation. 
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However, the analyses of the study•s data seem to indicate that organi-
zational structure does not have any significant influence on the rela-
tive importance of different functions in large industrial firms. 
Effect of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty. Table XXVII shOI'iS 
the effect on the strategic mixes of organizational functions when 
firms in each of the four strategy groups are further analyzed by per-
ceived environmental uncertainty (PEU). 
In case of firms pursuing Stability and Retrenchment strategies, 
the very small sample sizes for firms with high PEU, make any generali-
zation misleading. Although for Retrenchment strategy, LSD tests showed 
that Marketing had the highest strategic significance for firms with low 
PEU. 
For the two growth strategies, analyses by PEU showed few differ-
ences in the strategic mixes of functions for high and low PEU. The 
results of LSD tests showed that in case of firms pursuing External 
Growth strategies, Marketing and General Administration were the Critical 
functions for firms with high PEU; and Marketing, General Administration 
and Finance were the critical functions for firms with low PEU. 
The results of unweighted factorial AOVs show that when firms pursu-
ing different grand corporate strategies were sub-classified by PEU, the 
effect of PEU was not significant for any function; the effect of grand 
corporate strategy was significant for all functions except ~1arketing, and 
Public and Government Relations; and the interaction effect was signifi-
cant for only Public and Government Relations. Therefore, differences 
in strategy and PEU do not seem to have any effect on the relative strate-
gic significance of Marketing in industrial firms. For the other sixfunc-
tions, strategy and not PEU seems responsible for most of the differences 
in their relative importance. The results do not support the findings 
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of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), and Miles and Snow (1978) regarding the 
effect of PEU on the relative strategic importance of different 
functions. 
Analysis .Qy Firm Size 
The analysis of aggregate data by size (Table XXI, overall row 
cells) revealed differences in the strategic mixes of functions for 
different sizes. General Administration had the highest mean strategic 
significance scores in all size categories, although LSD tests revealed 
significance only for the small and medium size categories. The results 
of LSD tests also showed that Marketing had the lowest strategic import-
ance in large firms. The relative importance of Finance and, Public and 
Government Relations seemed to increase with size, whereas the import-
ance of Marketing declined with the increase in size. Large firms also 
gave higher importance to Engineering and R&D and lower importance to 
Personnel 
The results of one-way AOVs by size indicated significance for 
Engineering and R&D, Finance, and Public and Government Relations. 
Therefore, the relative strategic significance of each of these three 
functions seem to vary with size. Conversely, the relative strategic 
significance of General Administration, Production, Marketing, and 
Personnel do not seem to change with the change in size. 
Godiwalla's (1977) findings regarding the strategic functional 
managements in firms of different size are not comparable with this 
study's findings because of the difference in the definitions of size. 
Analysis .Qy Corporate Diversity 
The analysis of aggregate data by corporate diversity (Table XXIII, 
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overall row cells) did show changes in the strategic mixes of organi-
zational functions for different degrees of corporate diversity. The 
results of LSD tests showed that for the related business firms General 
Administration had the highest strategic significance, and Production 
had the lowest strategic significance. No significant differences in 
the mean scores were observed for the other three diversity categories. 
However, the results of one-way AOVs by corporate diversity showed 
significance in case of only two functions: Engineering and R&D,and 
Public and Government Relations. Thus, there do exist significant 
differences in the relative importance of these two functions attri-
butable to corporate diversity. Conversely, in industrial firms the 
relative importance of General Administration, Production, Marketing, 
Finance and Personnel, do not seem to vary with the change in the 
degree of corporate diversity. 
{j_nalysis by Indus@ 
The analysis of aggregate data by industry (Table XXIV, overall 
row cells) revealed differences in the strategic mixes of organizational 
functions for different industries. The results of LSD tests showed 
that General Administration had the highest strategic significance in 
the capital and producer goods industries; and Production had the lowest 
strategic significance in the consumer nondurable and producer goods 
industries. Public and Government Relations had higher importance in 
the consumer nondurable goods industry. Marketing seemed more important 
in the consumer durable and capital goods industries. 
The results of one-way AOVs by industry showed significance for 
Production and Marketing; therefore we would expect the relative 
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·strategic importance of Production and Marketing to differ in different 
industries. Thus, the relative strategic importance of General Adminis-
tration, Engineering and R&D, Finance, Personnel, and Public and 
Government Relations, in industrial firms seem to remain the same 
irrespective of the type of industry. 
The study•s findings do not seem to support the conclusions from 
Miles and Snow•s (1978) study. According to them, the chief executives• 
ranking of top three functions were different in food processing and 
electronics industries. In food processing industry, the top three 
functions were: sales and marketing, production, and long t·ange plan-
ning. According to data from this study, in the consumer nondurable 
goods industries, General Administration (including long-range planning) 
was found to have the highest mean score, Marketing had the fourth 
highest mean score, and Production was the least important function. 
According to Lawrence and Lorsch (1967b), 11 • •• marketing had more 
influence than production in both container-manufacturing and food-
processing firms, apparent.ly because of its involvement in (uncertain) 
innovations and with customers 11 (Hickson et al., 1971, p. 219). This 
study•s findings indicate that ~1arketing had higher mean scores than 
-... 
Production in all four types of industries~ 
--l 
Analysis .Q.i prodl:!_ction System 
The analysis of aggregate data by production system (Table XXV, 
overall raw cells) showed changes in the strategic mixes of functions 
for different production sy~tems. General Administration got the 
highest rank in the unit and small batch, and mass production systems; 
for the continuous process production system, the LSD tests showed no 
197 
·significant differences in the mean scores of different functions. 
Apparently, senior executives do not consider Production function to be 
strategically important to effective implementation of grand corporate 
strategies. In the case of mass and process production systems, 
Production had the lowest strategic importance. 
The results of one-way AOVs by production system showed signifi-
cance for General Administration, Engineering and R&D, Marketing, and 
Public and Government Relations. Therefore, it seems that there do 
exist significant differences in the relative importance of these 
functions attributable to production system. Conversely, the relative 
importance of Production, Finance, and Personnel do not seem to vary 
with the change in the production system. The most surprising i~esult 
is that the differences in the predominant production system do not 
seem to have any effect, on the perceptions of senior executives in 
industrial firms, about the relative strategic significance of the 
Production function. 
Woodward (1965) identified development, production, and marketing 
as the critical functions for unit and small batch, large batch and 
mass, and process production system, respectively. The study•s 
findings do not support Woodward•s conclusions, none of the three 
functions were found to be 11 Critical 11 for any type of production system. 
In fact for mass production system, the Production function not only 
had the lowest rank but also had mean score significantly lower than 
all the other functions. If Woodward's three functions alone were 
considered, for each of the three types of production system, the rank 
ordering was: marketing, development and production. 
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The study's findings also partially support Godiwalla's (1977) 
findings about the influence of functional managements on overall 
corporate strategy in firms with different production systems. 
Godiwalla found Marketing and Finance as the two top functions for all 
three types of production system. However, the data from this study 
indicates similar results only for the unit and small batch type; 
besides, Finance and Marketing were the top functions in the mass pro-
duction and Finance and Public and Government Relations in the process 
production. The relative importance of R&D and Production identified 
by Godiwalla also differs from this study's findings. 
Analysis gy Organizational Structure 
The analysis of aggregate data by organizational structure (Table 
XXVI, overall row cells) revealed no major changes. The top four 
functions in all types of organizational structures (not necessarily in 
that order) were: General Administration, Finance, Personnel and 
Marketing. 
/ 
The results of one-way AOVs by organizational structure showed 
significance for only two functions: Finance, and Engineering and R&D. 
Therefore, barring these two functions, the relative importance of 
functional tasks in industrial firms do not seem to vary with their 
organizational structures. 
Analysis gy Perceived Environmental Uncertainty 
The analysis of aggregate data by perceived environmental uncertain-
ty (Table XXVII, overall row cells} revealed a few changes. The rank-
ings of functions in case of firms with low PEU were the same as those 
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for the aggregate data. For firms with high PEU, Marketing was ranked 
second to General Administration. Therefore, a high degree of perceived 
environmental uncertainty seems to increase the relative strategic 
significance of Marketing in industrial firms. However, it must be 
noted that LSD tests revealed no significant differences in the mean 
scores of different functions for firms facing high PEU. The results 
of one-way AOVs by PEU showed significance in only one function -
Marketing. Thus, with the exception of Marketing, differences in the 
degree of perceived environmental uncertainty do not seem to influence 
the perceptions of senior executives in industrial firms about the 
strategic significance of different functional tasks. 
The study's findings do not quite support Miles and Snow's (1978) 
contention that firms facing high PEU place greater emphasis on 
externally oriented functions like product development and market 
research. Although, the firms facing high PEU considered Marketing 
important; the same phenomenon was not observed for Engineering and R&D, 
and Public and Government Relations. 
Summary of Findings 
The central point of the study's findings indicate that General 
Administration is perceived by the senior executives as having the 
highest strategic significance in industrial firms. The strategic 
significance score of General Administration was the highest among all 
functions, approximate LSD tests showed that the mean score for General 
Administration was significantly higher than all other functions. The 
next three strategically important functions were Finance, Personnel 
and Marketing. As a group their mean scores were significantly higher 
than those of the last three functions. The next in the order of 
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importance were Engineering and R&D, and Public and Government 
Relations. Production was found to be strategically the least import-
ant function in industrial firms. 
Analysis by grand corporate strategy showed that strategic mixes 
of functions were different for the four types of grand corporate 
strategies. For Stability strategy, General Administration had the 
highest mean strategic significance score. For Internal Growth strategy, 
LSD tests showed that General Administration had significantly higher 
! mean score than all other functions. For External Acquisitive Growth 
strategy, the top three functions were Marketing, General Administration 
and Finance; of which Marketing and General Administration had signifi-
cantly higher mean scores than the remaining five functions. For 
Retrenchment strategy, Marketing had mean score significantly higher 
than all other functions. One-way AOVs by grand corporate strategy 
showed significance in case of all functions. The relative strategic 
significance of each of the seven functions is therefore different for 
firms pursuing different grand corporate strategi;J 
The influence of size as a mediating variable was assessed through 
unweighted factorial AOVs of size x strategy. The effect of strategy 
was found to be significant for a 11 functions. The effect of size, 
however, was limited to only two functions: Engineering and R&D, and 
Public and Government Relations. The interaction effect was signifi-
cant for all functions except Finance. 
The results of unweighted AOVs of corporate diversity x strategy 
showed that the effect of strategy was significant for all functions 
except Marketing; the effect of corporate diversity was significant 
only for Public and Government Relations. The interaction effect showed 
significance only for Engineering and R&D, and Public and Government 
Relations. 
r 
\ The results of unweighted factorial AOVs of industry x strategy 
'---' 
showed that the effect of strategy was significant for all functions 
except Marketing. The effect of industry was significant for only 
Production and Marketing and the interaction effect was significant 
only for General Administrati~ 
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The results of unweighted factorial AOVs of production system x 
strategy again showed the effect of strategy to be significant for all 
functions except Marketing. The effect of production system showed 
significance only in case of Public and Government Relations, and the 
interaction effect showed no significance for any function. 
The results of unweighted factorial AOVs of organizational struc-
ture x strategy showed that the effect of strategy was significant for 
all functions except Marketing. The effect of organizational structure 
was not significant for any function; however, the interaction effect 
was significant for Finance, Personnel, and Public and Government 
Relations. 
And finally, the results of unweighted factorial AOVs of perceived 
environmental uncertainty (PEU) x strategy showed that the effect of 
strategy was significant for all functions except Marketing, and Public 
and Government Relations, the interaction effect was significant only 
for Public and Government Relations, and the effect of PEU showed no 
significance for any function. 
The statistical analyses, therefore, clearly indicate that the 
relative strategic importance of different functions is affected more 
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by grand corporate strategy than any other organizational characteris-
tics. The grand corporate strategy affected the strategic significance 
of all the seven functions; the other organizational variables affected 
the strategic significance of some of the functions, as delineated 
below: 
The size was found to affect the strategic significance of 
Engineering and R&D, Finance, and Public and Government Relations. 
The extent of corporate diversity was found to affect the strategic 
significance of Engineering and R&D, and Public and Government Relations. 
The type of industry was found to affect the strategic significance 
of Production and Marketing. 
The type of Production system was found to affect the strategic 
significance of General Administration, Engineering and R&D, Marketing, 
and Public and Government Relations. 
The type of organizational structure was found to affect the 
strategic significance of Engineering and R&D, and Finance. 
And finally, the degree of PEU was found to affect the strategic 
significance of Marketing. 
It is therefore clear that these seven organizational characteris-
tics have differing impact on the relative strategic importance of 
different functional tasks in industrial firms. In terms of their 
impact on the number of functions, the seven organizational character-
istics may be rank ordered as shown below: 
1. Grand corporate strategy 
2. Production system . 
3. Size 
4. Industry 
5. Corporate diversity 
6. Organizational structure 
7. Perceived environmental uncertainty 
The relative strategic importance of each of the seven organiza-
tional functions is affected by differences in grand corporate 
strategy. Conversely, out of the seven functions, the relative 
strategic importance of Marketing alone seems to differ significantly 
with varying degree of perceived environmental uncertainty. 
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To sum up, the relative strategic importance of General Adminis-
tration varies significantly in industrial firms pursuing different 
strategies and having different production systems. The relative 
strategic importance of Production varies significantly in firms with 
different strategies and in different industries. The relative 
strategic importance of Engineering and R&rr varies significantly with 
differences in strategy, size, corporate diversity, production system, 
and organizational structure. The relative strategic importance of 
Marketing varies significantly with differences in strategy, industry, 
production system, and PEU. The relative strategic importance of 
Finance varies significantly with differences in strategy, size and 
organizational structure. The relative strategic importance of 
Personnel seems to be affected only by strategy. And finally, the 
relative strategic importance of Public and Government Relations varies 
significantly in industrial firms with differences in strategy, size, 
corporate diversity, and production system. 
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Conclusions 
This business policy research has sought to identify the strategic 
mixes of organizational functions in industrial firms pursuing differ-
ent grand corporate strategies. It has also sought to identify 
differences in the strategic mixes .of organizational functions between 
firms pursuing a particular grand torporate strategy classified by 
their size, corporate diversity, industry, production system, organiza-
tional structure, and perceived environmental uncertainty. The data for 
this study was obtained from senior executives of large U. S. industrial 
corporations, their collective experience, judgement and insights have 
endowed the research findings with the verisimilitude of the real world 
of business. 
The contingency approach of this study recognizes that the relative 
strategic significance of different functional tasks cannot be the same 
in all types of industrial firms, however there are definable patterns 
of relationships for different types of industrial firms that can be 
empirically determined. The central concept derived from the stucty•s 
findings suggests that there is no one universally effective strategic 
mix of organizational functions for all industrial firms. The nature 
and content of the strategic mix of functions for a firm would depend 
upon the nature of some key organizational characteristics, the most 
important of which, as the study•s findings indicate, is the firm•s 
~rand corporate strategy. The strategic mix of functions is one which 
is perceived to be essential for the effective implementation of the 
grand corporate strategy pursued by a firm during a particular time 
frame. 
205 
This section will provide a discussion of the implications of the 
study•s findings, suggestions for future research, and concluding 
statements. 
Implications of the Findings 
Implications for Theory. Gh.is research has identified the nature 
of contribution of each functional task.to effective implementation of 
different grand corporate strategies in industrial firms facing 
different contingencies. It has enriched the field of corporate 
strategy by integrating certain key concepts from organization theory 
and behavior. It has also provided empirical support for the inte-
grative approach to the study of corporate strategy through the identi-
fication of strategic mixes of organizational functions. Business 
policy courses are designed to provide the students, among other things, 
with a means for ~ona.LJ.~.tjon. This study has attempted to 
integrate the different fields of management by identifying critical 
functional tasks; however its research approach is based more on 
functional decomposition rather than functional integration. Its aim 
was to determine the relative strategic significance of different 
functions for effective implementation of grand corporate strategies 
in industrial firms facing different contingencies. 
The functional approach to the study of corporate strategy is of a 
~- .. .-, .... , ,.,~-·,.....,~~---~-·.,.,·-·· - ··--~"- ..... ,.. --
very r~cen\ ori~in. The results of the study provide important contri-
butions to the existing body of knowledge regarding the influence of 
grand corporate strategy, size, corporate diversity, industry, production 
system, organizational structure, and perceived environmental uncertainty 
on the strategic mixes of functions in industrial firms. The influence 
of grand corporate strategy appears to be the most crucial among these 
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·different contingencies. The study has also provided empirical evidence 
that, contrary to certain expectations, the degree of perceived environ-
mental uncertainty does not by itself influence the firm's strategic 
mix of functions. 
The study has been largely of an exploratory nature but contains 
several questions which have differing degrees of theoretical and 
empirical support. 'l! has provided a research methodology for inte-
grating, interdisciplinary, and exploratory research using the function-
al approach to the study of grand corporate strategy; and has thereby 
opened many research avenues to the study of grand strategy in other 
business and non-business oragnizatio_~ 
~plications for Organizational Practice~-.) Aside from the pre-:-
ceding implications for theory and research, there are some significant 
implications for organizational practice which may be based on the 
results of the study. The study's findings are based on the perceptions 
of the senior executives of large industrial firms and thus are 
likely to be of interest to all practicing managers. Depending upon 
the nature of contingencies facing the firm, its senior executives can 
compare their strategic mix of functions with those identified by the 
senior executives participating in this study. This will help 
practicing managers become aware of the key strateqic functions in their 
firms and induce them to search for possible reasons for a particular 
strategic mix; this might require identification of strategic key 
result areas in each functional task as well as the establishment of an 
ongoing information system for close monitorinq. 
The identification of strategic key result areas for a particular 
firm would be similar to the management audit. Since most senior 
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executives are pressed for time, their concentration on the strategical-
ly significant areas would not only result in ~he more productive use 
of top management time but would also result in the more effective 
implementation of chosen strategy and better overall corporate 
performance. As Steiner (1969a) points out 
... that by identifying the majority of strategic factors 
which businessmen themselves think are most important in their 
firm's success, the basis will be laid for a more systematic 
evaluation of these factors by each executive to find that 
combination which, when identified and followed, will enhance 
the fortunes of his company and benefit all those interested 
in its well-being (p. 56). 
The contingency approach of this study has another significant 
implication for practicing executives. If a change occurs in any of 
the major organizational characteristics (e.g., grand corporate 
strategy, diversity, industry, etc.), it certainly calls for a re-
assessment of the· firm's strategic mix of functions (and also strategic 
key result areas in different functions), although it may or may not 
necessitate a realignment of functional priorities. This is necessary 
even when (or if you prefer, especially when) the firm has a formal 
planning system. As Allison (1971) points out: "Long range planning 
tends to become institutionalized and then disregarded'' (Heau, 
Chap. X, p. 12) . 
The foregoing remarks indicated the importance of identifying 
strategic mixes of functions for effective implementation of grand 
strategy at the corporate level. However, similar processes of identi-
fication of strategic functions and key result areas, could be extremely 
beneficial at the division level, as well as at the business level with-
in a division. For large di~isionalized firms this may in fact be 
essential. 
The specific findings of this study also have some significant 
implications for management practitioners. The identification of 
~Jb~!'zS~~j.!l2 as the most critical function for firms pursuing retrench-
ment strategies has a very clear message to the top executives. For 
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such firms a reduction in resources allocated to the !~arketing function, 
as a part of an across-the-board cost reduction program, may prove to 
be counterproductive. Especially in the early stages of the problems, 
such firms may in fact want to strengthen their Marketing function, 
this action might be an effective turnaround strategy. in the long 
run. 
The identification of §eneral 8dmjoistrat~n as the most critical 
function in inost types of industrial firms highlights the importance 
... 
of strategic planning and management in general, and planning for top 
management manpower in particular. Most managers require some broaden-
ing in order to be effective generalists, and the chief executive 
officers, personnel managers, and management training and development 
manage~s need to be cognizant of this phenomenon. In fact, awareness 
and understanding of top management's functions and responsibilities 
should be the single most important criterion for determining the 
promotability of a functional manager. The findings of the study seem 
to emphasize this point especially for production executives; most 
senior executives do not regard Production as a critical function, 
the production executives can, therefore, increase their visibility for 
promotion to top management positions by increasing their knowledge and 
experience in the area of general management. This holds true for 
all young managers in quest for self-development who aspire to be 
chief executive officers. 
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Implications for Business Educators. The implications of the 
findings for the business educators are even more obvious. The develop-
ment of student awareness and understanding of the general management 
functions and responsibilities is one sure way of developing tomorrow's 
business leaders. According to Tavernier (1979), the Royal Dutch/Shell 
Group is convinced it can identify managers with the potential for 
senior-level promotion on the strength of only four basic qualities. 
They are: the power of analysis, imagination, a sense of 
reality and the 'helicopter' quality, the ability to look 
at facts and problems from an overall viewpoint ... The 
helicopter quality, which has become the hallmark of 
successful Shell executives world-wide, is considered by 
far the most crucial in predicting management potential, 
particularly in the early stages of a career (p. 36). 
Most business policy/strategic management courses have as their primary 
objective, the development of this 11 helicopter 11 quality in students. 
It is also not surprising that most well-known busines$ schools have 
business policy/strategic management as a core course in their MBA 
programs. 
Implications for Further Research 
Future research on the areas studied and reported herein should 
entail a replication of the present study. Replication can do much 
in evaluating the value and generalizability of this study's findings. 
Further empirical work is needed to see if these results may be 
generalized to industrial firms classified as 11 Small businesses. 11 
The study's findings indicate the importance of the general management 
function and especially the need for effective strategic planning 
systems. In small business the dichotomy between planning and doing is 
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not always clear-cut, and routine activities tend to take a large 
proportion of top management time. Therefore, empirical identification 
of critical functions and critical key result areas can be very helpful 
to small business managers. 
The functional approach to the study of grand strategy can be 
modified and applied to settings other than large industrial corpora-
tions. In every organization, there exists a number of functional 
tasks. Any research that helps identify critical functions and 
critical key result areas for a particular type of organization can be 
very fruitful. The functional approach to the study of grand strategy 
needs to be extended to other business and non-business organizations. 
OtherG'~riables should be incorporated into the study of strategic 
mixes of functions for effective implementation of grand corporate 
strategies. Such variables as performance, investment intensity, and 
others have been suggested or examined in other corporate strategy 
studie~ For instance,~might be fruitful to empirically test the 
differences in the strategic mixes of functions for a particular grand 
corporate strategy, when the firms are categorized into high and low 
performers. It might also be useful to replicate the study using a 
different measure of perceived environmental uncertainty, to evaluate 
the generalizability of the findings pertaining to the influence of 
perceived environmental uncertainty. 
In this study, the focus of the research was to identify the 
strategic mixes of functions for effective implementation of grand 
corporate strategies. The study's approach might be modified to 
identify the influence of different functions in the formulation of 
different types of grand corporate strategies. 
More research of a longitudinal type is also needed in a study of 
this type, since the concept of strategy is essentially dynamic. It 
is extremely important to bear in mind that even for the same firm, and 
even without a change in the grand corporate strategy, the same top. 
manager may perceive the strategic mix of functions differently at two 
different points of time. Through longitudinal research, studies can 
be undertaken for a small sample of homogeneous firms to assess 
causality in the relationships being tested. 
Finally, further empirical work also needs to be done to identify 
strategic mixes of functions for different divisional strategies within 
a firm, for different business strategies within a division, and for 
different key result areas wtthin a function. For large multi-unit 
companies with tremendous diversity, strategic planning needs to be 
analyzed as a multi-level process, the purpose of which is determined 
at each hierarchical level by the perceptions that the managers have 
of their task. According to Berg (1963): "For the purpose of corporate 
long range planning, a large, multiunit company cannot usefully be 
regarded as a single economic unit with a single set of interests" 
(Heau, 1976, Chap. X, Pw l9)r 
~ncluding Statemen~ 
To conclude, this thesis has made contributions to the study of 
corporate strategy. It has integrated different concepts from corpor-
ate strategy literature and organizational theory and behavior 
literature in a coherent ma~ner and has empirically studied certain 
relationships. The study has also contributed to the research method-
ology in the field of corporate strategy. It is important to note that 
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research in corporate strategy is, .for the most part, in embryonic 
stages. The major purpose of any research should be to add to existing 
knowledge in the area. It is believed that this thesis has provided 
evidence for further theoretical and empirical research, utilizing 
the strategic functional mix approach, in the area of corporate 
strategy; and has also provided several implications for organizational 
practices. 
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A. General Administration: 
1. Attracting and retaining well-trained and competent top managers. 
2. Achieving a better overall control of general corporate 
performance. 
3. Ability to perceive new business opportunities. 
4. Simultaneous and continuous emphasis on efficiency (productivity) 
and innovation in patterns of firm's products, markets, technol-
ogy and management. 
5. Developing and communicating a corporate identity, corporate 
mission and objectives, a corporate creed and a grand corporate 
strategy ... a unified sense of direction and a sense of 
common purpose to which all members of the organization can 
relate. 
6. Ability to unify conflicting opinions, improve coordination 
and enhance effective collaboration between key executives, 
generate enthusiasm and motivate sufficient managerial drive 
for growth and profits. 
7. Developing a more effective company-wide strategic planning 
system for planned overall corporate development. Maintaining 
and enhancing the management depth by ongoing training and 
development programs for: 
8. a) Domestic operations. 
9. b) Overseas operations. 
10. Need for greater international orientation at senior and middle 
management levels. 
11. Increased participative decision-making at senior and middle 
management levels. 
12. Increased use of MBO and "responsibility accounting" reporting 
systems to facilitate joint goal-setting and self-evaluation of 
performance. Assuring and rewarding better judgement creativity 
and imagination in decision-making at: 
13. a) Top management levels. 
14. b) Lower management levels. 
15. A more extensive and effective use of quantitative techniques 
in decision making. 
16. A more extensive and cost-effective computer systems emphasizing 
richness, timeliness, flexibility, and accessibility of informa-
tion for managerial decision-making. 
17. Ability and courage to identify and undo past strategic blunders 
(e.g. by divestment). 
18. Ability to participate and be effective in industry organization, 
and project a corporate image of an enlightened industry leader 
and a responsible corporate citizen worldwide. 
B. Production/Operations: 
19. Considering relocation of present production facilities in terms 
of opportunity costs of the existing sites. 
20. An ongoing plant modernization program to keep the efficiency 
of equipments comparable to those of the major competitors. 
21. Developing more felxibility in using facilities for different 
products and changing demand levels. 
22. Establishing production facilities overseas. 
23. A good trade-off between expanding capacity and increased 
sub-contracting. 
24. An improved balancing of equipment capacities. 
25. Increased automation of production processes. 
26. Improved plant layout workflow and work environemnt. 
27. More efficient and reliable multiple-source material 
procurement. 
28. Reduced sub-contracting and more extensive backward vertical 
integration. 
29. Owning and controlling (captive subsidiary) sources of raw 
materials. 
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30. Measuring and controlling performance of purchasing, material· 
handling, and traffic functions as effectively as production 
or sales performance. 
31. More effective equipment maintenance and replacement policies. 
32. Increased computerization and decentralization of production 
control systems for better control of quality, cost and time. 
33. Improved materials and inventory control. 
34. Improved industrial engineering capabilities. 
35. Improved energy efficiency of production processes and equipments. 
36. Reduced air, noise and other pollution and greater compliance 
with industrial health and safety regulations. 
37. Improved production-incentive systems for workers. 
38. Preparing employees for technological changes. 
C. Engineering and R&D: 
39. Improvement in basic research capabilities. 
40. Improvement in applied research and new product development 
capabilities. 
41. ·Value analysis for improving present products and developing 
and using alternative or substitute raw materials. 
42. Improved process engineering with an added emphasis on energy 
efficiency. 
43. Better overall management of and increased productivity from 
R&D expenditure by matching explicit R&D objectives and 
strategies with present and proposed product-market domain. 
44. Better cost control through shorter R&D investment payback time. 
45. Using multi-disciplinary task forces or project teams for 
effective coordination between R&D operations and marketing 
(research). 
46. National and international reputation for scientific and 
technological leadership. 
D. Marketing: 
47. Increased corporate commitment to the marketing concept. 
48. Improved marketing research and information systems. 
49. Widening the customer base by intensive market penetration 
and development. 
50. Developing overseas markets. 
51. Ability to secure large business contracts from governments 
and other large customers. 
52. Developing new products in new markets. 
53. Improved customer service. 
54. Exploring and developing fundamental new ways of providing 
services which are exclusive and customer-oriented. 
55. More effective use of different pricing strategies. 
56. More novel and effective sales promotion and advertising 
campaigns. 
57. Effective and result-oriented control of marketing costs. 
58. Widening the distribution networks and improved distributor 
relations. 
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59. Establishing and maintaining an efficient product distribution 
system. 
60. Stricter control over credit and ~ollections. 
61. Improved product management. 
62. Developing more efficnet and effective product-line policy for 
product additions and deletions. 
63. Maintaining a highly trained motivated, vigorous and dynamic 
sales organization. 
E. Finance: 
64. Improved bond ratings and common stock market performance. 
65. Maintaining a steady growth of earnings and improving the 
health of earnings. 
66. Providing a competitive return to shareholders through 
effective dividend policies even under price regulations. 
67. Improving financial public relations in general and stock-
holder relations in particular. 
68. Lower cost of equity capital and borrowings. 
69. Sound capital structure allowing flexibility to raise 
additional capital as needed. 
70. Strong working capital position allowing flexibility to raise 
short term capital at low cost. 
71. Efficient and effective working capital management. 
72. Effective tax management. 
73. Ability to manage foreign investment risks of inflation and 
exchange losses. 
74. Effective capital expenditure evaluation procedures that would 
encourage taking risks with commensurate returns for new 
business opportunities in order to attain growth objectives. 
75. Extensive application of ROI techniques and periodic monitoring 
of product-cum-market profitability. 
76. Effective financial, cost and managerial accounting systems. 
77. Efficient, effective and independent internal auditing system 
with tremendous top management backing. 
F. Personne 1 : 
78. Effective relations with trade unions. 
79. Effective and efficient personnel policies for hiring, training, 
promotion, compensation and employee services. 
80. Ability to attract and retain high quality employees through 
the corporate image of a model employer. 
81. Optimizing employee turnover (neither too high nor too low). 
82. Increased employee motivation and job satisfaction. 
83. Stimulating and rewarding creativity and innovativeness in 
employees. 
84. Achieving more effective two-way communication. 
85. Reliance on promotion from within. 
86. Maximum utilization of employee skills and competencies. 
87. Installing incentive performance reward systems. 
88. Periodical restructuring of organization structure to thwart 
empire-building tendencies. 
89. Effective grievance procedures. 
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90. Stimulating more employees at all levels to continue to 
educate themselves to remain abreast of developments in their 
fields. 
G. Public ~nd Government Relations: 
91. Ability to influence national policy in the industry. 
92. Effective relationships with relevant regulatory bodies. 
93. Better relations with consumerist groups. 
94. Better relations with environmentalist groups. 
95. Better relations with local community. 
96. Better relations with minority groups. 
97. Ability to maintain satisfactory governmental relations with 
local, state, federal and foreign governments. 
98. Devising better and newer ways of educating people in favor 
of the company. 
99. Promoting business and management ethics. 
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Oklahoma State University 
COLLEGE Of BUS!N($5 ADMINISTRATION I 
~1/Ll\\AftR. 01\LAHOMA 7407-4 
1-IO'i I b.!-1· ~06-1 
July 18, 1978 
There is usually an underlying logic behind the development of a business or-
ganization over time--a logic we call "corporate strategy". It is a grand 
design which includes, but need not be expressed in terms of, the microeconom-
ics surrounding the engineering, manufacturing, and marketing of each of the 
firm'• products. As a Chief Executive, you are most concerned with your firm's 
grand corporate strategy. Your experience provides you with a vision of vhat 
the separate things you observe (in your company) might constitute, and a trained 
mind to carry out effective syntheses. However, the development of a systema-
tized body of kno•o1ledge in the field of corporate strategy for training young 
managers has not yet come close to matching its crucial importance to the sur-
vival and growth of contemporary business organizations. 
At the Oklahoma State University, we are currently engaged in corporate &trategy 
research designed co develop a profile of key result areas (strategic factors) 
in different organizational functions that are crucial to effective implementa-
tion of different grand corporate strategies. We believe that the findings of 
this study would be useful and applicable to both the teaching and practice of 
tr.anagement. However, we realize that without your active support and your ap-
proval of your company's participation we would not be able to obtain the 
requisite information. 
We would appreciate it if you would have two senior company executives (familiar 
with your firm's overall operations and its overall business environment) com-
plete ·the enclosed two identical copies of our questionnaire independently of 
each other, and return the questionnaires in the enclosed self-addressed stamped 
envelopes. as soon as possible. We assure you that no personal questions are 
asked nor is any proprietary information requested. The information supplied 
by your company's two executives will be kept in the strictest confidence and 
will appear only in aggregate statistical form. The important findings of the 
study will be made available to all participating firms upon request, 
Thank you very much for your time and cooperation, 
Sincerely, 
Michael A. Httt 
Associate ~rofessor of Management 
Project Director 




Oklahoma State University 
(Ol\[Gl OF IIU~INE ':iS ,\[},\\!.-...:1) ll\1\ II( lN I )ltLl\\tl'/1/{, CJk/.:\1/(J.\1~\ l·lfl?-l ;.JIJiJ t • .!-1· ·,m,.., July 18, 1978 
CORPORATE STRATEGY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SENIOR EXECUTIVES 
(To be filled out by a senior executive familiar with 
his/her firm's overall operations and its overall 
business environment.) 
The attached questionnaire is being administered to a select sample of 
firms as part of our research study on corporate strategy. The main objective 
of this study is to develop a profile of key result areas (strategic factors) 
in different organizational functions that are crucial to effective implemen-
tation of grand corporate strategies in different types of fims·. We believe 
that senior corporate executives like you are the most kno"ledeeable people 
~o provide meaningful insights on corporate strategies and therefore your 
support and cooperation are vital to the success of this study. 
The questionnaire is designed to gother information about various aspects 
of your firm and its enviror,ment. No personal questions are asked nor is any 
proprietary information requested. h1e hope that the time spent by you in com-
pleting the questlonnaire would be worth\.,:ohile. The infomation supplied in 
this questionnaire will be kept in the strictest confidence. This research 
study does not necessitate individual case studies of participating firms; we 
are interested in using the information in aggregated form only and hence your 
anonymity is guaranteed. 
May we request you to kindly complete the questionnaire and return it in 
the attached self-addressed stamped envelope as soon as possible? If you 
would like to give us any advice regarding this study, we would be most happy 
to receive it. In particular, your comments or sugecstions with respect to 
question wording, response structure, relevance to your firm, any notable 
omissions, etc., would be most welcon1e, The irnportant findings of the study 
will be made available to all participants upon request. 
Thank you very much for your time and cooperation. 
Michael A. Hitt 
Associate Professor of Management 
Project Director 
K. A. Palia 
Research Analyst 
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COllECE Of BUStk[SS A0,\.11NISTRATIUN 
I 
I 
Oklahoma State Unii.'ersity HILL WATER, OKLAiiOMA 74074 
i~OSJ 624-5064 
September 7, 1978. 
About a month ago, we sent some questionnaires to you as a part of a re-
search project on corporate strategies employed by different businesses. 
W~ have net received responses from your firm as yet. We realize that you 
and your colleagues have many demands. However, our project cannot be suc-
cessful without participation from firms such as yours. We want you to 
know that we are dedicated to gr·aduating students who can make strong con-
tributions to Oklahoma 1 s businesses. We a~e ulso dedicated to the develop-
ment of effective extension efforts to our businesses in Oklahoma. TIIis 
rese•rch project is designed to provide data which can help do both more 
effectively. We sincerely appreciate your support in this project. For 
your convenience, another set of questionnaires has been enclosed. 
We vould be sincerely appreciative of your having two senior company execu-
tives (familiar vi th your firm's overall operations and its ove.rall busi-
ness environment) complete the enclosed two identical copies of our ques-
tionnaire independently of each other, and return the questionnaires in 
the enclosed self-addressed stamped envelopes, as soon as possible. We 
assure you that no personal questions are asked nor is any proprietary in-
formation requested. The information supplied by your company's two execu-
tives will be kept in the strictest confidence and will appear only in ag-
gregate statistical form. The important findings of the study will be made 
available to all participating firms upon request. 
Thank you very much f~r your time and cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
Michael A. Hitt 




K. A. Palia 
Research Analyst 
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Oklahoma State University 
COllfC:£ OF BUSIN£~~ r.,Q,\,\I,O..,!~li.:ATION 
I \li/L\\A/IK (Jf..tAIHl.\1,\ i.JOl-1 I·WiJfo.!.J·iflh-1 
September 7, 1978 
CORPORATE STRATEGY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SENIOR EXECUTIVES 
(To be filled out by a senior executive familiar with 
his/her firm's overall operations and its overall 
business environment.) 
The attached questionnaire is being administered to a select sample of 
firms as part of our research study on corporate strategy. The main objective 
of this study is to develop a profile of key result areas (strategic factors) 
in different organizational functions that are crucial to effective implemen-
tation of grand corporate strategies in different types of firms. We believe 
that senior corporate executives like you are the most knowledgeable people 
to provide meaningful insights on corporate strategies and therefore your 
support and cooperation are vital to the success of this study. 
The questionnaire is designed to gather information about various aspects 
of your firm and its environment. No personal questions are asked nor is any 
proprietary information requested. We hope that the time spent by you in com-
pleting the questionnaire would be worthwhile. The information supplied in 
this questionnaire will be kept in the strictest confidence. This research 
study does not necessitate individual case studies of participating firms; we 
are interested in using the information in aggregated form only and hence your 
anonymity is guaranteed. 
May we request you to kindly complete the questionnaire and return it in 
the attached self-addressed stamped envelope as soon as possible? If you 
would like to give us any advice regarding this study, we would be most happy 
to receive it. In particul~, your comments or suggestions with respect to 
question wording, response structure, relevance to your firm, any notable 
omissions, etc., would be most welcome. The important findings of the study 
will be made available to all participants upon request. 
Thank you very much for your time and cooperation. 
Michael A. Hitt 
Associate Professor of Management 
Project Director 
K. A. Palia 
Research Analyst 
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CORPORATE STRATEGY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SENIOR EXECUTIVES 
Please answer all the questions. There are no right or wrong answers. The informa-
tion supplied by the participants would be used in aggregated form only and hence your 
anonymity is guaranteed. After completion, please return the questionnaire in the attached 
self-addressed stamped envelope to ~lr. K. A. Palia, College of Business Administration, 
Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74074. 
I. GRAND CORPORATE STRATEGY: This question is designed to ascertain the type of grand 
corporate stt·ategy currently pursued by your finn. 'The grand corporate strategy is the 
major plan of action for achieving the sales and earnings goals for the company as a whole 
(rather than a product, division or marke~.2.~::_!:). It is thez_-efore the overall, pre-
doruinant or master strategy of the firm. There dre no good or bad, effective or ineffec-
tive, proactive or reactive strategies and contrary to popular belief, growth strategies 
are not the only effective or desirable strategies. Since each company is unique it has 
to evolve a grand strategy for attainit1g its corporate goals in the context of its 
unique organizational and envirorunental characteristics. Please remember, what is 
required is not the grand strategy you would prefer for the firm, but the one that is 
actually being pursued by your firm. Check only one. 
[ ] 1. Stability Strategy: 
Your firm continues to serve the customers in the same or similar 
product-market domain, has its main strategic decision focus on 
incremental improvement of functional performance, and continues 
to pursue the same or similar objectives, adjusting the level of 
achievement about the same percentage each year as it has achieved 
in the past. 
(A Note for !terns 2 and 3 - Growth Strategies: 
Your firm is pursuing a growth strategy if it aims at increasing 
the level and/or scope of its product-market objectives upward in 
a s'ignificant increment, much higher than an extrapolation of its 
past achievement levels. Thus it not only strives at intensive 
growth of its current product line(s) but may also add new product 
lines which may or may not be related to its present business.) 
[ ] 2. Internal Growth Strategy: 
Your fit~ pursues internal growth strategy if your emphasis is 
predominantly on growth through internal development from within 
the company. 
[ ] 3. External Growth Strategy: 
Your firm pursues ~xterna_l gro\olt.h strategy, if your emphasis is 
predominantly on acquisition of, or merger or joint venture with, 
other firms or divisions of firms. 
[ ] 4. Retrenchment Strategy: 
Your firm pursues retrenchment strategy if it tries to improve its 
performance by scaling down the level and/or scope of its product-
market objectives by cutback in costs and by reducing the scale of 
operations by divestment of some divisions or units. 
II. FIRM SIZE: What is your firm's annual sales revenue (inclusive of service and rental 
revenues but exclusive of non-operating revenues and excise taxes)? Check One 
1. $200 million and less 
[ J 2. 
[ I 3. 
$201 million to $599 million 
$600 million and over 
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III. CORPORATE DIVERSn'Y: To what extent is your firm diversified? Check One -----
[ I 1. Sin9le Business: 
95 percent or more of annual sales from one.end product business. 
I l 2. Dominant Business: 
70 to 94 percent of annual sales from one end product business. 
[ I 3. Related Business: 
I.ess than 70 percent of annual 5ales from one end product business 
and diversification primarily in concentrically relat~~ products 
(i.e., similar markets or similar technology). 
[ ] 4. Unrelated Business: 
Less than 70 percent of annual sales from one end product business, 
and diversification unrelated to primary end product business (for 
example, a widely di~~sified multi-industry conglomerate). 
IV. PERCEIVED ENVIRONHENTAL UNCERTAINTY: This question is designed to elicit from you 
your perception of the en.viroru~~itions faced by your firm as a whole during the 
past 3 years. We are interested in your firm's overall relationships with various sectors 
of the external environment (e.g. suppliers, customers, competitors). Specifically, we 
would like you to rate the characteristics or behavior of various sectors on the dagree of 
their predictability, where 1 = highly predictable and 7 = h~~redictable. The 
distinctions you make should be as precise as you feel you can make them. 
1. Suppliers of your raw rnalerlals and cnmpo:1ents: 
a. lhelr price changes are .........•............. 
b. quality changes .......•......•.••..••....•••• 
c. design changes ............................. . 
d. lntroduc11on ol new m•terials or components .• 
2. Compclitors' actions: 
1. their p1ice chant;~es are ...................... . 
b. product qual1ty changes .•. , ................. . 
c. product design changes ..................... . 
d. lntrodl.lction of new producu .....••.....•.... 
3. Customers: 
a. ihelrdemand lor existino products is ......... . 
b. demand for new products .................. .. 
-4. The Unanclallcapital market: 
a. interest rz.te changes: 
1. short-term debt •...•.•••••••••..••.••••••• 
2. lonQ·term debt ............•......•.....••• 
b. changes ln financi~llnstruments available: 
1. short-term debt ......•.....••..•......•.•• 
2. lon'iJ·Ierm debt .....•.•••.••••• o ••••• o ••• o. 
c. aYallabiJJty of c1edil: 
1. short-term debt ....•.•....••....••.•••.••• 
2. long·tcrm debt ...•........•...•• o ••••••••• 
5. Go'ternwent regulatcry agencies; 
a. changes lr1laws or agency policies on pricing 
are .•••.•.••••...••••..........•••...•..••... 
b. changes In law:i m policies on product stan· 
dards or quality .•......••.....••..•••...•. o •• 
c. changes In laws or policies reoarding financial 
practices •....••..••.•• o •••••••••••• o •••••••• 
d. chances in labor (personnel) taws or policies .• 
e. changes In laws or poiJcies affecting m.arketlnQ 
and distribution mcmods .................. .. 
t. chanQeS in laws or policies on acceptable 
accounting procedi.Jres ...................... . 
6. Actions of labor unions: 
a. changes ln-waoos, hour~. and working concH· 
\I::HlS .•... ,,,, ......•.•. •••• .. ,,;,,., .• ·.,, ••. 
b. changes In union st:curity ................... . 

















V. RELATIVE STRATEGIC SlGNIFICi\NCE OF KEY li.ESlJL'l' 1\PLl\S IN OlfTEHENT ORGANTZATION/\L 
FUNCflONS: This question is designed to-elicit from you your perceptions of relative 
strategic significance, of functionally grouped key result areas, to effective implementa-
tion of grand corporate strategy currently pursued by your firm. A comprehensive list of 
key result areas {strategic factors) grouped into seven functional ·categories has been 
prepared. Your firm's performunce in these different key result areas would determine how 
effectively your finn 1 S grand corporate strategy would be implemented; however the strategic 
significance. of these key result· areas would differ. He would like you to evaluate each key 
result area in terms of its strategic significance (to effective implementation of you:r:-
grand corporate strategy} based upon a 7-point rating scale as shown below: 
1 - completely strategically insignificant 
2 - of very little strategic significance 
3 - of 
4 - of 
5 - of 
6 - of 
7 - of 
somewhat less than average strategic significance 
average strategic significance 
somewhat more than average strategic significance 
very great strategic significance 
the greatest strategic significance 
A. General Administration: 
B. 
1. Attracting and retaining well-trained and competent 
top managers. • • . • • • . • . • . . 
2. Achieving a better overall control of general corporate 
performance. • •..•.••.••••. 
3. Ability to perceive new business opportunities and 
potential threats. . .•••••.••••.••• 
4. Developing and communicating a corporate identity, 
corporate mission and objectives, a corporate creed 
and a grand corporate strategy .•. a unified sense 
of direction and a sense of common purpose to which 
all members of the organization can relate ..•• 
5. Ability to unify conflicting opinions 1 improve 
coordination and enhance effective collaboration 
between key executives, generate enthusiasm and 
motivate sufficient managerial drive for grm.,oth and 
profits. • •••.••••••••••.•..•• 
6. Developing a mo<e effective comrany-wide strategic 
planning system for planned overall corporate 
development. . ••••••••....•••••. 
7. Maintaining and enhancing the management depth by 
ongoing training and development programs for both 
domestic and overseas operat~ons~ . . . . • . . . • 
B. Increased use of HBO and "responsibility accounting 11 
and increased participative decision making at senior 
and middle management levels .....•.••... 
9. A more extensive and effective use of quantitative 
techniques in decision making. . ....... . 
10. !-tore extensive and cost-effective computer systems 
emphasizing richness, timeliness, flexibility and 
accessibility of information for managerial decision 
making •.••••••.••.••.•••••.••. 
Production/0£C ra·tions: 
ll. An ongoing plant modernization prog<am to keep the 
efficiency of equipment comparable to that of the 
major competitors. 
12. 1\ good trade-off bct\oJeen expanding capacity and 
increased sub-contracting. 
13. Increased automation of production processes. 
...... ..., 
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V. RELATIVE STRATEGIC SIGNII'ICI\NCE OF KEY RESUL'r AREAS (continued from page 3) 
1 - completely strategically insignificant 
2 - of very little strategic sig11ificance 
3 - of somewhat less than average strategic significance 
4 - of average strategic significance 
5 - of somewhat rrore than average. strategic significance 
6 - of very great strategic significance 
7 - of the greatest strategic significance 
B. Production/Operations: (continued) 
14. Improved plant layout, workflow and work environment. 
15. More efficient and reliable multiple-source material 
procurement. 
16. ~~re effective equipment maintenance and replacement 
policies. 
17. Increased computerization and decentralization of 
production control systems for better control of 
quality, cost and time. 
18. Improved materials and inventory control. 
19. Improved industrial engineering capabilities. 
20. Reduced air, noise and other pollution and greater com-
pliance with industrial health and safety regulations. 
·c. Engineering and R & 0: 
21. Improvement in research and new product development 
capabilities. 
22. Value analysis for improving present products and 
developing and using more economiCal and easily 
available raw material substitutes. 
23. Improved process engineering with an added emphasis 
on energy efficiency. 
24 .. Better overall management of and increased productivity 
from R & D expenditure by matching explicit R & D objec-
tives and strategies with present and proposed product-
market domain. 
25. Using multi-disciplinary task forces or project teams 
for effective coordination between R & 0, operations and 
marketing (research) . 
D. Harketing: 
26. Improved marketing research and information systems. 
27. Widening the customer base by intensive market 
penetration and development. 
28. Ability to secure large business contracts from 
governments and other large, especially overseas 
customers. 
29. More effective use of different pricing strategies. 
30. More novel and effective sales promotion and 
advertising campaigns. 
31. Widening and improving the product distribution 
networks and improving distributor relations. 
32. Developing more efficient and effective product-line 
policy for 1- ·.educt additions and deletions. 
33. Maintaining a highly trained, motivated, vigorous and 


































































































V, RELATIVE STRATEGIC SIGNIFIC~.NCE OF KEY RF.SUL'l' AREAS (continued from page 4) 
1 - completely strategically insignificant 
- of very little strategic sigQificance 
3 - of somewhat less than average strategic significance 
4 - of average strategic significance 
5 - of somewhat more than average strategic significance 
6 - of very great strategic significance 
7 - of the greatest strategic significance 
E.~: 
34. Improving bond ratings and common stock market 
performance. • . • 1 
35. Providing a competitive return to shareholders through 
effective dividend policies even under price regulations 
36. Improving financial public relations in general and stock-
holder relations in particular. 1 
37. Lower cost of equity capital and long-term borrow~ngs, 1 
38. Sound capital structure allowing flexibility to 
raise additional capital for internal growth and 
acquisitions. 1 
39. Strong working capital position allowing flexibility 
to raise short-term capital at low cost. 1 
40~ Effective tax management. 1 
41. Ability to manage foreign investment risks of inflation 
and exchange losses. 
42. Effective capital expenditure evaluation procedures 
that would encourage taking risks with con~ensuraLe 
returns for new business opportunities in order to 
attain growth objectives. 1 
43, Extensive application of ROI techniques and periodic 
monitoring of product-cum-market profitability. 
44. Efficient, effective and independent internal ·auditing 
system. 
F. Personnel: 
45. Effective relations with trade unions. 
46. Effective and efficient personnel policies for hiring, 
training, promotion, compcn~ation and employee serv1ces. 
47. Optimizing employee turnover (neither too high nor too 
low), through the corporate image of a model employer. 
48. Improved employee motivation, job satisfaction and 
morale. 
49. Stimulating and rewarding creativity in employees and 
installing incentive performance reward systems. 
50. Effective grievance procedures. 
51. Stimulating more employees at all levels to continue to 
educate themselves to remain abreast of developments in 
their fields. 
G. Public and Government Relations; 
52. Ability to influence national policy in the industry 
and to maintain effective relationships with relevant 
regulatory bodies. 
53. Better relations with spE'cial intcrest_groups such as 
environmentalists, consumerists and others. 
54. Ability to maintain satisfactory relations with local, 
state, federal and foreign governments. 







































































































VI . .!_~fRY: What is the principal industry (representing the largest percentage of 
your total company sales) in which your firm operates? Check only one 
1. Consumer nondurable goods industry 
2. Consumer durable goods industry 
[ ] 3. Capital goods indust:ry 
[ ] 4. Producer goods (raw materials, components and supplies) industry 
VII. PRODUCriON SYSTEM: What is the single, most predominant production system used in 
your f.trm? Check only one 
[ ] 1. Unit and small batch production system (e.g. production or fabrication of a single 
unit or a fe"'' units of products, like prototypes, custom pressings, special 
equipments, tools and dies, etc., according to customer specifications). 
2. Large batch and mass production system (e.g. large batches of durgs, cans and 
bottles, mass production of automobiles, etc.). 
(] 3. Continuous procezs production system (e.g. oil refining, chemicals, etc.). 
[ ] 4. None of the_abovc (please specify) 
VIII. OF<.GANIZATIONAL STRUCI'URE: How would you characterize your firm's organizational 
structure? Check one 
( ] 1. Functional: An organization in which the major subunits deal with different 
organizational functions, like production, marketing and finance, 
rather than complete businesses. General management function is 
concentrated 3t topmost level and coordination and product-market 
performance are its primary responsibilities. 
[ ) 2. Functional with Or1c or Mort! Product Djvisions or Subsidiaries: 
An organization that is ba-sically functional but which also has one 
or more separate product divisions or subsidiaries w~ich report to 
top management (or in some i!1stances to functional managers). The 
distinguishing characteristic of this hybrid form (which is neither 
wholly functional nor truly multi-divisional) is that the general 
managers of the product divisions are organizationally on the same 
level or below the functional managers. 
[ ] 3. Product Division: 
An organization that consists of a central office and a group of 
quasi-autonomous divisions, each having the responsibility and 
resources needed to engineer, produce and market a product or set 
of products .. 
[ ) 4. Geographic Division: 
An organization that consists of a headquarters office and a group 
of operating divisions, each having the responsibility and resources 
needed to engineer, produce and market a product or a set of products 
in a different geographic area. 
( ] 5. Holding CO.!"£~: 
IX. NAME OF FIRM: 
An association of firms {or divisions) commonly owned by a parent 
corporation~ Each firm is virtually autonomous and formal organiza-
tion above the level of the individual firm is virtually nonexistent. 
X. YOUR NAME & TITLE: 
[ l Check here if you wish to receive the main findings of this study. 
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Oldahoma State Universz"ty 
COllEGf. Of BUSINESS A.DMINISTRA T!ON I STILLWATER, OK.V.I10MA 74074 (405) 614-506-4 
November 27, 1978 
At the Oklal1oma State University, we are currently engaged in corporate strategy 
research designed to develop a profile of key result areas (strategic factors) in 
differ~nt organizational functions that are crucial to effective implementation 
of grand corporate strategies in different types of firms. We believe that the 
findings of this study will be useful and applicable to both the teaching and 
practice of management. A recently completed pilot study of a select sample of 
industrial finns in the southwest region has shown encouraging results; most of 
the seni.or executives participating in the pilot study have shown interest in 
receiving a summary of the important findings of the study. The enclosed question-
naires, designed to gather information about various aspects of your finn and its 
environment, are now being administered to a select sample of firms as a part of 
our nationwide study. 
We would sincerely appreciate if you will spend a few minutes answering just one 
question listed in the chief executive officer's questionnaire and have any senior 
company executive (familiar with your firm 1 s overall operations and its overall 
business environment) complete the senior execuli.ve's questionnaire and return them 
both in the enclosed, self-addressed, stamped envelope as soon as possible. We 
assure you that no personal questions are asked nor is any proprietary information 
requested. The information supplied in these questionnaires will be kept in the 
strictest confidence. This research study does not necessitate individual case 
studies of participating firms; we are interested in using the information in 
aggregated form only and hence, respondents may, if they so wish, remain anonymous. 
The important findings of this study will be made available to all participating 
firms on request. 
In our opinion, senior corporate executives like you are the most knowledgeable 
people to provide meaningful insights on corporate strategies. We also realize 
that you and your colleagues have many demands and we deeply appreciate your 
support. which you would agree is essential to this project. 
Thank you very much for your time and cooperation. 
Since rely~ 
Michael A. Hitt 




K. A. Palia 
Research Analyst 
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CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER'S QUESTIONNAIRE 
(To be filled out by the firm's Chief Executive Officer) 
GRAND CORPORATE STRATEGY~ This question is designed to ascertain the type of grand 
corporate strat<::gy currently pursued by your firm. The grand corE££_ate strategy is the 
~Er plan of action for achieving the sales and earnings goals for the company as a whole 
(rathe.~ than a product, div_isior. or market segment). It is therefore the overall, predom-
inant or master str-ategy of the firm. There are no good or bad, effective or ineff~ctive, 
proactive or reactiv~ strategies and contrary to popular belief, growth strategies ure not 
the only effective or desirable strategies. Since each company is unique it has to evolve 
a g=and strategy for attair.ing its corporate goals in the context of its unique organiza-
tional and environmental charact:eristics. Please remember, what is required is not the 
grand strategy you would prefer for the firm, but the one that is actually being pursued 
by ycur firm. Check only one. 
( ] 1. Stability Strateqv: 
Your firm continues to serve the customers in the same or similar 
product~rnar·ket domain, has its main strategic decision focus on 
incremental improvement of functional perfornLance, and continues 
to pursue the sa:ne or similar aDjectives, adjusting the level of 
achievement about the same percentage each year as it has achieved 
in t.he past. 
(A Note for Items 2 and 3 - Growth Strategies: 
Your firm is puLsuing a growth strategy if it aims at increasing 
the level and/or scope of its product-market objectives upward in 
a significant increment, much higher than an extrapolation of its 
past achievement levels. Thus it not only strives at intensive 
growth of its current product line(s) but may also add new product 
lines which may or may not be related to its present business.) 
[ ] 2. Internal Growth Strategy: 
Youi firm pursues i_nternal growth strategy if your emphasis is 
predominantly on growth through internal development from within 
the company. 
[ ] 3. External Acquisitive Gruwth Strategy (inc~uding joint ventures): 
Your firm pursues external_ growth strategy, if your emphasis is 
predominantl_y on acquisition of, or merger or joint ~with, 
other firms or divisions of firms. 
[ I 4. Retrenchment Strategy: 
Your firm pursues retrenchment strategy if it tries to irnpr.ove its 
performance by scaling dcwn the level and/or scope of its product-
market objectives by cutback in costs and by reducing the scale of 
operations by divestment of some divisions or units. 
Note: AFTER COMPLETION, FLEASE RETURN THIS QUESTIONNAIRE ALONG WITH THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE'S 
QUESTIONNAIRE IN THE ATTACHED SELF-ADDRESSED, STAMPED ENVELOPE. 
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SENIOR EXECUTIVE'S QUESTIONNAIRE 
(To be filled out by a senior executive familiar 
with the firm's overall operations and its over-
all business environment.) 
This questionnaire is being administered to a select sample of firms as a part of our 
research study on corporat~ strategy. The questionnaire is designed to gather information 
about various aspects of your firm and it~ environment. Please answer all the quGstions. 
There are no right or wrong answers. The information supplied by the pa7ticipants would be 
kept in the strictest confidence and used in aggregated form only, hence your anonymity is 
guaranteed. After completion, please return this questionnaire, along with the chief 
executive officer's questionnaire, i.n the attached self-addressed, stamped envelope to 
Mr. K. A. Palia, College of Business Administration, Oklahoma State University 1 Stillwater, 
OK 74074. 
I. FIRM SIZE: What is your firm's annual sales revenue (inclusive of service and rental 
revenues but exclusive of non-operating revenues and excise taxes)? Check One 
l 1 l. 
[ J 2. 
[ 1 3. 
$200 million and less 
$201 millior. to $599 million 
$600 million and over 
II. INDUS'rRY: What is tha J::!'incipal industry (representing the largest percentage of 
your total company sales) in '.Jhich your firm operates? Check only one 
l l l. Consumer nondurabl~ goods industry 
2. Consumer durable goods industry 
3. Capital goods industry {e.g. industrial machinery and equipment) 
l J 4. Pr·oducer goods (r~w materials 1 components and supplies) industry 
III. PRODUCTION SYSTEM: What is the single, most predominant production system used in 
your firm? . Check OI~ly one 
( ) 1. Unit and small batch production systern (e.g. production or fabrication of n. 
single unit or a few units oi products, like prototypes, custom pressings, 
special equiprnents, tools and dies, etc., according to customer specifications). 
( ] 2. Large batch and mass production system (e.g. large batches of drugs, ce.ns and 
bottles, mass production-of automobiles, etc.). 
l ] 3. Continuous process Production system (e.g. oil refining, chemicals, etc.). 
[ l 4. None of tha at.ove (please specHy) 
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IV. CORPORATE DIVERSITY: To what extent is your firm divel"Sified? Check One 
[ ) 1. Single Business: 
95 percent or more of armual sales from one end product business. 
( ) 2. Dominant Business: 
70 to 94 percent of annual sales from one end produCt business. 
[ I 3. Related Business: 
Less than 70 percent of annual sales from one end product business 
and diversification primarily in concentrically related products 
(i.e., similar markets or similar technology). 
[ I 4. Unrelated Business: 
Less than 70 percent of annual sales from one end product business, 
and diversification unrelated to primary end product business (for 
example, a widely diversified multi-industry conglomerate). 
V. PERCEIVED ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTY: This question is designed to elicit from you 
your perception of the environmental conditions faced by your firm as a whole during the 
past 3 years. We are interested in your firm's overall relationships with various sectors 
of the external environment {e.g. suppliers, customers, competitors). Specifically, we 
would like you to rate the characteristics or behavior of various sectors on the degree of 
their predictability, where l = highly predictable and 7 = highly unpredictable. The 
distinctions you make should be as precise as you feel you can make them. 
1. Suppliers of your raw materlal3 and components: 
e. their price changes are ••..••...........•.•... 
b. qualily changes ............................ . 
c. de~ign changes ............ .. 
d. Introduction ol new material5 or component,,. 
2. Competitors' actions: 
1. thefr price changes are .•.••.• 
b. product quality changes ..•..•. 
c. product desi~n changes ..••.•.. 
d. Introduction of new products ..••••••.....•••. 
3. Customers: 
a. their demand lor existing products IS ..•••••••• 
b. demand for new proc.tucts , .................. . 
-4. The ltnanclalfcapital market: 
1. Interest rate changes: 
1. short·term debt .•. _ ...................... . 
2. long-term debt ..........•.............•••• 
b. change~ In financ1allnstruments available: 
1. short-term debt .•.•.•.••...••......••••••• 
2. long-term deot .•.....................••..• 
e. a\lallabllity of credit: 
1. short-term debt .......................... . 
2. tong-term debt •.••••.•...... 
5. Government regulatory agencies: 
a. changes In laws or agency policle3 on pricing 
are....................... . ••••.•.••.....•. 
b. ch~ngcs In laws or policies on product st~n· 
d~rds or quality... . . . . ................... . 
c. changes In laws or policies repardlng financial 
practices.. . .....•...•.•.•.........•..•.•.•• 
d. changes In labor (personnel) laws or policies .. 
1. changes In laws or policies affecting marketing 
and distribution methods .. ,., .............. .. 
f. changes in taw~ or policies on acceptable 
accounting procedures ..................... .. 
e. Actions of labor unions: 
1. changes In wagos, hours, and working condl· 
tlons .•.....•..........•..••....•.•..••••••• 
b. changes In union security ....... , .......... .. 

















VI. RELATIVE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OP KEY RESULT AREAS IN DIFFEREN1' OHGANIZATIONAL 
FUNCTIONS: This question 1s designed to elicit from you your perceptions of relative 
strategic significance, of functionally grouped key result a.reas, to effective implementa-
tion of grdnd corfX)rate strategy currently pursued by your firm. A comprehensive list of 
key result areas {strategic facto-'::.~) grouped into seven functional categories has been 
prepared. Your firm's performance in these different key result areas would determine how 
effectively your firm's grand coq)Qrate strategy would be implemented; however the strategic 
significance of these key result areas would differ. We would li.ke you to evaluate each key 
result area in terms of its strategic significance (to effective implementation of your 
grand corporate strategy) based upon a 7-point rating scale as shown below: 
1 - completely strategically insignificant 
2 - of very little strategic significance 
3 - of somewhat less than average strategic significance 
4 - of avera9e strategic significance 
5 - of somewhat more than average strategic significance 
6 - of very great strategic significance 
7 - of the greatest strategic significance 
A. General Administration: 
(!? Attracting arid retaining well-trained and competent 
top managers. 
/'1) Achieving a better overall control of general corporate 
performance. 
(11 Ability to perceive new business opportunities and 
potential threats. 
~.41. Developing and communicating a corporate identity, 
corporate mission and objectives, a corporate creed 
and a grand corporate strategy a unified sense 
of direction and a sense of common purpose to which 
all members of the organization can relate. 
r''j_j. Ability to unify conflicting opinions, improve 
coordination and enhance effective collaOOration 
between key executives, generate enthusiasm and 
motivate sufficient managerial drive for growth and 
6 ~, 
profits. 
Developing a more effective company-wide strategic 
planning system for planned overall corporate 
development. 
7'~·, l'1aintaining and enhancing the management depth by 
ongoing training and development programs for both 
domestic and overseas operations4 
Increased use of MBO and "responsibility accounting" 
and increased participative decision making at senior 
and middle management levelS. 
9., A more extensive and effective use of quantitative 
techniques in decision making. 
10. More extensive and cost-effective computer systems 
emphasizing richness, timeliness, flexibility and 
accessibility of information for managerial decision 
making. 
B. Production/Ooerations: 
(}J:~ An ongoing plant modernization program to keep the 
efficiency of equipment comparable to that of the 
major competitors. 
12. A good trade-off between expanding capacity and 
increased sub-contracting. 














































VI. RELATIVE STMTEGIC SIGNIFICMICE Of KEY RESULT AREAS •• (continued from page 3) 
1 - completely strategically insignificant 
2 - of very little strategic significance 
3 - of somewhat less than average strategic significance 
4 - of average strategic significance 
- of somewhat more than average strategic significance 
6 - of very great strategic significance 
7 - of the greatest strategic significance 
B. Production/Operations: (continued) 
\!.4: Improved plant layout, workflow and work environment. 
t:~-)· More efficient and reliable multiple-source material 
procurement. 
r6.. f.1ore effective equipment maintenance and replacement 
policies. 
17. Increased computerization and decentralization of 
production control systems for better control of 
quality, cost and time. 
18. Improved mate_rials and inventory control. 
19. Improved industrial engineering capabilities. 
20. Reduced a~r, noise and other pollution and greater com-
pliance with industrial health and safety regulations. 
·c. Engineering and R & 0: 
.,2}.: ..Improvement in research and new product development 
capab~lities. 
22. Value analysis for improving present products and 
developing and using more economical and easily 
available raw material substitutes. 
23. Improved process engineering with an added emphasis 
on energy efficiency. 
24. Better overall management of and increased productivity 
from R & 0 expenditure by matching explicit R & 0 objec-
tives and strategies with present and proposed product-
market domain. 
25. Using multi-disciplinary task forces or project teams 
for effective coordination between R & D, operations and 
marketing (research). 
D. Marketing: 
26. Improved marketing research and information systems. 
27~, Widening the customer base by intensive market 
penetration and development~ 
28 ... Ability to secure large business contracts from 
governments and other large, especially overseas 
• customers. 
29. l-1ore effective use of different pricing strategies. 
30. More novel and effective sales promotion and 
advertising campaigns. 
31. Widening and improving the product distribution 
networks and improving distributor relations. 
32 .. Developing mare efficient and effective product-line 
policy for product additions and deletions. 
33. Maintaining a highly trained, motivated, vigorous and 
















































































VI. RELATIVE S1'RATEGIC SIGNif"ICANCE OF KEY RESUW' AREAS (continued from page 4) 
1 - completely strategically insignificant 
2 - of very little strategic significance 
3 - of somewhat less than average strategic s1gnificance 
4 - of average strategic significance 
5 -· of somewhat more than average strategic .significance 
6 - of very great strategic significance 
7 - of the greatest strategic significance 
E. Fina~: 
~~~34. Improving bond ratings and common stock market 
performance. 
35. Providing a competitive return to shareholders through 
effective dividend policies even under price regulations 
36. Improving financial public relations in general and stock-
holder relations in particular. 1 
37. Lower cost of equity capital and long-term borrowings. 1 
F. 
38. Sound capital structure allowing flexibility to 
raise additional capital for internal growth and 
acquisitions. 
39. Strong wcrking capital position allowing flexibility 
to raise short-term capital at low cost. 
40. Effective tax management. 
41. Ability to manage foreign investment risks of inflation 
and exchange losses. 
42. Effective capital expenditure evaluation procedures 
that would encourage taking risks with commensurate 
returns for new business opportunities in order to 
attain growth objectives. 
43. Extensive application of ROI techniques and periodic 
monitoring of product-cum-market profitability. 
44. Efficient, effective and independent internal ·auditing 
system. 
Personnel: 
i.rs. Effective relations with trade unions. 
4-6. Effective and efficient personnel policies for hiring, 
J training, promotion, compensation and employee services. 
47. Optimizing employee turnover (neither too high nor too 
low), through the corporate image of a model employer. 






Stimulating and rewarding creativity in employees and 
install~ng incentive performance reward systems. 
Effective grievance procedures. 
Stimulating more employees at all levels to continue to 
educate themselves to remain abreast of developments in 
their fields. 
G. Public and Government Relations: 
52. Ability to influence national policy in the industry 
and to maintain effective relationships .,.,,ith relevant 
regulatory bodies. 
53. Better relations with _special interest_ groups such as 
envirorunentnlists, consumerists and others. 
54. Ability to maintain satisfactory relations with local, 
state, federal and foreign governments. 












































































VII. ORGANIZATIONAL S'TRUCTUR£: How \o.!Ould you characterize your firm•s organizational 
structure? Check one 
[ ] 1. Functional: An organization in which the major subunits deal with different 
organizational functions, like production, marketing and finance, 
rather than complete businesses. General management function is 
concentrated at topmost level and coordination and product-market 
perform~1ce are its primary responsibilities. 
[ ] 2. Functional with One or More Product Divisions or Subsidiaries: 
An organization that is basically functional but which also has one 
or more separate product divisions or subsidiaries which report to 
top management (or in some instances to functional managers). The 
distinguishing characteristic of this hybrid form (which is neither 
wholly functional nor truly multi-divisional) is that the general 
managers of the product divisions are organizationally on the same 
level or below the functional managers. 
[ 1 3. Product Division: 
An organization that consists of a central office and a group of 
quasi-autonomous divisions, each having the responsibility and 
reSources needed to engineer, produce and market a product or set 
of products. 
[ ] 4. Geographic Division: 
An organization that consists of a headquarters office and a group 
of operating divisions, each having the responsibility and resources 
needed to engineer, produce and market a product or a set of products 
in a different geographic area. 
[ 1 5. Holding Company: 
An association of firms (or divisions) commonly owned by a parent 
~ration. Each firm is virtually autonomous and formal organiza-
tion aOOve the level of the individual firm is virtually nonexistent. 
Would you please promptly mail this questionnaire and the chief executive officer's 
questionnaire in the attached self-addressed, stamped envelope? Thank you very much! 
Note: The data below is optional. -Confidentiality will be respected even if you give it. 
NAME OF FIRM: 
YOUR NAME & Tn'LE: 
OFFICE ADDRESS: 
[ ] Check here if you wish to receive the main findings of this study. 
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APPENDIX D 
RELEVANT EXCERPTS FROM LETTERS RECEIVED FROM 
FIRMS AND EXECUTIVES WHO DECLINED TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THE SURVEY 
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11 We regret that, because of the number received, time required to 
complete, and frequent requests for confidential information, we have 
to establish a company policy of not responding to any questionnaires. 11 
11 lt is the general policy of ... Corporation not to discuss the 
content of corporate stra.tegy publicly or in such questionnaireS. 11 
11 lt is not the policy of our company to complete questionnaires 
of this nature. 11 
... over a period of years we have encountered a number of 
serious problems in our endeavors to provide such assistance. 
These problems include: 
- Availability of information requested. 
- Time required by key professional people to assemble 
information requested. 
An occasional reaction that our assistance was not exactly 
what the respondent desired in terms of content, format 
and timing. 
In view of the above, ... has adopted a general policy of 
declining to submit the kind of information you requested. 
Because of the volume of correspondence and the concommitant 
time commitments, it has become necessary for us to decline 
participation in research projects of this type. In 
addition, we have found that infor·mation gathered by this 
process later becomes public property at various universities 
and while this might not be the case with you, we have none-
theless opted to refrain ... This declination of participation 
is in no way an evaluation of your project. 
While these questionnaires are, I am sure, an excellent 
method to provide beneficial and functional information to 
utilize both for teaching and the practice of management, 
corporate policy precludes corporation from 
participating. 
Throughout the year, we receive numerous letters from organi-
zations and institutions requesting our help with their 
research projects. Since the amount of staff time it would 
take to answer t~ach survey is far more than we can afford, 
we have made it a general policy to turn down all letters of 
this nature . 
. . . the large number of requests we receive for that type of 
assistance and the amou~t of executive time that would be 
required to complete the studies has made it necessary for. 
to establish a consistent policy of not cooperating in such 
projects. 
We have been rece1v1ng so very many of these recently that we 
have decided, by policy, that we could not take the time to 
do a good job in providing information requested on these 
questionnaires . 
... we have determined, in order to conserve management time, 
we can respond only to those required by government or 
directly related to our business . 
... we have adopted a policy of limiting our responses to 
privately sourced requests to those few originating in 
organizations of which we are members. 
In recent years the volume of questionnaire requests we 
receive has grown to extraordinary proportions. The 
workload in filling them out has become so heavy that we have 
had to adopt a policy of responding only to official question-
naires and surveys . 
... of necessity, we have adopted a general policy of not 
participating in surveys, questionnaires, and related 
studies. 
I am awfully sorry but I just don't have time to fill out 
that form .. I get about eight to ten of these a week, and 
I would do nothing else if I filled them out . 
.. . There is such a priority on executive time that we can 
hardly justify the dilution that would result from 
cooperating with all of the requests we receive ... As an 
alumnus of OSU, I regret that I must refuse your request, 
but I hope you will understand our problem. 
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APPENDIX E 
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES N10NG RATING SCALES AND 
IDENTIFICATION OF t,10DE AND HEAN RATINGS AND 
THEIR RANKINGS FOR KEY RESULT AREAS 




Result Rating Scale Response Area -; N f1 0de r~1ean Mean 
No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 % Rank Rating Rank 
Genera 1 Administration: 
1 2 :2 3 13 34 92 103 41 1 6.06 1 
2 0 6 13 26 82 93 29 37 4 5.33 4 
3 0 4 5 28 93 71 48 37 13 5.47 3 
4 3 9 36 63 65 40 33 26 20 4. 73 18 
5 0 _6 25 32 68 98 20 39 3 5.15 6 
6 1 5 20 50 85 67 21 34 15 5.00 10 
7 1 13 34 56 61 67 17 27 11 4.73 17 
8 0 26 76 53 57 31 6 31 47 4.04 40 
9 9 36 80 59 47 16 2 32 46 3.62 53 
10 7 41 72 53 46 26 4 29 48 3.74 50 
Production/O~erations: 
ll 0 10 28 62 62 58· 29 25 21 4.87 11 
12 17 55 58 57 36 21 5 23 53 3.49 55 
13 2 26 51 50 61 44 15 24 22 4.34 28 
14 5 37 69 69 42 22 5 28 38 3. 77 49 
15 3 39 55 64 53 25 10 26 40 3.96 43 
16 2 46 73 75 29 20 4 30 33 3.64 52 
17 7 23 39 90 58 25 7 36 27 4.09 37 
18 2 13 36 71 68 46 13 29 37 4.53 23 
19 6 49 42 74 40 32 6 30 35 3.86 46 




Result Rating Scale Response Area ~ N Mode Mean Mean 
No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 % Rank Rating Rank 
Engineering and R & D: 
21 s· 8 22 36 61 89 28 36 5 5.08 7 
22 11 38 53 45 69 29 4 28 19 3.91 45 
23 5 22 71 59 52 33 7 29 49 4.04 41 
24 5 17 54 55 46 49 23 22 43 4.44 26 
25 9 38 55 61 38 40 8 24 42 3.94 44 
Narketing: 
26 4 10 48 62 60 53 12 25 41 4. 49 24 
27 6 11 16 36 69 81 30 33 7 5.06 8 
28 45 39 39 45 30 43 8 18 45 3.55 54 
29 8 21 47 76 53 39 5 31 31 4. 13 36 
30 13 33 27 52 56 59 9 24 12 4.28 32 
31 8 20 32 43 56 80 10 32 8 4.60 20 
32 10 41 64 46 49 33 6 26 52 3.83 47 
33 2 5 4 26 43 78 91 37 2 5.82 2 
Finance: 
34 12 12 15 31 65 82 32 33 6 5.00 9 
35 6 12 25 62 82 51 11 33 16 4.60 21 
36 6 12 45 72 78 27 9 31 17 4.29 30 
37 4 18 15 77 75 49 11 31 30 4.57 22 
38 4 3 6 52 69 77 38 31 9 5.26 5 
39 2 7 19 74 68 56 23 30 34 4.84 12 
40 2 32 25 78 48 37 27 31 29 4.43 27 
41 23 34 33 52 42 52 13 21 44 4.06 38 - -
42 1 24 57 43 47 51 26 23 54 4.48 25 
43 2 29 65 42 47 43 21 26 51 4.27 33 
44 3 32 56 45 55 41 17 22 55 4.24 34 
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Key Mode 
Result Rating Scale Response Area .; N Mode t~ean Mean 
No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 % Rank Rating Rank 
Personnel: 
45 18 8 19 56 61 70 17 28 10 4.65 19 
46 5 21 96 49 50 27 39 25 4.79 15 
47 2 20 43 96 56 25 7 39 26 4.15 35 
48 0 2 25 73 73 63 13 29 18 4.84 13 
49 0 4 26 80 65 56 18 32 28 4.79 14 
50 3 24 45 98 57 l3 9 39 24 4.03 42 
51 2 25 69 59 59 24 11 28 50 4.06 39 
Public & Government Relations: 
52 10 29 43 48 57 42 20 23 23 4.28 31 
53 14 34 52 74 48 22 5 30 36 3.78 48 
54 3 22 47 66 59 42 10 27 39 4.29 29 
55 9 26 57 92 46 18 37 14 4. 77 16 
Note: (1) For the description of key result areas and the explanation 
of rating scale see Appendix C. 
(2) Underscored numbers represent the mode response/frequency .. 
APPENDIX F 
COMPARISON OF THE TOP TEN KEY RESULT AREAS RANKED 
BY THEIR MEAN STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE SCORES: 
ANALYSES BY GRAND CORPORATE STRATEGY, SIZE, 
CORPORATE DIVERSITY, INDUSTRY, PRODUCTION 
SYSTEM, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, AND 
PERCEIVED ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTY 
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Notes to Tables included in Appendix F 
(1) For the description of key result areas see Appendix C. 
(2) Legend: GADM = General Administration 
PROD = Production/Operations 
ERD = Engineering and R & D 
MKTG = Marketing 
FIN = Finance 
PERS = Personnel 
PGR = Public & Government Relations 
(3) For a list of the top sixteen key result areas and their mean 
strategic significance scores for all 249 firms see Table XXVIII. 
Unless otherwise stated, the Key Result Areas shown in different 
tabulations in this Appendix are included in Table XXVIII. 
TABLE XXX 
COMPARISON OF THE TOP TEN KEY RESULT AREAS RANKED BY THEIR MEAN STRATEGIC 
SIGNIFICANCE SCORES: ANALYSIS BY GRAND CORPORATE STRATEGY 
Stability Internal Growth External Acquisitive Retrenchment 
(N=29} ( N = 1 04} ·Growth (N = 96) (N=20) 
Rank KRA No. Mean KRA No. Mean KRA No. Mean KRA No. 
GADMl 6. l 0 GADMl 6.12 GADMl 6. l 0 MKTG33 
2 PRODll 5.76 GADM3 5.71 FIN34 5.61 FIN34 
3 GAD~12 5.55 MKTG33 5.63 GADM3 5.35 GADMl 
4 MKTG33 5.48 FIN38 5.55 MKTG27 5.35 GADM2 
5 GADr13 5.48 FIN42* 5.40 GADM2 5.34 t~KTG27 
6 FIN38 5.41 PERS48 5.39 GADM5 5.34 PGR55 
7 GADM5 5.31 PERS46 5.36 MKTG31* 5.20 MKTG30* 
8 MKTG27 5.24 ERD21 5.34 GADM6 5. 17 PERS45* 
9 PROD13* 5.21 PERS49 5.30 FIN38 5.08 PRODll 
10 PERS46 5.17 GADM5 5.22 ERD21 5.03 MKTG3l* 
*Not included in the top sixteen KRAs for all 249 firms, the overall ranks: PROD13(38), FIN42(25), 























· TABLE XXXI 
COMPARISON OF THE TOP TEN KEY .RESULT AREAS RANKED BY THEIR MEAN STRATEGIC 
SIGNIFICANCE SCORES: ANALYSIS BY FIRM SIZE 
Small Medium Large 
{N = 60} {N = 84} (N = 105) 
KRA No. Mean KRA No. Mean KRA No. 
GADMl 5.90 GADMl 6.01 GADMl 
MKTG33 5.88 MKTG33 5.75 MKTG33 
GADM2 5.43 GADM3 5.46 GADM3 
GADM3 5.23 GADM2 5.36 FIN38 
FIN38 5. 12 GADM5 5.23 ERD2l 
MKTG27 5.08 FIN38 5. 15 GAD~15 
FIN39 5.05 FIN34 5. 13 GADM2 
GADt·16 4.97 MKTG27 5.08 GADt16 
FIN37* 4.93 ERD21 5.02 FIN34 
PERS48. 4.87 GADM6 4.90 MKTG27 























COMPARISON OF THE TOP TEN KEY RESULT AREAS RANKED BY THEIR MEAN STRATEGIC 
SIGNIFICANCE SCORES: ANALYSIS BY CORPORATE DIVERSITY 
Single Business , - Dominant Business Related Business Unrelated Business 
Firms (N=28) Firms (N = 55) Firms ( N = 116) Firms ( N = 50) 
KRA No. Mean KRA No. Mean KRA No. Mean KRA. No. i .. 1ean 
MKTG33 5.75 GADMl 5.91 GADMl 6.17 GADMl 6. 18 
GADMl 5. 71 MKTG33 5.89 t~KTG33 5.80 MKTG33 5.80 
GADM2 5.57 GADM2 5.29 GADr,13 5.60 GADf~3 5.66 
GADM3 5.36 GADM5 5.20 FIN38 5.35 FIN38 5.48 
PERS48 5.14 MKTG27 5. 12 GADM2 5.29 GADM2 5.30 
GADM5 5. 11 GADM3 5.07 ERD21 5.19 ERD2l 5.24 
FIN38 5.07 ERD21 5.05 GADM5 5.12 GADM5 5.20 
GADr16 5.07 FIN38 4.95 MKTG27 5.09 GADM6 5. 12 
PGR55 5.07 FIN34 4.93 FIN34 5.07 FIN34 5.02 















TABLE .XXXII I 
COMPARISON OF THE TOP TEN KEY RESULT AREAS RANKED BY THEIR MEAN STRATEGIC 
SIGNIFICANCE SCORES: ANALYSIS BY INDUSTRY 
Consumer Nondurable Consumer Durable Capital Goods Producer Goods 
Goods (N = 73) Goods (N = 34) {N=61} { N = 81 } 
KRA No. Mean KRA No. Mean KRA No. Mean KRA No. 
GADMl 5.97 GADMl 5.85 GADMl 6.21 GADMl 
MKTG33 5.81 MKTG33 5.76 MKTG33 6. 15 MKTG33 
GADM3 5.47 MKTG27 5.59 GADM3 5.67 GADM3 
FIN38 5.27 ERD21 5.47 GADt12 5.56 FIN38 
GADM2 5.23 · GADM3 5.24 GADM5 5.28 GAm~2 
MKTG27 5.15 GADM2 5. 24 ERD21 5.26 GADM5 
GADM5 5.01 FIN34 5.24 FIN34 5.26 GADM4* 
FIN39 5.01 FIN38 5.18 GADM6 5.16 GADM6 
FIN34 5.00 MKTG31* 5.00 FIN38 5.13 PRODll 
ERD21 4.99 GADM5 4.94 MKTG27 5. l3 PERS49 













COMPARISON OF THE TOP TEN KEY RESULT AREAS RANKED BY THEIR MEAN STRATEGIC 
SIGNIFICANCE SCORES: ANALYSIS BY PRODUCTION SYSTEM 
Unit & Small Large Batch & Continuous Process 
Batch {N=41} ~1ass { N= 138) (N=70) 
Rank KRA No. Mean KRA No. Mean KRA No. Mean 
MKTG33 5.85 GADM 1 6.20 GADM 1 5.97 
2 GADM 1 5.78 MKTG33 5.90 MKTG33 5.63 
3 GADr~. 3 5.46 GADM 3 5.62 GADM 2 5.26 
4 GADM 2 5.29 GADM 2 5.37 GADM 3 5. 19 
5 ERD 21 5.27 FIN 38 5.36 GADM 5 5.17 
6 FIN 38 5.22 ERD 21 5.27 r=I N 38 5.07 
7 GADM 6 5.15 MKTG27 5.26 FIN 34 4.91 
8 PRODll 5. 10 GADM 5 5.21 GADM 6 4.89 
9 MKTG27 5.00 FIN 34 5.11 PRODll 4. 76 
10 GADM 5 4.93 GADM 6 5. 01 PERS45* 4. 74 





COMPARISON OF THE TOP TEN KEY RESULT AREAS RANKED BY THEIR MEAN STRATEGIC 
SIGNIFICANCE SCORES: ANALYSIS BY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Functional Type II** Product Division Geographic Holding Company 
(N = 28) (N-= 57} (N = 111} Division{N=32) {N =21) 
Rank KRA No. Mean KRA No. Mean KRA No. Mean KRA No. Mean KRA No. Mean 
MKTG33 5. 71 GADM 1 5.98 GADM 1 6.13 GADM 1 6.19 GADM 1 6.43 
2 GADM 2 5.61 MKTG33 5.72 MKTG33 5. 77 MKTG33 5.94 MKTG33 6.29 
3 GADM 1 5.57 GADM 3 5.42 GADM 3 5.62 GADM 2 5.53 GADM 2 5.67 
4 GADM 3 5.25 GADM 2 5.37 FIN 38 5.59 GADM 3 5.38 FIN 34 5.48 
5 GADM 5 4.96 FIN 38 5.18 ERD 21 5. 31 f~KTG27 5.38 MKTG27 5.33 
6 PGR 55 · 4.96 r4KTG27 5. 11 GADr4 5 5.23 GADM 5 5.34 GADM 5 5.29 
7 PERS45* 4.96 GADM 6 5.09 . GADM 2 5.11 PGR 55 5.22 GADM 3 5.24 
8 PRODll 4.93 ERD 21 4.98 GADM 6 5.05 ERD 21 5. 16 PGR 55 5. 14 
9 PERS48 4.93 PRODll 4.96 FIN 34 5.00 FIN 38 5.13 GADM 4* 5. 10 
10 MKTG27 4.82 GADM 5 4.93 MKTG27 4.96 FIN 34 5.13 GADM 6 5.00 
*Not included in the top sixteen KRAs for all 249 firms, the overall ranks: PERS45(19) and GADt44 ( 18) . 
















COMPARISON OF THE TOP TEN KEY RESULT AREAS RANKED BY THEIR MEAN 
STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE SCORES: ANALYSIS BY PERCEIVED 
ENVIRONMENTAL UNCERTAINTY 
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty 
Low (N==194) High (N=55) 
KRA No. Mean Rank KRA No. 
MKTG33 6.22 1 GADM 1 
GADM 1 6.11 2 MKTG33 
GADM 3 5.51 3 GADM 3 
MKTG27 5.40 4 GADM 2 
ERD 21 5.38 5 FIN 38 
GADM 2 5.36 6 GADM 5 
GADM 5 5.31 7 ERD 21 
FIN 38 5.22 8 MKTG27 
FIN 34 5.13 9 FIN 34 
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Commerce & Economics, University of Bombay, 1969-71 and 
received Master of Commerce degree in Cost Accounting in 
April, 1973; attended Extension Programs in Management 
Studies, University of Bombay, 1971-72 and received Diploma 
in Managerial Accounting in June, 1973; passed Intermediate 
and Final examinations of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of India in May, 1968 and November, 1969, 
respectively; passed Intermediate and Final examinations of 
the Institute of Cost and Works Accountants of India in 
January, 1970 and January, 1973, respectively; completed 
the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree at 
Oklahoma State University in July, 1979 .. 
Professional Experience: Three years' full-time 11 articled 11 train-
ing in Accounting, Auditing, Investigation and Taxation under 
the Chartered Accountants Regulations in a well-known firm 
of chartered accountants in Bombay, 1966-69; five years of 
industrial experience as an accounting and finance executive 
(currently on a leave of absence for doctoral studies in 
Business Administration in the U.S.A.) in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. 
Co. Private Ltd., a Bombay-based, large, broadly diversified, 
multi-industry manufacturer of branded consumer and capital 
goods with operations in India and S.E. Asia, 1970-74; two 
and a half years of university teaching experience as a 
Graduate Teaching Associate (in Management and Business 
Policy), College of Business Administration, Oklahoma State 
University, 1977-79. 
Professional Organizations: Member of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of India, the Institute of Cost & Works Accountants 
of India, and the Academy of International Business. 
